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 This study aims to explore the impact of college quality on early labor market outcomes in 
China, including the fresh college graduates’ initial employment status and starting wages for 
students who graduated in 2011. The main data source is the College Student Labor Market 
(CSLM) survey conducted by Tsinghua University. 
 Distinguished from previous Chinese studies that merely utilized the broad and abstract 
college quality categories to measure college quality in China, input-based school resource 
indicators, including faculty-student ratio, proportion of faculty members holding doctoral 
degrees, average freshman National College Entrance Examination (NCEE) score, and teaching 
expenditure per student are collected to measure college quality in China for the first time.  
 To identify the causal effect of college quality, the instrumental variable approach and the 
propensity score matching method are employed to account for the endogeneity of elite college 
attendance in addition to the traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. To explore the 
heterogeneous effect of college quality varying by student and family background characteristics, 
a series of interaction terms are generated in the OLS regressions. The quantile regressions are 
employed to explore the effect of college quality varying by earning distribution. Moreover, the 
Heckman correction approach is used to test for potential sample selection bias. 




statistically significant effect on the initial employment status and starting salaries for fresh 
college graduates who intend to work after college graduation. I find weak support for the 
existence of heterogeneous effect of college quality. Less-capable students tend to benefit more 
from attending elite colleges. However, the impact of college quality does not seem to vary by 
graduates’ earning distribution. When using the input-based college quality measures, the results 
suggest that the quality gap does exist between elite and non-elite colleges in China and the 
major finding that there is a positive impact of college quality on the starting salary still holds. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1 Context and Motivation 
 In 2011, the number of newly admitted undergraduates and the number of undergraduate 
graduates reached new highs of about 3.57 and 2.8 million, respectively, in China.
1
 According to 
the Ministry of Education (MOE), the enrollment rate for students taking the National College 
Entrance Examination (NCEE) was 75% in 2012. As the majority of today’s senior high school 
graduates manage to enter colleges
2
 in China, parents and students are more interested in where 
to attend a college rather than whether to go to a college.  

































































    
Note: Data are collected from the official website of the Ministry of Education in China. The scale on the left 
of the y-axis corresponds to the unit in person, while the scale on the right of the y-axis corresponds to the 
number of higher educational institutions. 
 
 Massive pursuit of higher education has been achieved by the unprecedented higher 
education expansion in China since 1999. Although the expansion began in an attempt to 
alleviate the economic crisis domestically after the Asian financial crisis, it became the fastest 
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expansion in human history (Levin, 2010). Figure 1-1 shows the scale and speed of higher 
education expansion from 1997 to 2011 for higher educational institutions (HEIs) that confer 
bachelor’s degrees. The number of HEIs that provide bachelor’s degree programs in China 
almost doubled, from 591 in 1998 to 1129 in 2011. Meanwhile, the government ordered 
continuous dramatic jumps in the number of undergraduate college admissions and new 
graduates year by year, with a temporary slowdown in 2002. The annual undergraduate 
enrollments and graduates both leaped by five times from 1998 to 2011. For example, in 2011, 
about 2.8 million fresh college graduates with bachelor’s degree were seeking jobs, which is an 
astonishing figure. During the same period, the number of full-time teaching faculty members 
also increased year by year, but the speed of the faculty increase could not keep up with the 
speed of student increase. We can see the gap between these two lines representing the number of 
students and the number of teachers grew wider over time. 
 In the context of Chinese higher education expansion, it is important to study the effect of 
college quality for students, colleges, and the government. 
 For students and parents, the expansion policy makes post-secondary education generally 
more accessible, whereas the number of students admitted into selective colleges and universities 
has increased much less due to their limited capacity. Expansion also creates a larger supply of 
new college graduates each year and exacerbates the severe unemployment problem that has 
been the major and persistent challenge right after the expansion since 1999 (Whalley & Xing, 
2012). The number of fresh college graduates has reached its peak in recent years. For example, 
2013 is the so-called “hardest job-hunting season in history” since the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China, with 6.99 million seniors who have graduated from institutions of 





accommodate such a huge sudden supply of fresh graduates year after year, and many graduates 
may go unemployed or underpaid. The severity and prevalence of college graduates’ 
unemployment dilemma and low initial pay have drawn much attention from society, especially 
when the number of recent college graduates has risen and jobs have failed to keep up in the 
economic downturn recently. Making the right school choice in terms of college quality by 
weighing both the benefits and costs is essential to students and parents to secure and enhance 
the returns of college investment.  
 For HEIs, the high unemployment rate and low average starting salary level raise concerns 
about institutional ineffectiveness and inefficiency. Challenges also arise to balance the quality 
and quantity in higher education development within a further diversified Chinese higher 
education sector. On the one hand, a large number of newly built and merged universities have 
emerged. They compete with the long-established colleges for personnel and capital inputs. On 
the other hand, the allocation of scarce resources to accommodate the extraordinarily large 
number of students who would be otherwise unable to accept higher education in the short term 
is made at the sacrifice of college quality. In other words, as the quality divergence between 
colleges becomes wider, many researchers are concerned that the expansion at such a rapid rate 
dilutes the education quality both within and among the colleges. 
 With the realization of these opportunities and challenges, the Chinese government launched 
a series of projects such as Project 985 and Project 211 aiming to enhance college quality and 
even to catch up with world-class universities more than a decade ago. HEIs in both Project 985 
and Project 211 are well acknowledged as the top-quality colleges or elite colleges not only 
because, due to the extra investments they enjoy, these colleges tend to have many resources: 





qualified and talented academic faculty, enjoy renovated and better equipped laboratories and 
facilities, and offer other aspects that are associated with quality upgrade. For example, 
according to a People’s Daily news report, Chinese government has appropriated 71.725 billion 
RMB (approximately 10 billion U.S. dollars) to implement Project 985 and Project 211 until 
2011.
3
 Given the huge governmental and collegiate investments in college quality enhancement 
projects, there is an urgent need to understand whether and how college quality affects student 
labor market outcomes and how to allocate resources more efficiently to improve the 
cost-effectiveness of government policies in financing higher education. 
1.2 Statement of Problem 
 While many studies attempt to evaluate the effect of college quality on future earnings in the 
United States (U.S.), the magnitude of the effect varies from moderately positive, slightly 
positive to null or even negative. No consensus has been reached on the sign and magnitude of 
the effect. Previous U.S. literature did not figure out what is functioning inside the black box of 
college quality and its possible channels and mechanisms to affect future earnings (Pascarella & 
Terenzini, 2005). 
 Although the influence of college quality has been well documented in developed countries 
such as the United States, we have limited knowledge about the return to college quality in 
developing countries such as China, not to mention the return to college quality in some unusual 
circumstances, such as under the continuous large expansion period. Anecdotal observations and 
economic theories suggest that the payoff is higher for elite college students than for non-elite 
college students. Still, there have been surprisingly few empirical studies with rigorous 
econometric analyses on the payoff of attending an elite college in China.  
                                                 
3






 Furthermore, previous Chinese research also has not determined whether the wage premium 
for high-quality colleges is due to institutional characteristics or to students’ unobservable 
characteristics as a result of the deficiencies in methodology, data, and measurements employed. 
Therefore, no causality can be drawn about the relationship between college quality and student 
labor market outcomes.  
 Distinct from other Chinese studies, this study proposes to employ multiple measures of 
college quality, multiple quasi-experimental methods, and the most recent Chinese data to 
ascertain the relationship between college quality and early labor market outcomes such as 
college graduates’ starting salary as well as the initial employment status. The study will further 
explore the potential heterogeneous effects rather than making inferences merely on the average 
effect alone. 
1.3 Key Research Questions 
 Given the context of the problem, the key research question for this dissertation is “Does 
college quality affect the starting salary of fresh college graduates in China?” This major 
research question can be split into five sub-questions: 
1. Does college quality affect the initial employment status of fresh college graduates in China? 
2. Does college quality affect the starting salary of fresh college graduates in China?  
3. Does the effect of college quality vary by student individual characteristics, such as gender, 
ethnicity, family background and student ability? 
4. Does the effect of college quality vary by fresh college graduates’ earning distribution? 





1.4 Overview of Higher Education in China 
 Historically and until the late Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) in China, advanced education was 
the privilege of the elite few with the sole purpose of screening and selecting the government 
officials. After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Soviet model was 
strictly followed to restructure higher education, which meant the HEIs were owned and 
administered by the government and open to a small, elite group. The system of a unified 
National College Entrance Examination (NCEE) was established in 1952, but it was halted from 
1966 when the Cultural Revolution began. Before the NCEE was resumed in 1977 after the fall 
of the “Gang of Four”, the student selection was based on political virtues. After 1977, the arts 
and sciences were taught at general and comprehensive universities, whereas specialized 
disciplines (agriculture, engineering, political science, etc.) and vocational training (teaching 
training) were taught in specialized institutions. It was highly competitive to gain access to 
higher education, and the colleges and universities were primarily responsible for finding job 
assignments for their graduates until the mid-1990s. The bachelor’s degree is granted by 
universities, specialized institutions, and some vocational universities upon the completion of 
four-year studies. Graduates with bachelor’s degrees can pursue master’s and doctorate degrees 
in graduate schools through entrance examinations.
4
 The large scale of higher education 
expansion began in 1999, which marks the transition of elite higher education to mass higher 
education in China. Jobs are no longer assigned, and graduates make great efforts to find jobs 
(Altbach & Umakoshi, 2004; Huang, 2005). 
 Now, admission to all formal higher education (bachelor’s degree programs) requires 
graduation from a senior high school and a passing grade on the annual NCEE. The NCEE is 
administered by provincial authorities throughout the country in June every year and covers three 







compulsory subjects (Chinese, mathematics and one foreign language) and several optional 
subjects (chosen from among physics, chemistry, biology, politics, history, and geography). The 
selection of subjects in the NCEE depends on the academic track taken in senior high school. For 
example, science track students in senior high schools take physics, chemistry, and biology as 
their specialties in the NCEE. The admission is to match students with both colleges and majors. 
Taking the NCEE is the first stage and the second stage is to match students with colleges based 
on the students’ reported preferred college and major fields of study listed on the preference 
form(Davey, De Lian, & Higgins, 2007). A typical preference form categorizes colleges that 
confer bachelor’s degrees into four tiers (early enrollment colleges, first-tier colleges, second-tier 
colleges and third-tier colleges). The higher-tiered colleges are given higher priority during 
admission. Students first fill in the name of the college in each tier and list majors in order of 
preference prior to or after the NCEE score is released. Their preferences are honored in the 
admission procedure if they meet the college admission threshold score and the admission quota 
has not been filled. Given the limited seats available in high-quality institutions, students may 
fail to be admitted to their preferred elite colleges even if their scores are higher than the 
minimum admission requirement score when there are more competitors than the quota allows. 
Since the second-tier colleges also give priorities to students who list their colleges as top 
choices, it may occur that if students were not admitted by their first-choice universities, they 
will end up in the second or lower-tier of colleges. Each student is granted at most one college 
offer. Not accepting means not going to any college in that year (Hongbin Li, Meng, Shi, & Wu, 
2012a).  
 The higher education sector in China is highly diversified and there are many ways to 





were regular colleges and universities and 287 out of them are independent colleges.
5
 
Independent colleges are developed by private education providers and affiliated with 
degree-awarding HEIs. They also confer bachelor’s degrees. According to their specialist subject 
in the China Statistical Yearbook 2004, HEIs can be classified into 13 categories: comprehensive 
institutions, science and engineering institutions, agriculture institutions, forestry institutions, 
medicine institutions, teacher training institutions, linguistics and literacy institutions, economics 
and finance institutions, politics and law institutions, physical education institutions, arts 
institutions, ethnic nationality institutions and short-cycle vocational colleges that confer 
associate’s degrees.  
 China’s higher education can also be classified by region. Figure 1-2 graphs the number of 
HEIs and GDP per capita in each province. Chinese higher education institutions are not equally 
distributed in different areas. Four municipalities even have a comparable number of institutions 
to some provinces. Western provinces tend to have a smaller number of universities. We can also 
notice that the numbers of institutions are close between the eastern and central provinces. 
However, the western and northeastern regions tend to have lower numbers. Regional economic 
development can be an important influential factor for explaining institutions’ numbers, although 
it is not the only factor. China’s economic development is highly unbalanced. Regions with 
higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita generally have a greater number of institutions 
since GDP is an indicator of economic development level, but the number of institutions does not 
increase proportionally with the increase in GDP.  
























































Data Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2011. 
Notes: 1. Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing are four municipalities in China reporting directly to the 
central government the same way that provinces do in China’s administrative structure. 
      2. Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Tibet, Ningxia, and Xinjiang are five autonomous regions in China. They 
enjoy more autonomous power than the provinces. 
      3. The rest are 22 provinces. Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan are not included. 
 At present, colleges and universities in China are administered through an education 
provision system at two levels: the central government and provincial/local governments. The 
former is responsible for the overall planning and management and still directly administers 111 
national-level universities that are under the jurisdiction of central-line ministries such as the 
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Agriculture. Many of them were the so-called “key 
universities” that referred to universities recognized as prestigious and received a high level of 
support from the central government in the 1960s.
6
 The provincial governments are mainly 
responsible for the provincial universities and colleges. Greater autonomy is granted to the HEIs, 
with various forms of joint establishment and cooperation with the government and the society. 
 With regard to the higher education financing system, the old funding system that was 
entirely dependent on the governments has gradually shifted to a new system that is capable of 
pooling resources and raising funds from diverse channels in addition to financial provision from 
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the government (Zhu & Lou, 2011). Although there is still substantial bureaucratic control and 
involvement, China welcomes private and foreign investment and has opened up its private 
sector. Table 1-1 reflects this change in financing regular HEIs in selected years. In 1996, the 
majority of the funds came from the governments with most of them in public expenditure on 
education. From 1996 to 2011, this amount of government funds increased rapidly while the 
percentage of government funds decreased steadily, from 81% to nearly half of the total funds, 
though it is still the major funding source. The share of total funding that grows most is the 
tuition and miscellaneous fee, which means applicants should pay for their seats in universities 
and the burden of funding higher education was shifted to students and their parents partially. In 
addition, schools raise funds from soliciting contributions and from the society, but the 
percentage is quite low. 
Table 1-1 Educational Funds in Regular Institutions of Higher Education in China for 
Years 1996, 2002, 2007, 2011 (10,000 RMB) 
                  
            Income     
Year           from     
  Total Government Public Funds from Donations Teaching Tuition Other 
    Appropriation Expenditure Investors and Research and Educational 
    for on of Fund-raising and Other Miscel- Funds 
    Education Education Private for Running Auxiliary laneous   
        Schools Schools Activity Fees   
1996 3267929 2625524 2299718 5667 36961 N/A 446237 153539 
% 1 0.80  0.70  0.0017  0.01  N/A 0.14  0.05  
2002 14878590 7521463 7243459 331363 278253 N/A 3906526 2840985 
% 1 0.51 0.49 0.02 0.02 N/A 0.26 0.19 
2007 36341851 15983187 15543042 318788 271809 16987027 12231914 2781040 
% 1 0.44 0.43 0.01 0.01 0.47 0.34 0.08 
2011 68802316 40234989 37632641 332915 431870 24007176 18121026 3795366 
% 1 0.58  0.55  0.005  0.01  0.35  0.26  0.06  
Data Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1997-2013. 





1.5 Structure of Dissertation 
 The remaining part of this dissertation is organized as follows: In chapter two, the theory, 
literature on the empirical evidence concerning the effect of college quality on student labor 
market outcomes and methodologies used in previous studies will be reviewed and synthesized. 
In chapter three, the key research questions, conceptual framework, methodological designs and 
data processing procedure are presented. In chapter four, the descriptive statistics and the 
correlation matrix for covariates are reported. The summary statistics for college quality and 
early labor market outcomes are displayed, and the student profiles in elite and non-elite colleges 
are compared using t-tests. In chapter five, empirical results and findings are shown for each 
research question in the order of the identification strategy used to reach the findings and 
conclusions. Chapter six ends with a discussion of conclusions and political implications of this 
dissertation. It also points out the drawbacks of this study and directs the potential way for 
improvement and extension in the future. References and appendices are provided at the end of 
this dissertation. 
1.6 Definition of Key Terms 
 The end part of this chapter introduces the definition of some key terms and concepts in this 
dissertation. 
(1) College Quality 
 College quality measures are not consistent in previous studies. Generally, three common 
approaches are taken to measure quality in undergraduate education in existing empirical studies: 
(1) Reputational approach: The reputational approach defines quality solely based on a college’s 
rank or prestige in the order relative to other institutions. Such ranking is largely based on 





Gourman ratings and the Coleman prestige ranking used in early U.S. studies. This approach is 
abandoned in later literature due to numerous criticisms of its reliability (Brooks, 2005). (2) 
Categorical approach: The categorical approach is meant to define quality in terms of relative 
quality categories or rankings based on objective college resource measures (e.g., U.S. Barron’s 
ratings, Astin’s selectivity index, Carnegie category). (3) Resource approach: The resource 
approach specifies and assesses quality in terms of absolute and objective college resources 
usually measured by college inputs. Input resource measures can be further divided into several 
categories such as monetary resources (e.g., expenditure per student) and personnel resources 
(e.g., average student college entrance test score, teacher-student ratio, the average faculty salary, 
etc). The latter two approaches are commonly used in current literature. Recent studies have 
shown that college quality is associated with student earnings to some extent, depending on 
which measure of college quality is chosen. 
 In my dissertation, I use more than one approach to measure college quality. First, I divide 
Chinese undergraduate colleges into four quality categories (Project 985 colleges, Project 211 
colleges, non-key colleges, and independent colleges) according to whether they enjoy the extra 
investment by the central government for quality upgrade. The colleges in projects 985 and 211 
are further defined as elite universities whereas non-key colleges and independent colleges 
belong to the non-elite college group. Second, four college input-based resource indicators are 
used as college equality measures—namely, faculty-student ratio, proportion of faculty members 
with a doctoral degree, student selectivity, and expenditure per student for a subsample of 
institutions with needed data. Third, college quality composite indexes are constructed using the 
above input indicators to form a more comprehensive measure of overall quality and to reduce 





research on college quality in China before. 
(2) Project 985 
 Project 985 is a governmental constructive project to found world-class universities. It was 
announced on May 4, 1998, by former President Jiang Zemin, who declared that “China must 
have a number of first-class universities of international advanced level to realize 
modernizations” (thus, named after the date of the announcement date). In the initial phase, nine 
universities were chosen, referred to as the Chinese equivalent of the US Ivy League. In the 
second phase, from 2004 until now, Project 985 was expanded to 39 universities.
7
 It was 
announced in 2011 that the project has closed its door to additional universities.
8
 
(3) Project 211 
 Project 211 is the Chinese government’s endeavor to strengthen about 100 HEIs and key 
disciplinary areas as a national priority for the twenty-first century, which was initiated in 1995 
by the Ministry of Education. The figures of 21 and 1 in the name are from the abbreviation of 
the twenty-first century and approximately 100 universities, respectively.
9
 There is an overlap 
between the 985 and 211 projects. All institutions in Project 985 are also in Project 211(with a 
total number of 112)
10
, but the reverse is not true. All Project 985 colleges also receive Project 
211 funding, but funding from Project 985 is much higher than that of Project 211. Compared to 
local universities and colleges, which are mainly funded and sponsored by local governments, 
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the colleges within projects 985 and 211 draw a large portion of their funding from the central 
government. 
(4) NCEE Score 
 NCEE is the abbreviation for the national college entrance examination, an academic 
examination held annually in China as the prerequisite for college entrance and sorting. The term 
“NCEE score” in this dissertation refers to the total score of three main subjects in the national 
college entrance examination in China, including Chinese, mathematics and a foreign language 
(e.g., English). It is used as a proxy for student cognitive ability. Extra credits for eligible 
students are not taken into account in this study. Because the scales of total NCEE score vary 
across the provinces, the NCEE score is rescaled to a range of 0 to 100. 
(5) Initial Employment Status 
 Initial employment status relates to the employment status of a student at the time when he 
or she took the survey in May or June of the year of graduation. If the senior student with the 
intention to work after graduation successfully obtains at least one job offer in the 
college-to-work transition, the student is said to be employed; otherwise, the student is said to be 
unemployed. 
(6) Starting Wage 
 Starting wage refers to the monthly wage that is paid to the college graduate new to a 
position in his or her initial accepted job offer, either contracted or non-contracted. Starting wage 
is generally lower than the mid-career salary level and is paid to the college graduates with 
virtually no previous formal work experiences. They are in the “starting” versus the “mid-career” 






Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 The literature review chapter is organized in five sections. The first section reviews the 
human capital theory that explains the economic returns to college quality. The second and third 
sections review and synthesize the empirical evidence on effect of college quality on labor 
market outcomes from both the United States and China. The fourth section summarizes and 
critiques the methods used to reach the conclusions and findings in existing research. The last 
section concludes main findings and knowledge gaps identified in previous review sections. 
2.1 Theory 
 Defined by Goode (1959), “human capital” refers to knowledge, skills, attitudes, aptitudes, 
and other acquired traits that enhance the productive capacity of individuals. The human capital 
theory was pioneered and reinforced by the works of Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker. Before 
the human capital theory appeared, assets of money and physical equipment were the only two 
acknowledged factors of production. Schultz (1961) added the third factor of production, 
workforce or human capital, into the production process, and it helps explain a nation’s economic 
growth. It was also pointed out that the expenditures on human capital should be classified as 
investment rather than consumption. Becker (1964) extended the concept of individual human 
capital investment into the area of microeconomics and attempted to explain the differences in 
individual earnings of workers. According to Becker, human capital accumulation takes the 
major forms of either formal schooling (i.e., when the individual devotes his or her whole time to 
education) or on-the-job training (i.e., post-school training in the workplace). Education is an 
important investment of time, expenditure and forgone earnings for a higher rate of return in later 
periods. Through education, the workforce’s productivity is raised by obtaining higher human 





schools. Workers with higher productivity due to human capital accumulation will be rewarded 
in a competitive labor with higher wages. Based on the previous theoretical framework and 
empirical arguments, Mincer (1974) modeled the natural logarithm of earnings associated with S 
years of schooling ( lnYs ) as a function of the earning with 0 years of education ( 0lnY ), years of 
schooling ( S ), labor market experience ( E ) and an error term ( U ) as follows: 
2
0 1 2ln ln +UsY Y rS E E                                             (2.1)   
  
 In the above classic Mincerian equation, the focus is on estimating the rate of return to 
investment in education ( r ), which is the most common human capital investment. Education is 
usually measured by the education quantity as in years of schooling in the equation and does not 
take education quality into account.
11
  
 Many studies have estimated the internal rate of return to education quantity. They suggest 
that people with additional years of formal schooling earn more, and people with college degree 
gain higher returns than their high school counterparts (Angrist & Krueger, 1999; 
Psacharopoulos, 1994). In fact, current literature relies heavily on human capital theory to 
explain the impact of college quality on future earnings. The reason is that the human capital 
accumulation process is different at HEIs. Students in higher-quality institutions tend to have a 
higher acquisition rate of academic knowledge, skills, and work-related experiences as well as 
traits through many channels such as the peer effect, curricular design, student-teacher 
interaction, administrative staff support, school climate and culture (both academic and social), 
and so on. Thus, students at elite colleges possess more human capital stock, which will later be 
rewarded in the labor market reflected by wage premium and lower probability of unemployment 
right after graduation. 
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2.2 Empirical Evidence of the Effect of College Quality in the United States 
 College quality may have profound effects on a number of outcomes, monetary and 
non-monetary. In addition to the immediate initial labor market success, previous U.S. studies 
also explored other intermediate or long-term pecuniary returns to college quality, such as the 
wage growth (Thomas & Zhang, 2005), and many types of non-pecuniary outcomes, of which 
we have limited prior knowledge, such as college graduates’ graduate school enrollment behavior 
(Eide, Brewer, & Ehrenberg, 1998; L. Zhang, 2005a), overeducation (Robst, 1995), job 
satisfaction (X. Liu, Thomas, & Zhang, 2010) and even external returns such as health outcomes 
(Fletcher & Frisvold, 2011). Nevertheless, labor economists and education researchers are 
particularly interested in economic effects, and I will only focus within the scope of literature 
reporting economic effects of college quality. 
 Numerous early research studies on the economic effect of college quality have documented 
the association between college quality and future incomes since the later 1960s, (Brewer & 
Ehrenberg, 1996; Fox, 1993; Griffin & Alexander, 1978; Karabel & Astin, 1975; Kingston & 
Smart, 1990; Loury & Garman, 1995; Monks, 2000; Morgan & Duncan, 1979; Reed & Miller, 
1970; Solomon, 1973, 1975; Solomon & Wachtel, 1975; Trusheim & Crouse, 1981; Wachtel, 
1976; Wales, 1973; Weisbrod & Karpoff, 1968; Wise, 1975), and they were summarized and 
commented on by Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) and Zhang (2005). Overall, most early studies 
in the United States suggested that college quality had a small positive and statistically 
significant effect on earnings. This conclusion was usually achieved by employing the 
conventional ordinary least squares regression (OLS) (e.g., Weisbrod & Karpoff, 1968; Wales, 
1973; Solmon & Wachtel, 1973), and this finding was confirmed by studies that used the 
recursive structural equation model to decompose the direct and indirect effect of college quality 





1989; Loury & Garman, 1995; Mueller, 1988; Smart, 1988).  
 However, the existence of correlation does not guarantee causality, because the college 
quality variable is potentially endogenous and the OLS estimate is biased and inconsistent in this 
case. A renaissance began with a new round of works that tried to correct for the endogeneity 
problem with econometric advances (Black & Smith, 2004; Brand & Halaby, 2006; Brewer, Eide, 
& Ehrenberg, 1999; Dale & Krueger, 2002, 2011; Hoekstra, 2009; Long, 2008; Monks, 2000). 
These recent studies that address the endogeneity problem are listed in Table 2-1 below, and the 
identification strategies employed to circumvent the endogeneity will be discussed in the 






















Table 2-1 Summary of Recent Studies on the Impact of College Quality on Earnings in the United States 
Study Data College Quality 
Measure 











Sex, race, father’s education, 
mother’s education, mother’s 
occupation, 
college major, GPA, 
private/public dummy, labor 
market conditions(including 
working experience, hours 
per week, public sector, 
self-employed, degree 
requirement, job not related to 
major) 
Log annual earnings 
estimated by OLS and 
two-level HLM 
College quality affects 
initial earnings of 
college graduates, but 
the effect is small and 
not consistent for 
student of different 
majors. 
Behrman et al. 
(1996) 
8,400 female 
twins born in 
Minnesota in 
1936-1955 










School years, working 
experience 
Log annual earnings 
estimated by the FE model 
Higher faculty salary, 
granting of Ph.D., 
smaller college size, 
and private controls 
have significant 







High School and 
Beyond (HS&B) 
1980 senior 




based on Barron’s 
rating 
Gender, race, family size, 
father’s education, mother’s 




Log hourly wage estimated 
in the context of a structural 
model 
Attending an elite 
private college does not 
necessarily pay off in 
terms of early earnings, 
but it increases the 
probability of graduate 
school enrollment. 








2,165 from HS&B 
Six-fold 
classification 
based on Barron’s 
rating 
Gender, race, family size, 
father’s education, mother’s 




Log hourly wage estimated 
in the context of Heckman 
correction for selection bias 
Large premium to 
attending an elite 
private institution, 
smaller premium to 
attending a 
middle-rated private 








sophomore cohort elite private college 
increases for 1980 
cohort as compared to 
1972 cohort. 





first follow-up in 
1994 
Average SATs of 
the entering 
freshman 
Gender, race, first generation 
bachelor’s degree completers, 
parental occupation, GPA, 
number of other colleges 
attended, attended community 
colleges, college major, labor 
market characteristics, private 
institution, college size, urban 
college 
Log annual earnings 
estimated by HLM 
College quality affects 
initial earnings but the 
effect is very small. 
Effect of private college 
is also close to zero. 





cohort, with 1995 
earnings 
Average SAT 
scores divided by 
100, net tuition, 
Barron’s index 
Race, SAT/100, high school 
top 10%, college athlete, 
additional applications, 
undergraduate percentile in 
class, advanced degree, 
public/private dummies, 
liberal arts, average tuition 
charged 
Log annual earnings 
estimated by OLS, 
matching technique 
Quality does not affect 
earnings, but tuition is 
significantly related to 
earnings. 
Thomas (2003) 4,604 bachelor’s 
degree completers 
from B&B second 
follow-up in 1997 
Six-fold 
classification 




Similar as in Thomas (2000) Log annual earnings 
estimated by HLM 
Quality confers larger 
earnings advantages 
compared with Thomas 
(2000), both for public 
and private institutions. 
Academic performance 
and major also affect 
earnings significantly. 
Black & Smith 
(2004) 
3,199 students in 
the full sample of 
National 
Longitudinal 









background, and high school 
experiences 
Log annual wage estimated 
by PSM 
Point estimates from 
the OLS regression 
and matching are 
similar for men but not 
women. PSM estimates 
tend to be smaller with 
higher standard errors. 
Long (2008) Panel data from 
the National 
Median freshman 
SAT test score, 
Replicate the model 
specification and controls in 
Earnings a bachelor’s 
degree, log hourly earnings 
Alternative methods 

















from above  
Dale & Krueger (2002) and 
Black & Smith (2004) 
and log family annual 
earnings regressed by the 
OLS, IV and PSM methods 
Positive selection bias 
in the OLS regression. 













Student ability, high school 
achievement, high school 
type, family background 
Earning educational 
attainment, early, mid-, and 
late-career occupational 
status and annual income 
estimated by PSM 
Insignificant effects are 





occupational status.  
Hoekstra(2009) 12,189 applicants 
of a large flagship 
state university 
from 1986 to 1989 
 
Adjusted SAT 
score relative to 
the admission 
cutoff SAT 
score in the 
flagship state 
university 
Years of experience after high 
school graduation, year 
dummies, cohort dummies, 
actual SAT score, high school 
GPA 
Average residual earnings 
derived from the earning 
equation in the fuzzy RD 
design 
Attending the most 
selective state 
university causes 
earnings to be 
approximately 20% 
higher for white men. 
Dale & Krueger 
(2011) 
12,075 in 1976 
cohort and 6,479 
in 1989 cohort 






over a long time 
horizon for the 
1976 cohort 
Average SAT 
score, net tuition, 
Barron’s index 
Demographic characteristics, 
high school GPA, high school 
SAT score, predicted parental 
income, whether an athlete, 
the average SAT score of the 
colleges that student applied 
to, the number of applications 
Log median of annual 
earnings in 2007 dollars 
over 5-year intervals 
estimated by the 
self-revelation model in 
matching techniques  
Estimate of the return 
to college selectivity 
indistinguishable from 
zero when controlling 
for the unobserved 
student ability. 
Heterogeneous returns 






 Far from getting closer to the convergence on how large the college quality impact is, the 
recent empirical evidence with new identification strategies have yielded mixed findings. The 
sign and magnitude of the estimates differ depending on the data, model specification, and 
methodology employed in recent studies. While some studies report solid large wage premiums 
for elite college attendees (Brewer et al., 1999; Hoekstra, 2009; Long, 2008), others find small 
positive and statistically significant estimates (Thomas, 2000; Black & Smith, 2004). The open 
debate continues with the null evidence presented consistently by Dale and Kruger (2002, 2011). 
They questioned the return to college selectivity in their 2002 paper, which obtained weak or 
insignificant payoff to attending more selective colleges by matching and self-revelation models. 
Their 2011 study found that after adjusting for unobserved student characteristics, the return to 
college selectivity dropped to values indistinguishable from zero, suggesting virtually no effect 
for most students. However, they did find a large positive effect for black and Hispanic students 
with less educated parents, which suggested the existence of heterogeneity of effect. 
 In fact, the heterogeneity of returns to institutional attributes across certain groups has been 
addressed by a number of previous studies in addition to Dale and Krueger (2011). For example, 
L. Zhang (2005c) tested a series of potential variabilities of effects by individual demographics 
and family backgrounds such as gender, race, family income, parental education, intellectual 
ability, and field of study by running separate regressions by subgroups. The effect of college 
quality turned out to be non-uniform. Non-White students tend to benefit more from attending 
high-quality colleges than did White students. College quality mattered more for students from 
low- and middle- income families than it did for those from wealthier families. Students in 
lucrative majors enjoy larger effects of college quality. Another example was Monks (2000), 





performing regressions for subgroups such as female vs. male students and, White vs. 
non-Whites, and statistical tests were implemented to see if the differences were significant or 
not. The results did suggest that the effects vary across gender and race. The author gave 
explanations from the human capital accumulation perspective and implied that peer effects or 
the classroom dynamics of race and gender may vary within an institution. Due to increasing 
evidence of variations in economic returns, many studies present the estimation results for the 
whole sample and sub-samples in their publications. 
 Another much less documented direction of heterogeneity is the variations in the effect of 
college quality across earning distribution pioneered by L. Zhang (2005c). The results generated 
from the quantile regressions at seven points of the earning distribution suggested a stronger 
effect of college quality for college graduates at the high end even many years after college 
graduation. 
 Common key covariates in model specifications included the variables from these categories: 
individual demographics, family background, labor market conditions, and student ability 
control.  
 Measures using the categorical approach and the input resource approach are the most 
popular quality measures in the current literature. College quality categories are usually 
classified based on a computed overall quality index from various outside rating sources such as 
Astin’s selectivity index, Carnegie ratings, and Barron’s index (Brewer et al., 1999; Griffin & 
Alexander, 1978; Rumberger, 1993; Thomas, 2003). The following input resource measures 
appeared in literature with high frequency: average freshman SAT scores (Dale & Krueger, 2002, 
2011; Griffin & Alexander, 1978; Morgan & Duncan, 1979; Mueller, 1988; Solomon, 1973, 1975; 





2008), expenditure per student (Behrman, Rosenzweig, & Taubman, 1996; Morgan & Duncan, 
1979; Wachtel, 1976) and faculty-related indicators such as the average faculty salary (Black & 
Smith, 2004; Long, 2008) and the faculty-student ratio (Behrman et al., 1996; Long, 2008). L. 
Zhang (2005b) reviewed and explored the varying effects of college quality due to different 
measures of college quality, including Barron’s ratings, mean SAT scores of entering freshman 
class, tuition and fees, and Carnegie Classification by the OLS regressions. The empirical results 
suggested that the effect of college equality on wage is sensitive to the measure of college quality. 
Thus, the implicit term of college quality is not enough in future studies. We should be explicit 
about what measure of college quality is under use. The author also explained that previous 
findings differed because they provided partial explanation of the entire entity of economic 
return to college quality. However, the wage premium to attending high-quality colleges is robust 
to different measures. Likewise, Long (2008) used a variety of different college equality 
measures and found significant positive effects in many cases by the OLS estimates, but these 
positive effects might not be consistent if alternative college quality measures were adopted. 
 Most studies used the natural log form of the self-reported monthly or hourly salary for fresh 
college graduates or experienced workers in their mid-career stage as measures for the outcome 
variable. One exception was Dale and Kruger (2011) which argues that administrative earning 
data is more precise and can reduce possible measurement errors.  
 One thing to note is that previous reviews are primarily based on the literature examining the 
effect of college quality on college graduates’ wages after many years of graduation. As Brand 
and Halaby (2006) suggested, the effect may change depending on whether the surveyed college 
graduates are in their early-, middle-, or later-career. If we want a comprehensive picture of the 





on this research topic. 
 To sum up, lessons learned from the U.S. literature are as follows: First, college quality’s 
role in determining future earnings is still uncertain, probably small and positive. Second, it is 
necessary to control for both the observables and unobservables. It is well recognized that failure 
to correct for the endogeneity of high-quality college attendance biases the estimation, but the 
results can be method dependent. We should keep in mind that each causal method has its 
advantages and limitations when judging plausibility of the results. Third, the conclusion based 
on a single measure of college quality could be misleading. It is advisable to use more than one 
quality measure given the multi-faceted nature of college education. Fourth, the average effect of 
college equality is not universal. It is necessary to explore the heterogeneous effect of college 
quality for students with certain characteristics and to examine the point estimate with students at 
different earning distributions. Fifth, the mechanism of how college quality affects graduates’ 
labor market outcomes is still largely unrevealed and requires future research. 
2.3 Empirical Evidence on Labor Market Returns to College Quality in China 
 There is an increasing amount of literature on the rate of return to quantity of education in 
China (Fleisher, 2005; Haizheng Li, 2003; T. Li, 1998; D. T. Yang, 2005; J. Zhang, Zhao, Park, 
& Song, 2005) but only a few studies on return to quality of schooling partly due to the difficulty 
in measuring education quality. With an unprecedented increase in the number of college 
education recipients after the implementation of higher education expansion policy in 1999, the 
severe unemployment problem and resource constraints call for examination of the impact of 
college quality on newly graduated cohorts. For example, people are curious to know whether 
college education is still worth the investment. If so, are there disproportional returns to elite 





from the government necessarily of better quality? If so, how do elite colleges differ from 
non-elite colleges in terms of quality and how to improve it? 
 However, college quality was often treated as a control factor and added as a dummy 
variable indicating that the student belongs to some broad college quality category in the OLS 
regression equation by empirical studies trying to find the determinants of college graduates’ 
employment status and initial salary (Chen & Tan, 2004; Du & Yue, 2010; Min, Ding, Wen, & 
Yue, 2006; Yue, Wen, & Ding, 2004; Yue & Yang, 2012) with multivariate regression analysis. 
 For example, Chen and Tan (2004) randomly selected 1200 college graduates in 14 colleges 
in the central area in 2003 and 400 college graduates in 4 colleges in 2004 to conduct the survey 
and focus on two dependent variables: initial employment status and starting salary. When 
analyzing the employment status measured as discrete choices and the starting salary as a 
continuous variable, the logistic model and multivariate linear model were used. The researchers 
concluded that college prestige had no significant impact on either the employment status or the 
starting wage. The authors proposed a possible explanation that college prestige has a weaker 
correlation with early than with later career status.  
 Yue et al. (2004) conducted the college graduate survey in 7 provinces and 45 colleges with 
a sample of 18722 students. The descriptive statistics showed that the initial employment rate in 
Project 211 colleges is 49.7%, 53.7% in regular colleges and 20.2% in 3-year short-cycle 
colleges. Grouping by college control types, the initial employment rate was the highest, 43.2%, 
in public colleges followed by 10.7% in private independent colleges and 10.5% in private 
colleges. However, the OLS regression results showed that the students with bachelor’s degrees 
earned less than their counterparts who are students with associate degrees and there was no 






 Based on a survey of 34 universities in 16 provinces conducted in 2005, Min et al. (2006) 
compared the empirical results of 2003 and 2005 and found that student performance in college 
is the key factor on both the employment status and starting salary. College prestige measured 
with dummy variables indicating if it is a Project 211 university, other undergraduate HEIs or 
3-year short-cycle college. The authors found a significant impact of college prestige on both the 
initial employment status and starting salary. More specifically, the probability of finding a job 
right after college graduation was higher for graduates from Project 211 universities than from 
other types of universities. The same pattern also held true for starting salary. 
 Likewise, Du and Yue (2010) examined the determinants of initial employment status and 
starting salary with a college graduate survey in 2009. The estimation of college quality dummy 
indicator was statistically significant for both the employment status equation and the wage 
equation when the measurement of college quality is whether the student is from a Project 211 
college. They also confirmed positive role of student demographics and family backgrounds in 
determining the labor market outcomes and concluded that the human capital accumulation in 
college is more influential than other factors in determining employment status. 
 With a new round of data collection, Yue and Yang (2012) applied the logit model for 
employment status and the OLS regression model for the wage outcome to 2011 graduation class. 
They found the probability of finding a job is higher for Project 211 college graduates and 
vocational college graduates when the reference group is the non-key college students. The 
school prestige also pays in the labor market. The coefficient on the 211 dummy is 0.13 and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, the highly influential role of job 





 However, several caveats undermined the reliability of these results for understanding the 
impact of college quality. First, these articles miss important determinants such as students’ 
innate ability and job market conditions so that the results may suffer from the omitted variable 
bias. Second, many authors mix the students from undergraduate colleges and 3-year short-cycle 
colleges and define college quality using short-cycle colleges as the reference group while the 
students with bachelor’s degrees and those with associate degrees are hardly comparable. It is 
difficult to interpret the effect as being purely the result of college quality difference or degree 
level. Third, none of these studies addresses the endogeneity problem of college quality. Most 
studies adopted the OLS regression corresponding to the wage outcome and the logit model 
corresponding to the employment status merely to establish the correlations. No causal 
relationship is warranted. Fourth, these surveys were mostly regional, and random sampling 
strategy was not employed. So the conclusion cannot be generalized to larger populations. Last 
but not least, none of them mentioned the potential sample selection bias when they restricted the 
regressions to observations with observable wage values, and no attempt was made to treat the 
missing data. 
 Some studies that explore the causes of salary inequality in the early labor market bring in a 
new angle to understand the impact of college quality. From their perspective, elite college 
attendance could be deemed a source of disparity in terms of college factors. A few studies also 
paid special attention to wage inequality from other aspects. For example, disparities arise due to 
demographic characteristics such as gender disparity in science and engineering majors (C. Guo, 
Tsang, & Ding, 2010), family background such as parents with different social economic status 
or social capital (Hongbin Li, Meng, Shi, & Wu, 2012b; Wen, 2005), and labor market conditions 





 Four recent studies highlighted the economic returns of college quality (Hongbin Li et al., 
2012a; Z. Liu & Qiu, 2011; S. Yang & Yang, 2011; Zhong, 2011). They are based on more 
representative national datasets and have a larger sample size. 
 Zhong (2011) found that returns to higher education vary significantly depending on college 
quality. However, the measurement of college quality in this article was a subjective and 
self-evaluated ranking of a college or university an individual attended, which is too crude and 
imprecise. Again, the omitted ability factor may bias the OLS estimates.  
 Hongbin Li et al. (2012a) argued that the premium of attending elite colleges (colleges in 
projects 985 and 211) drops but does not disappear with controlling for ability. They tackled the 
endogeneity by assuming that student unobservable characteristics are partly determined by 
observable individual and family backgrounds because it is common practice for students and 
parents to choose colleges together. Therefore, the “selection on observable” assumption is 
reasonable enough and the OLS regression with comprehensive controls is sufficient to draw 
causal inferences. They tried to generate squared term and cubic term of NCEE score and 
included them all in the wage determination equation to ensure sufficient controls, but it turned 
out none of these nonlinearities seemed to be reasonable. Admittedly, the college admission 
process in China may be largely dependent on student observed ability such as the NCEE score 
rather than other application materials, such as the reference letters and application essays in the 
United States. It is arbitrary to expect comprehensive controls of the NCEE to absorb all the 
effect of unobservable characteristics. This is why the authors call their estimate an upper bound 
of the true wage premium for elite colleges. One contribution of this paper is the attempt to 
explore the heterogeneous effects of college quality across student groups. The sub-group 





are better educated. 
 Z. Liu and Qiu (2011) employed the propensity score matching method to overcome the 
selection bias. However, this method was poorly performed with the 2005 urban household 
survey dataset. Due to lack of proper measurements, many variables had to be replaced by proxy 
measures that contained large measurement errors, and even the author themselves suspected that 
their estimated point estimate on college quality was greatly overestimated because the dataset 
lacks key determinants that predict the treatment entry. Lack of such controls will drive the 
outcome differences across groups much higher than valid estimates.  
 S. Yang and Yang (2011) established the intercept and slopes as outcome models with the 
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) technique. They found the starting salary higher for Project 
985 and Project 211 colleges than others, and about 11% of total difference in starting salary can 
be attributed to institutional factors. It is the only article that distinguished individual level and 
college level factors and established multilevel models.  
 To summarize, most Chinese literature that examines the link between college quality and 
labor market outcomes focuses on the sample of fresh college graduates rather than workers in 
their mid- or late- career. It is encouraging that the Chinese research has improved over time in 
survey implementation, research design, and rigorous econometric analysis. Nevertheless, 
knowledge gaps remain in several aspects. First, no causal inference can be drawn with 
confidence from previous Chinese studies so far because they mostly apply the single OLS 
technique based on strong assumptions that may not hold in reality and they fail to adequately 
and sufficiently address the potential endogeneity of elite college attendance behavior. Second, 
the college quality measures as categorical dummies are too broad and crude to use. They mask 





suggestions or interpret the findings. No previous Chinese study uses concrete college quality 
measures such as school inputs. Third, the results on the average effect of college quality may 
cover up the extraordinary benefits for a particular group of students concerning the dramatic 
diversity of the college student body. Most previous Chinese studies neglected potential 
heterogeneity of college quality. Fourth, previous Chinese literature does not address the 
potential sample selection problem properly and make endeavors to solve it. Fifth, previous 
studies rarely use national representative datasets with the most recent data to analyze this 








Table 2-2 Summary of Chinese Studies on Economic Returns to College Quality 
Study Model Data College Quality 
Measure 
Findings on College Quality and Determinants of Employment Status (1) and Initial 
Salary (2) 










(1)prestige(- insignificant), major(-), working experience(+), appearance (+), 
working ability(+) 
(2)prestige(- insignificant), academic performance(-), working ability(+), working 
experience(+) 
 













(1)211(+ 0.794), non-key (+0.916), public college (+), bachelor’s degree(+), 
graduate (+), education major(-), agriculture major (-), male(+), working experience 
(+), job search information(+) 
(2)211 (insignificant), regular (-), public college (+), graduate (+), law (-), CET-4 
(+), job search cost (+), working in municipal cities (+), working in the non-Western 
regions (+), working in government (-), working in R&D sector (-), working in joint 
venture (+) 
 










according to prestige 
(1)211(+0.478), associate’s degree(-), male(+), top 25% in academic 
performance(+), scholarship(+), other certificate (+), job search cost(-), job search 
information (+), average family income (+), attend college in the west(-) 
(2)211 (+0.244), associate’s degree(-), graduate degree(+), male(+), top 25% in 
academic performance(+), working experience(+), job search information(+), 
average family income(+), family social network(+), attend college in Beijing(+), 
attend college in the west(-) 
 








Project 211/other (1) 211(+0.95), bachelor’s degree(-), male(+), home in the East(+), annual family 
income(+), dual degree(+), student leader(+), party member(+) 
(2) 211(+779 RMB),bachelor’s degree(+), master’s degree(+), annual family 
income(+), mother’s education(+), father’s occupation(+),male(+), merit aid(+), 
English proficiency(+), dual degree(+),student leader(+), party member(+) 
 






(2) Earning gap between recipients of high and low quality higher education is 
(+28%) and the gap for annual return is 1.4% after controlling for ability. The 
quality effect is larger for newer working cohorts as the date of entering the labor 
force changes from 1981 to 1986 to 1993. 
 





Elite college are 
those covered by 
projects 985 and 211 
(2) elite (+0.107) The return to elite college attendance varies by gender and father’s 
education. The human capital and experience variables can explain a large 

















Z. Liu & Qiu 
(2011) 





Project 211 vs. 
non-211 
(2) average treatment on the treated (+0.375) 









NCEE score, college 
location/composition 
(2)985(+) , 211(+), private (-), independent College (-), average NCEE score (+), 
college located in urban cities (+), college with more disadvantaged students (-), 
recruit from the same province(insignificant), male(+), age (+), standardized NCEE 
score (+), work in urban cities(+), company size (+), high-income working sector 
(+), parent’s education (+), parent’s cadre (+) 
 









(1)211(+0.69),independent college(-0.78),male(+), student leader(+), associate’s 
degree(-), academic ranking(+), certificate(+),family annual income(+), Part-time 
work(+), job search cost(+) 
(2)211(+0.13), male(+),student leader(+), master degree or higher(+), associate 
degree(-), annual family income(+), mother’s education(+), job search cost(+),job 






2.4 Methodology Review 
 As mention in section 2.2, milestone advancements began to emerge in the late 1990s to 
empirically estimate the unbiased economic return to college quality with a series of innovative 
new econometric approaches after the need to correct for the endogeneity problem was widely 
recognized. At least five methodologies and identification strategies are employed to determine 
the causal effect of economic return to college quality, including the instrumental variables (IV) 
approach (Long, 2008), matching conditioning on observables and unobservables (matching) 
(Dale & Krueger, 2002, 2011), propensity score matching (PSM) (Black & Smith, 2004; Brand 
& Halaby, 2006), regression discontinuity design (RD) (Hoekstra, 2009), and the fixed effects 
(FE) model (Behrman et al., 1996). The advantages and limitations for each of above 


































Data structure Advantages Limitations Studies 
OLS Cross-sectional - control for confounding variables 
by directly controlling for 
observables 
- strong assumption that controlling for observable 
confounding variables is adequate to eliminate the 
selection bias 
- adding further controls that correlated with 
observables has little effect 
(Fox, 1993; Griffin 
& Alexander, 1978; 
Morgan & Duncan, 
1979; Solomon, 
1973, 1975; 
Solomon & Wachtel, 






FE Cross-sectional - difference out the omitted variable 
problem by eliminating the fixed, 
unobservables associated with 
selection 
- relevant omitted variable may not be fixed over time 
- may severely reduce the sample size 
- generally biased toward zero in the presence of 
random measurement error 
(Behrman et al., 
1996) 
Matching Cross-sectional - complementary with regression 
adjustment 
- highlight areas of covariate 
distribution with insufficient 
overlap between the treatment and 
control groups 
- harder to find the match as the number of strata or 
bins increase 
(Dale & Krueger, 
2002, 2011) 
PSM Cross-sectional - relax the linearity assumption 
- only match on propensity scores 
instead of multidimensional match 
- based on the assumption of selection on observables 
- assumptions of common support and balance may   
not hold 
(Black & Smith, 
2004; Brand & 
Halaby, 2006; Long, 
2008) 
IV Cross-sectional - purge the bias that results from 
the omitted variable problem 
- prevent selection bias 
- hard to find valid instruments 
- not usable if it is weak 
- hard to justify interval validity directly 
(Long, 2008) 
RD Cross-sectional -most close to randomized 
experiments 
- a large sample size is required within the bandwidth 
- assumptions that no manipulation the side of the 
cutoff and that people at two sides near the cutoff 







 However, the results from the studies that applied these identification strategies did not yield 
a consensus on how big the impact of college quality is, mainly due to their discrepant 
underlying assumptions and contexts to use. As a result, too much reliance on estimates from a 
particular method based on pretty strong assumptions will not convince the reviewers. It is worth 
noticing that each method has its own pros and cons and we need to be cautious to draw definite 
conclusions about the estimated results.  
 The OLS regression method responds to the endogeneity problem by directly controlling for 
all the observable variables. This strategy is based on the assumption that adequate controls for 
confounding variables would eliminate the selection bias and potential omitted variable bias if 
observed and unobserved variables are correlated. Obviously, we never know what are the 
possible unobservable confounders. Therefore, it is arbitrary to make any assertion about the 
adequacy of controls.  
 Similar to the conventional OLS regression, the matching and PSM rest on the critical 
assumption of unconfoundedness, which regards treatment assignment as exogenous once we 
control for an explicit set of observed covariates (Murnane & Willett, 2010). PSM has some 
advantages that make it more favorable than the conventional OLS. First, PSM relaxes the 
linearity assumption in the OLS. Second, instead of specifying the multi-dimensional 
relationship between explanatory variables and outcomes, PSM as a special kind of matching 
technique reduces the dimensionality problem in matching. However, the major limitation of 
PSM is that we should be cautious to interpret any matching estimator as causal effect if the 
selection is likely to be based on unobservable variables that we fail to control. In this case, even 
after we apply the PSM, this selection bias remains. 





find the valid instruments that are correlated with the suspected endogenous variable but 
uncorrelated with the error term. It also overcomes the omitted variable bias given that the 
instrument is uncorrelated with the omitted variable. The basic challenge is to find the valid 
instruments, ideally referred to as “natural experiments”. Moreover, the validity of the 
instruments cannot be tested directly and more work is required to justify the exogeneity of the 
instruments, not to mention in the cases of “weak” instruments, which may lead to biased 
estimates. 
 Taking advantage of the within family FE model, the FE strategy differences out any fixed, 
unobservable differences between twins or siblings. Any differences left in the outcome can be 
attributed to the remaining differences in variable of interest after we control for covariates. FE 
estimates are subject to a number of potential problems: First, and most obviously, the relevant 
omitted variable may not be fixed over time. Second, the fixed effects strategy often ends up 
with a severely reduced sample size. For example, the effect of college quality is identified from 
the twins enrolled in colleges of varying qualities. Twins who enter the same college quality 
category do not contribute to the identification. Third, the estimates are generally biased toward 
zero in the presence of random measurement error (Currie, 2005). 
 RD is the research design most close to the randomized experiment when only observational 
data are available. But it requires a large sample size to have sufficient observations within the 
bandwidths around a certain cutoff point to work, which might be troublesome to collect. 
Moreover, the fulfillments of some strict assumptions cannot be directly tested, and internal 
invalidity is often questionable (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). 
 When realizing the ubiquitous problem of self-selection and omitted variable bias, it is 






2.5 Summary and Discussion 
 In theory, higher education pays not only in terms of quantity but also in quality due to the 
superior human capital accumulation in high-quality HEIs. Based on this explanation from the 
human capital theory perspective, quality, which is often neglected, should be incorporated into 
the classic wage determination model. 
 Abundant studies in the United States have documented the average effect of college quality. 
Although the conclusion concerning the magnitude of the effect is not unanimous, there is far 
more evidence suggesting the positively existing effects of college quality than indicating null or 
negative effects. The effect could also be heterogeneous and vary by student characteristics and 
distribution of labor market outcome. The result variation calls for consistency checks across 
multiple methods and with multiple college quality measures. The potential endogeneity and 
selection bias of college choice in terms of quality should be addressed with careful designed 
identification strategies to enhance causal inference regarding the findings. 
 Examining the determinants of fresh college graduates’ labor market success is a hot 
research topic in China because the higher education expansion policy has generated the biggest 
number of college graduates in Chinese history in recent years. College graduates’ labor market 
success is crucial to individuals, to their motherhood institutions, and to the society as it plays an 
important role in realizing personal education investment, enhancing institutional efficiency and 
promoting social equality and stability. However, current Chinese studies suffer from potential 
problems such as selection bias and omitted variable bias. The effect of college quality is often 
treated as homogeneous for all. In addition, no research collects concrete college quality 





 When comparing the results, we should keep in mind that they are contingent on the method 
employed in the application. Each method has its own assumptions and conditions to work and 
has its own advantages and disadvantages. 
 In summary, there are significant large knowledge gaps in the study of the economic returns 
to labor market outcomes in China. Research with a carefully designed and collected dataset, 






















Chapter 3 Research Questions and Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, the key research question and sub-questions are proposed to deal with some 
of the knowledge gaps identified in Chapter 2. A multilevel conceptual framework is established 
and displayed in Figure 3-1 and the analytical approach presented. The identification strategies 
and alternative models are set up to address the suspected endogeneity of elite college attendance. 
Other issues including the sample selection bias and heterogeneous effects of college quality by 
earning distribution are handled with the Heckman correction method and quantile regression, 
respectively. These methodologies and identification strategies are applied to the dataset 
collected by Tsinghua University. The rest of the chapter describes the data collection and 
processing procedures in detail, including the explanations of the sampling strategy, 
collaborative design of the questionnaire instruments, calculation of the sampling weight, 
treatment of missing data, and construction of the indexes. 
3.2 Key Research Questions 
 To fuel the economy with technology and knowledge advances, raising college quality is a 
key concern of Chinese higher education policy formulation. It is important to study the labor 
market effects of college quality in China for several reasons. First, graduates from high-quality 
HEIs are expected to become highly productive future workers who serve the industries and 
communities in national economic development. Second, it is imperative to assess and supervise 
the quality assurance of HEIs, especially for the heavily endowed elite colleges and rapidly 
growing independent colleges. Third, because the priority and concentrated financial support 
were given to certain national leading universities and colleges in projects 985 and 211, the 





education quality in these selected HEIs with limited resources with the hope that Project 985 
and 211 colleges might help raise the quality of the whole Chinese higher education system. 
 As identified in the literature review part, the primary knowledge gaps in existing Chinese 
studies include the following: (1) There are very limited empirical studies with special attention 
to college quality in China. (2) The causal inference methods are seldom applied to study the 
effect of college quality in China, particularly in treating the endogeneity problem. (3) The 
limited measure of college quality fails to provide informative findings and hinders the deeper 
understandings of the effect of college quality. (4) The potential heterogeneity of college quality 
is not examined. My study will try to reduce these gaps and address these deficiencies. 
 Based on the identified knowledge gaps in the literature review, the key research question 
for this dissertation is “Does college quality affect the starting salary of fresh college 
graduates in China?” This major research question can be split into five sub-questions: 
1. Does college quality affect the initial employment status of fresh college graduates in China? 
2. Does college quality affect the starting salary of fresh college graduates in China?  
3. Does the effect of college quality vary by student individual characteristics, such as gender, 
ethnicity, family background, and student ability? 
4. Does the effect of college quality vary by fresh college graduates’ earning distribution? 
5.  Does the effect of college quality vary by measures of college quality in China? 
 The first two sub-research questions concern the average effect of college quality on two 
major early labor market outcomes: initial employment status and starting wage. The next two 
sub-questions address the heterogeneous effect for particular student groups and for college 





sub-question involves the use of different measures of college quality, including input-based 
measures not previously used in studies in China. 
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
 Figure 3-1
12
 gives a visual illustration of the structure of the relationship between student 
early labor market outcomes and institutional factors at two levels: college level and student 
level. The influences from external contexts such as the government, the student’s family, and the 
labor market, that affect student labor market outcomes are connected to the higher education 
sector. The complex process of student initial employment status and starting wage determination 
is connected with arrows, which indicate the direction of influence from one factor to another. 
 As depicted in Figure 3-1, the square box in the center shows the student level and college 
level factors in a two-level structure, which is the focus of this study. Students with different 
backgrounds are sorted into colleges based on their demographic characteristics, cognitive ability, 
pre-college experiences, and other unobserved characteristics. Meanwhile, family background 
factors such as parental SES, family size, and parental expectations interplay with student 
background to jointly influence the college choice decision. Students enter into colleges and 
become one key component of college personnel inputs.  
 During college, students have a series of college experiences of all kinds, academic and 
social. Student personal experiences stimulate their knowledge, skill gains, and personal 
development, which lead to a higher productive capacity. Individual human capital accumulation 
rates differ both in the way students’ behaviors are influenced by their own backgrounds and in 
the way they are influenced by colleges with varying qualities. These student college experiences 
will be rewarded in the early labor market differentially, partially due to the labor market 
                                                 
12
 The source of this conceptual framework is the literature review of the human capital theory and empirical 





conditions such as the unemployment rate and many forms of job market segmentation. The 
student labor market outcomes affected by student college experiences include the initial 
employment status and the starting salary level. College output is obtained by aggregating the 
students’ labor market outcomes to the college level. As we can see, college quality plays an 
essential role in this whole process. Conceptually, college quality can be measured either by 
college input resources, college education process or college outputs. It is believed that 
higher-quality colleges not only comprised of a highly selective student body, but they also 
possess advantageous resources in other college inputs such as capital inputs, faculty and staff 
inputs, administration support, and structure. In China, these resources are largely allocated and 
regulated by the government. When inputs are transformed in the education process, colleges 
with higher quality are those with better decision making, better curriculum designs, stronger 
positive peer effects and student-faculty interactions, more supportive school environments, and 
favorable school climates, all of which promote student engagement. Ultimately, people’s 
perception of college quality can stem from college outputs such as the employment rate, 
average starting salary level, and general college prestige or ranking. These outputs serve as 
guidance for prospective students and parents who make the college choice decision in terms of 
quality.  
 Figure 3-1 provides conceptual guidance for the empirical study of the impact of college 





















3.4 Analytical Approach 
 Most empirical studies of school quality and earning relationship are derived from the 
cornerstone work of Jacob Mincer’s model of earnings (Mincer, 1974) as reviewed in Section 2.1. 
The basic Mincerian function reveals how the two productive attributes of schooling and 
working experiences are rewarded in the labor market, but it neglects some other major 
determinants of actual returns. One of these determinants is schooling quality. Focusing on the 
return to general education level by treating schooling as homogeneous tends to overestimate the 
rate of return to education.  
 Behrman and Birdsall (1983) suggested two ways of introducing school quality into the 
Mincerian model. The school quality component enters the model either through an interaction 
with education or through another variable representing the school quality independent from 
education quantity. The former specification implies that school quality influences earnings 
indirectly through rate of return to education quantity. The latter specification allows school 
quality to have a direct effect on earnings. In this approach, the effective years of schooling is a 
linear function of years of schooling ( S ) and school quality (Q ): 
* *
0 1 2( , )S S S Q w w S w Q                                               (3.1) 
 Most previous literature on the determinants of fresh college graduates’ earnings took the 
second approach in which college quality is a separate factor. A general linear reduced form is as 
follows: 
2
0 1 2 1 2ln ln +r Qs oY Y rw rw S w E E U                                      (3.2) 
where Ys represents an individual’s earnings with S years of schooling, S indicates individual 
years of education, Q represents school quality, E represents working experience and U  is the 





education r when school quality is not incorporated and w2. Most existing studies estimate some 
version of these specifications (Behrman et al., 1996; Card & Krueger, 1992; Heckman, 
Layne-Farrar, & Todd, 1995; Johnson & Stafford, 1973). To generate comparable results, this 
form will be used to incorporate the impact of college quality on the earnings function into this 
dissertation. Because we are concerned about the schooling quality at the undergraduate college 
level, all observations in the sample are senior college students who have the same number of 
years of schooling. Therefore, the years of schooling as education quantity measure could be 
omitted from our estimation equations. Extensions of the baseline Mincerian model can be made 
by including other factors that are related to fresh college graduates’ earning determination as 
covariates. 
3.5 Measuring College Quality 
 It is well known that HEIs have three major functions: teaching, research, and public service. 
Because the outcome of interest in my study is undergraduate students’ early labor market 
performance, which is largely determined by college teaching quality, finding teaching quality 
measures that are closely related to undergraduate students’ economic returns will be the focus. 
In other words, the basis of the whole study is to determine which are the high-quality and 
low-quality universities. The higher-quality colleges should be ones that facilitate the greater 
human capital accumulation during college intuitively. 
 In concept, many people vote for the so-called “gold-standard” value-added outcome 
approach to identify the colleges that are most/least capable of promoting the value-added 
student achievement in learning. Then, the college quality will be identified according to 
universities’ relative locations in the distribution of their students’ value-added achievement. 





United States) and critics often doubt its validity in measuring individual knowledge and skills. 
In practice, most researchers turn to other proxies of college teaching quality, such as school 
input resource measures (as in school accountability reports), employer’s perception of teaching 
quality (as in employer satisfaction survey instruments) and student’s perception of teaching 
quality (as in students’ college experience surveys) (Shin, Toutkoushian, & Teichler, 2011).  
 Existing empirical studies usually take advantage of college characteristics in terms of input 
amount and quality to identify college quality. The advocates of school input resource measures 
suggest that a number of college input measures (admission selectivity, faculty credentials, 
physical facilities, the size of the endowment, price of college education) are potential candidates 
for predicting college productivity. This study will be the first article to employ input-based 
college quality measures to examine the effect of college quality on labor-market outcomes in 
China. 
 Nevertheless, even the input resource approach is not without critics. Critics argue that 
college inputs tell us little about true quality. Colleges with more input resources are 
resource-advantaged schools rather than higher-quality ones (Pascarella, 2001). Actual process 
and outcomes for students matter more. Several initiatives are attempting to shift the 
conversation about the quality offered by institutions away from resources and reputation toward 
more relevant indicators, such as student learning process and outcomes surveyed by the 
National Survey of Student Engagement (NSSE) in the United States (Sarraf, Hayek, Kandiko, 
Padgett, & Harris, 2005). Based on students’ individual perceptions of college quality, the 
missing links between college inputs and outcomes are filled out by the process measures in the 
NSSE, such as student-faculty contact, peer effects, and supportive campus environment. The 





and personal development. These students’ practices and experiences can be at least as important 
to college quality as enrolled student ability because a substantial body of evidence has shown 
that the selectivity of the institution contributes minimally to learning and cognitive growth 
during college(Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005). Hu and Wolniak (2010) found that at the individual 
level, student engagement in college activities has a significant role in college graduates’ earning 
power in the labor market. But, surprisingly few empirical studies took this approach to measure 
college quality. In an earlier version of my dissertation proposal, I had proposed to aggregate 
student learning process indicators at the institutional level and identify college quality according 
to colleges’ relative positions in the distribution of their students’ overall value-added learning 
and engagement. However, I could not gain access to the required data in China due to copyright 
issues. There are two potential problems even if data were available. First, when individual level 
process indicators are aggregated to the school level, the quality gap between high-quality and 
low-quality colleges could be reduced because it is calculated based on students’ individual 
self-evaluations and perceptions without a reference college in mind. Then the correlation could 
be weakened. Second, the NSSE aims to assess learning gain, but some of the engagements are 
not so closely related to human capital accumulation. Measurement error could occur. 
 This dissertation study will use two approaches for measuring college quality. The first is the 
conventional categorical approach in which colleges are grouped into “elite” and “non-elite” 
ones. Elite colleges are those belong to “985” and “211” education quality enhancement projects 
that absorb special government funding. Elite colleges are presumably of higher quality than 
non-elite colleges in China. This approach enables a comparison of the findings of this study 
with previous Chinese studies. This study is also methodologically superior to previous studies 





method. Findings from these advanced econometric methods will provide new findings and 
insights on the effect of college quality when contrasting economic returns of elite college 
attendance (treatment) with non-elite college attendance (control). 
 The second approach consists of the use of input-based measures of college quality. This 
study will be the first one to do so in China. Some commonly used input measures in the United 
States cannot be applied to China’s case. For example, the net tuition used by Dale and Krueger 
(2002) and Long (2008) is believed to reflect the quality of HEIs in the United States, where 
private, highly-renowned colleges charge much more than public less-famed colleges. However, 
because a large proportion of colleges are public in nature, tuitions in Chinese HEIs are regulated 
and manipulated by the Chinese government. Likewise, a professor’s salary level as used in 
Black and Smith (2004) and Long (2008) is not appropriate in this study for three reasons: First, 
the salary level for professors is not market driven. Second, there is difficulty in adjusting for the 
local cost of living because the consumer price index (CPI) data do not allow provincial or 
regional comparison in China. Third, senior faculties with higher ranks tend to have more 
earnings, but they are not necessarily more helpful in promoting undergraduate learning. Instead, 
five input-based resource measures are chosen because they are more closely related to 
undergraduate learning and could well capture the essence of college quality in China’s 
circumstances. The five input-based measures of college quality are: 
  (1) Faculty-student ratio. This measure is similar to class size and is a measure of faculty 
availability. Normally, we would expect faculty members who have higher intensity to interact 
with students if the faculty-student ratio is bigger.  
  (2) Proportion of faculty members with doctoral degrees. This measure is intended to 





education attainment may have more teaching skills and productivity. 
  (3) Average freshman NCEE score. This measure is similar to the median freshman SAT 
test score used in the U.S. literature. It is intended to capture the effects of both student 
selectivity and peer quality (Long, 2008). 
  (4) Teaching expenditure per student. This is the per student amount of institutional 
teaching-related operational cost and special funding. This variable measures the capital 
resources devoted to student cultivation and development in college.  
  (5) Index of college quality. Each of the above four input quality indicators captures some 
aspect of college quality in China. When we talk about college quality, we often refer to the 
overall quality. Therefore, an index is computed based on the above measures with the principal 
component analysis (PCA) method. PCA is useful for converting multiple measures into a single 
variable that explains the largest variance of all components. The index construction process with 
PCA will be presented in detail in Section 3.7.5. This measure of college quality is similar to the 
approach taken by Black and Smith (2004) and Long (2008). The majority of input quality 
indicators are all positively correlated with the overall quality index, with the exception of 
faculty-student ratio. A detailed description of data collection sources and data calculation 
formula for input-based college quality measures is provided in Appendix 1. 
3.6 Research Methodology 
3.6.1 The Baseline OLS/Probit Model 
 The typical economic model and methodology used to estimate the differentials in earnings 
across institutional characteristics conditional upon individual characteristics and labor market 
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 This equation relates the logarithm of individual i’s monthly wage ( Yi ) as a function of 
quality variables of the college j the student attended ( ijQ ) and a set of individual demographic 
characteristics (
iD ), student ability ( iA ), family background characteristics( iF ), college 
experiences (
iC ), institutional characteristics of the college j for student i ( ijI ), job market 
conditions and behaviors (
iJ ) and an individual disturbance term ( i ). The estimated coefficient 
(
1 ) of college quality ( ijQ ) represents the impact of college quality on fresh college graduates’ 
starting salary. The key independent variable, college quality, will be measured by two 
approaches—namely, the categorical approach and the input-based resource approach.  
 For another early labor market outcome of interest—the initial employment status—a probit 
regression equation will be performed when the dependent variable is binary initial employment 
status (whether the student obtained a job by the time of the survey just before the college 
graduation or not). The probit regression equation is specified as follows: 
0 1 2Pr( 1/ ) Pr( * 0) Pr( 0)ij i iY X Y Q X                               (3.4) 
where Pr denotes the probability of finding a job. Y denotes the two possible outcomes: 
employed (Y = 1) or not (Y = 0). Y* is a latent variable. Y can be viewed as an indicator of 
whether this latent variable is positive. ijQ  is a measure of college quality. iX  is a set of 
covariates and 
i  is the error term. College quality will be measured in the same way as in 
Equation (3.3). The marginal effect on elite college attendance for an individual represents the 
advantage of probability that a student earns to find a job as an elite college student. 





Table 3-1 below is a list of definitions and measures of key variables.  
 Table 3-1 Definition and Measure Descriptions for Key Variables 
Variable Name Definition Measures 
Dependent Variable 
Starting salary 
Natural log monthly salary of the first 




Initial employment status: whether 
graduate has at least one job offer at the 
time of the survey 
Dummy, 1 = employed; 0 = 
unemployed 
Key Independent Variable: College Quality 
Elite 
College quality categories: Project 985 
and Project 211 colleges are elite colleges; 
other regular HEIs are non-elite colleges 




College in Project 985 




College in Project 211 




Public college not in the 985 or 211 
projects 




Private college affiliated to public HEIs 




Number of faculty members divided by 






Number of teaching faculty members with 
doctoral degrees/Sum of teaching faculty 

















First principal component extracted from 




Female Student’s gender Dummy variable: 1 = female, 0 = male 
Age Age at college graduation 
Continuous, calculated from birth year 
and month 
Minority Whether the student is an ethnic minority 






Student cognitive ability measured by 
NCEE score rescaled to 0-100 
Continuous 
Academic track Academic track in senior high school 








Whether the student has leadership 
experiences in senior high school 




The household’s registered residence 
location is in urban or rural area 
Dummy variable: 1 = rural, 0 = urban 
Only child Whether an only child in the family 
Dummy: 1 = Only child, 0 = has 
siblings 
SES index 
An index of family Socioeconomic status 




Major Major field of study in college 




Whether the student joins the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) 
Dummy: 1 = CPC member, 0 = 
otherwise 
Student leader 
Whether has leadership experiences in 
student organizations 
Dummy: 1 = student organization 
leader, 0 = otherwise 
Have certificate Whether has technical certificate  




Whether passes the College English Test 
(CET) level 4 and level 6 
Categorical: does not pass CET4 is the 
reference group 
Part-time work 
Whether has part-time work experiences 
during college 
Dummy:1 = works in college,0 = 
otherwise 
Have merit aid 
Whether has merit aid scholarships in 
college 




Whether has need-based financial aid in 
college 
Dummy:1 = has need-based aid, 0 = 
otherwise 
Have loan Whether has student loan in college Dummy:1 = has loan, 0 = otherwise 
Have minor Whether has a minor in college Dummy: 1 = has minor, 0 = otherwise 










The institutional location region
13
 
Categorical: municipalities (reference 




The institutional specialization type 
Categorical: comprehensive (reference 
group), engineering, etc. 
Job market conditions and behaviors 
Job industry The student’s job industry sector 
Categorical: agricultural industry is the 
reference group 
                                                 
13 We divide the whole nation into several economic regions according to the seventh 5-year plan in 1986. The 
institution region division is according to the regional belonging of the province or the municipal city where 
the college campus locates. The municipalities include Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai. The eastern region 
includes Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan. The northeastern 
region includes Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. The central region includes Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, 
Hubei and Hunan. The western region includes Inner Mongolia, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, 







The province of workplace 
Categorical: Beijing is the reference 
group 
Work migration 
Whether has interprovincial migration 
behavior 
Dummy:1 = migrate, 0 = otherwise 
Employer sector The ownership sector of the employer 
Categorical: public sector is the 
reference group 
 The typical methodological challenge to draw causal inference from observational data is 
that we do not observe the earnings if the student had attended a college that differs in quality 
from the one she actually did attend. In this study, the treatment of interest college quality is 
potentially endogenous because it may be correlated with the residual. There are two main 
sources of endogeneity that we are particularly concerned about: the omitted variables bias and 
the omitted selection. Both of them will generate biased results. Specifically, although we 
attempt to control for the observable student background characteristics that are correlated with 
college quality and earnings in the OLS regression as best as we can (for example, we try to 
eliminate the ability bias by using NCEE score as the proxy for student ability and the NCEE is 
the key determinant in college admission), the application and admission decisions may be based 
in part on some unobservable student characteristics that are not held constant. Suppose those 
who attend elite colleges tend to have higher non-cognitive skills, motivation, ambition, and 
drive for achievement, just to name a few. Neglecting these unobservable characteristics that are 
positively correlated with future earnings would lead to overestimated results in the OLS 
regression.  
 Moreover, the college participants are not randomly assigned to different colleges. In fact, 
they have been able to self-select their own college quality types according to the expected cost 
and return of attending each school quality category. Because of the selection, students in elite 
colleges and students in non-elite colleges will differ in some ways. This is problematic because 
differences between both the treatment and control groups may be correlated with labor market 





endogeneity that may not be handled by the OLS strategy, we resort to other identification 
strategies with additional information incorporated into the model. 
 This study will address the endogeneity problem with two quasi-experimental methods: IV 
and PSM. Other identification strategies are not appropriate to apply considering the data 
structure and research context. For example, the dataset does not satisfy the demanding sample 
size requirement of a regression discontinuity design or the particular requirement to include 
twin pairs for within-family fixed effect analysis. Even if the sample size is big enough, the 
admission procedure in China is not the same as in the U.S. where the SAT score works well as 
the treatment assignment variable and the people accepted and rejected by a comparable set of 
colleges could be matched. Instead, this study will use PSM strategy, which constructs a 
comparable control group (students in non-elite colleges) identical to students in the treatment 
group (students in elite colleges) in all observed characteristics except the treatment status (elite 
college attendance). The IV strategy offers the particular advantage of addressing the estimation 
problems associated with the omitted variable bias and selection bias. Estimates from these two 
strategies will be compared with the results from conventional OLS regression. Each proposed 
identification strategy and possible model specification forms will be discussed in the rest of the 
section. PSM and IV are causal-inference methods that are still seldom used in previous studies 
in China on my research topic. 
3.6.2 Instrumental Variables Estimation 
 IV estimation is typically used to estimate causal effects in the contexts in which randomized 
experiment are not feasible, such as, in our case, students’ elite college attendance.  
 The standard estimation method that can be used to calculate IV estimates is the two-stage 





on exogenous covariates to obtain the predicted treatment value as in equation (3.5). In the 
second stage, the endogenous treatment variable is replaced by the predicted value from the first 
stage in the outcome function (3.6). More specifically, the first-stage model takes the form: 
0 1 2 3i i i i iQ IV X P                                                  (3.5) 
where 
iIV  denotes the instrumental variable; iX is a vector of control covariates including 
individual, family, institutional and job market controls and 
iP  stands for additional covariates 
for students’ home provinces. In equation (3.5), the categorical measure of college quality (elite 
versus non-elite college) will be used for research questions 1 and 2, and the continuous 
measures of college quality will be used to answer research question 5. 
 In the second stage, we regress the wage outcome on the predicted elite college attendance 
from the first stage and all the exogenous covariates to determine the impact of elite college 
attendance on students’ starting salary as follows: 
0 1 2 3ln i i i iiY Q X P                                                 (3.6) 
 In the face of the potential threats to validity as discussed above, the appropriateness of 
proposed instrumental variables could be tested by several statistical tests such as the F-test to 
identify weak instruments (Stock & Yogo, 2002) and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to verify 
exogeneity (Hausman, 1978).  
3.6.3 Propensity Score Matching  
 PSM is a statistical matching technique that attempts to reduce the selection bias due to 
confounding variables by matching the treated units with comparable comparison units that 
differ in treatment status but are similar across a high-dimensional set of pretreatment 
characteristics with a single dimension of calculated propensity score. This strategy works when 





the common support assumption. The CIA implies that after controlling for covariates, the 
assignment of units to treatment is “as good as random” (equivalent to unconfoundedness or 
selection on observables) (Angrist & Pischke, 2008) and the common support assumption states 
that the probability of receiving treatment is strictly within the unit interval between 0 and 1 so 
that there is sufficient overlap for adequate matching. Basically, there are six implementation 
steps when using PSM according to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), as follows: 
 The first step is the estimation of propensity score. This study estimates the propensity score 
of elite college attendance with a probit model. Based on the college choice and human capital 
theory as well as previous empirical findings, the college attendance choice in terms of quality is 
influenced by observed covariates including student ability, high school characteristics, 
pre-college experiences, home environment and family background. The propensity score 
estimation model is specified as follows: 
0 1p Pr( 1| )i i i i iQ X X                                               (3.7) 
where pi is the propensity score to get the treatment; iQ is the treatment status which equals to 1 
if the student attends an elite college and 0 when untreated; and 
iX is a set of covariates that 
determine the treatment status.  
 The second step is to match up students who are in elite colleges with those in non-elite ones 
based on their propensity scores. We have to make decisions in terms of which matching 
algorithm to employ. This study considers four alternative matching algorithms: One-to-one 
Nearest Neighbor matching, Epanechnikov kernel matching, Gaussian kernel matching and 
Caliper matching. One-to-one Nearest Neighbor matching means that one case in the control 
group is matched to a treated case based on the closest propensity score. Kernel matching uses 





weight is calculated by the propensity score distance between a treatment case and all control 
cases. The closet control cases are given the greatest weight (Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1998). 
Caliper matching uses all cases in the control group within a specified caliper to avoid the risk of 
bad matches. Units with extreme propensity scores that lack common support will be dropped 
out of the comparison group.  
 The third step is to check the overlap or common support assumption. To identify the region 
of common support in which we can estimate the treatment effects, visual analysis of the 
propensity score distribution in the treatment and control groups is very helpful. We need to find 
counterfactual observations in the control groups for observations in the treatment group. 
 The fourth step is to check the balances. The balance is tested by comparing the covariates in 
the treatment and control group to make sure these groups are truly comparable. If the matching 
quality is not satisfactory, we should go back to step one and change the specification forms by 
including higher-order or interaction terms of the existing covariates or adding different 
covariates in an iteration process until we find acceptable matching with a good tradeoff between 
overlap and balances. 
 The fifth step is to estimate the treatment effects by performing the multivariate regression. 
For the regression adjusted treatment effect, the sample is restricted to the common support area.  
 Finally, a last step is to test the sensitivity of results with respect to “hidden bias”, which 
determines how strongly an unmeasured variable contributes to the selection process with the 
Rosenbaum bound (Rosenbaum, 2002). If the result is highly sensitive, the CIA assumption will 
be doubted. 
3.6.4 The Quantile Regression 





earnings distribution while the quantile regression examines the effect of college quality at 
different quantiles in the earnings distribution. Therefore, the quantile regression estimates are 
more robust against outliers than the OLS. Moreover, if we are interested in obtaining a more 
comprehensive picture of the relationship between variables rather than only the relationship 
between the means of such variables, quantile regression is more desirable in this case.  
 Tracing back to Koenker and Bassett (1978), the conditional quantile function of dependent 
variable lnYi at quantile q given a vector of regressors can be defined as: 
( ) inf{ln : ( , , , , , , , ) }Y i Y i i i i i i i iQ q Y F Q D F A C I J q   where ]1,0[q             (3.8) 
 Quantile regression solves the minimization problem that minimizes the weighted sum of the 
absolute value of errors, where the weights assigned to positive and negative errors determine the 
quantile: 
{ |ln } { |ln }
min[ | ln | (1 ) | ln |]
i i i i
q i i i i
i Y X i Y X




                        (3.9) 
3.6.5 The Heckman Selection Correction 
 The methods above are all based on the sample with students who have non-missing wage 
values. There is a sample selection concern that missing wage values are not missing at random, 
which would bias the results.  
 The sample selection bias can be corrected by the Heckman selection correction procedure 
(Heckman, 1979). The Heckman correction is a two-step approach to correct for non-randomly 
selected samples. It is typical to be applied to research on determinants of wage while we 
observe wage values only for those who work. Thus, it is suitable for our study.  
 In the first stage, we formulate a probit model to predict employment status ( iE ). This 





                   * 'i i iE w u                                     (3.10) 
When * 0iE  , Pr( 1| ) ( ' )i i iE w w                                     (3.11) 
When * 0iE  , Pr( 0 | ) 1 ( ' )i i iE w w                                  (3.12) 
We compute the inverse mills ratio (IMR): i ( ' ) / ( ' )i iw w                 (3.13) 
 In the second stage, we correct for sample selection by incorporating a transformation of the 
predicted individual probabilities as an additional explanatory variable in the wage equation. 
This additional variable is the so-called inverse mills ratio (IMR). If the coefficient on IMR is 
statistically significantly different from zero, it is a signal to assert that the results are subject to 
the sample selectivity.  
iln 'i i iY X      , observed only if 1iE                               (3.14) 
 Table 3-2 below summarizes the research designs discussed so far. 
Table 3-2 Summary of Research Design 
Research Question Data Research Design and 
Identification Strategies 
Q1: The impact of college 
quality on initial employment 
status 
College student labor market 
survey 
Probit, IV-probit 
Q2: The impact of college 
quality on starting salary 
College student labor market 
survey 
OLS, IV, PSM 
Heckman correction is used 
to test for the sample 
selection bias. 
Q3: The effect of college 
quality varying by student 
individual characteristics 
College student labor market 
survey 
OLS with interaction terms 
Q4: The effect of college 
quality varying by graduates’ 
earning distribution 
College student labor market 
survey 
Quantile regressions 
Q5: The result sensitivity to 
college quality measures 
1) College student labor 
market survey by Tsinghua 
University 
2) Institutional survey by 
Tsinghua University 
3) Annual Undergraduate 
OLS, IV 
Probit, IV-probit 
PCA is used to construct 






Teaching Quality Reports 
4) The Sunshine NCEE 
information platform 
supported by the MOE 
 
 To sum up, I will start with the conventional categorical college quality measure to estimate 
the average effect of college quality by performing the baseline OLS/probit models, IV and PSM 
methods. Then the heterogeneous effects are tested with the interaction terms in OLS regressions 
and quantile regressions. Lastly, alternative quality measures of input-based resource measures 
will be employed to conduct the additional sensitivity tests with institutional level information 
from various data sources.  
3.7 Data Collection and Data Processing 
3.7.1 Data Collection and Questionnaire Design 
 The survey data used in this dissertation are mainly collected through the Chinese College 
Student Survey (CCSS) project conducted by the Institute of Education, Tsinghua University in 
China. This dataset is accessible due to a research cooperation project between the Institute of 
Education, Tsinghua University, and the Center on Chinese Education in Teachers College, 
Columbia University. 
 The CCSS project was initiated in 2009 with the primary purpose to evaluate and improve 
undergraduate teaching quality in China. It is comprised of three major surveys: the College 
Student Labor Market (CSLM) survey, which tracks the post-college placement for fresh college 
graduates; the Chinese Student Engagement Survey (CSES) which is a Chinese version of the 
NSSE in the U.S.; the brief institutional survey, which contains information about college 
characteristics. The dataset used in this dissertation study is a merged dataset constructed from 





which encompasses the concrete college quality measures. 
 The final institutional level data in use is compiled from several sources due to the extreme 
difficulty of collecting concrete college quality measures in China. The institutional data are 
mostly derived from 2011 official Annual Undergraduate Teaching Quality Reports available for 
HEIs in the sample and the 2011 Tsinghua institutional survey. Where there is a conflict between 
these two sources, the official published data from the institutional annual teaching quality report 
posted on the website of the Office of Academic Affairs will be used. To ensure credibility, 
student selectivity as measured by freshman NCEE scores for the 2007 entering class is obtained 
from the Sunshine NCEE information platform online database supported by the MOE. Ideally, 
we measure school quality for the 2007 entering class by taking the average values of a 4-year 
span of input indicators from when this cohort was in college. For example, for typical students 
in our sample who started college in September 2007 and graduated in July 2011, the average 
college level data from 2007 to 2011 are desirable. Nevertheless, even the preferred official 
annual quality report was only initiated in 2010 for a limited range of best universities. It is 
impossible to collect reliable data that span four years. But given the stability of college ratings, 
it’s not a big problem. 
 Experts in the disciplines of education, sociology, and economics design the questionnaires 
collaboratively in Tsinghua University. The surveys contain not only the basic information such 
as student characteristics and family backgrounds, but also information about students’ 
pre-college experiences, during-college activities, and post-college placement after graduation.  
3.7.2 Sampling Strategy 
 The CCSS employed a multi-stage stratified random sample strategy to select the sample. 





northeastern, eastern, central and western) and by quality categories (elite, non-elite). For 
example, 2011 survey randomly chose 50 institutions, 13 of which are from three municipal 
cities (Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin), 14 from the eastern region, 11 from the central region and 
12 from the west. With regard to college academic specialization, there are 15 comprehensive 
universities, 21 science and engineering concentrated institutions, and 12 other institutions 
concentrated in other academic disciplines such as agriculture, finance and economics, political 
science and law, teacher training and ethnic nationality studies. This sample is therefore a good 
national representative sample of HEIs in China in terms of geographic locations and specialized 
academic disciplines. With regard to college quality, for the 2011 CSLM survey, the total sample 
size for use is 6977, which is significantly larger than in previous rounds. About half of them (24 
out of 49) are Project 211 or Project 985 colleges. Eight colleges are involved in Project 985 and 
sixteen are Project 211 universities. Thus, the elite colleges are oversampled in the final sample. 
Among a total of 6977 students, 3275 are from elite colleges. More specifically, 937 students are 
from Project 985 colleges, 2338 students are from Project 211 colleges, 3490 students are from 
non-key colleges, and 212 students are from two independent colleges. 
 The survey process is strictly managed and monitored to guarantee anonymity in each 
participating institution. In a lottery at each college, 200 to 300 randomly selected senior students 
in the graduating class are drawn by picking their student ID numbers. T-tests are further 
conducted to make sure the selected students are representative in terms of gender and major 
selected. Students whose IDs are picked by the lottery are asked to take back and complete the 
CSLM questionnaire sealed in the coded envelopes. The rate of submission of the questionnaire 





3.7.3 Sampling Weight 
 In order to make inferences about the national population of college graduates in 2011, 
sampling weight should be used to adjust for the non-representativeness of surveyed students. 
The sampling weight is readily available from the dataset. It is calculated according to the 
stratified sampling arrangement alone. Response rates of students are not taken into account. 
Simply put, the sampling weight for each observation can be expressed as the multiplication of 
two parts: the inverse of the first stage selection probability assigned to the sampled college and 
the inverse of the second stage selection probability assigned to the sampled student.  
3.7.4 Sample Selection and Missing Data 
 The original sample size for submitted student questionnaires is 8176. In order to study the 
Cohort 2007 students, who entered college in 2007 and graduated in 2011, we restrict our sample 
to Cohort 2007 students and delete observations in other cohorts. This action makes the sample 
size to decrease to 6985. In addition, students from 3-year vocational colleges are excluded from 
our sample because our focus is to estimate the returns to college quality for 4-year academic 
college students. Pooling the students from both 3-year and 4-year colleges would mix the effects 
of quantity of higher education with quality of higher education, which is undesirable. After this 
action, the sample size of 2011 fresh college graduates in four-year academic colleges is 6983. 
Then one student who reports his residence region before college as being Hong Kong is 
discarded from our sample to restrict the college graduates to Mainland China. One student who 
reports his work place in Macau after graduation is excluded from the sample. Furthermore, four 
contract students who are assigned to take college education by their current working units and 





determined by the market force. Therefore, the remaining 6977 observations constitute the final 
whole sample.  
 According to criteria that related to college graduates’ plan right after the graduation, the 
whole sample can be split into three subgroups—namely the “Intention-to-work” sample, 
“No-intention-to-work” sample and the “Missing-intention” group. In accordance with labor 
economics definitions, the unemployed status is conditional on one’s intention to find a job. Thus, 
the analysis on employment status will be conducted based on the “Intention-to-work” sample. 
According to Table 3-3 below, the valid sample size accounts for 61% of the original sample.  
Table 3-3 Sample Selection Criteria 
Sample Selection Criteria 
 
Action Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Have the intention to work in 2011 
four-year college graduates 
Keep 4984 61 61 
No intention to work after graduation 




1867 22.8 83.8 





126 1.5 85.3 
2011 four-year college graduates 
(Mainland area) 
Keep 6977 85.3 85.3 
Four 2011 4-year college graduates 
who will return to their previous work 
units by contract 
Delete 4 0.05 85.35 
One 2011 4-year college graduate 
work in Macau 
Delete 1 0.01 85.36 
One 2011 4-year college graduate 
from Hong Kong 
Delete 1 0.01 85.37 
2011 college graduates from 3-year 
vocational colleges 
Delete 2 0.03 85.4 
Other cohorts Delete 1191 14.6 100.00 
Total  8176 100.00  
 
 Table 3-4 reports the proportion of missing values of all variables derived from both the 
student questionnaire and the institution questionnaire in the “Intention-to-work” sample and 





Two separate tables are generated respectively because each table corresponds to one labor 
market outcome that we are interested in. More specifically, the regression on initial employment 
status is based on the “Intention-to-work” sample, and the regression on starting salary will be 
run on the “Have-job-offer” sample. It is also worth noting that the model specifications and set 
of variables used in these two samples differ as well. Thus, it is necessary to present missing rate 
calculation tables for both samples separately. For both samples, the missing rate is quite small 
(less than 5%) for the majority of the variables. 
 For the “Intention-to-work” sample, some variables have moderate missing rates of more 
than 10% or even 20% for student questionnaire instruments. They are concentrated in family 
background related variables, especially the SES index, which is built on a set of parental 
information and family background information. It is not surprising given that students may have 
difficulty recalling or providing the accurate figures. The missing rates for students’ academic 
performance during high school and college are relatively high. For example, the missing rate for 
average score in college exceeds 20% and the missing rate for NCEE score exceeds 10%, which 
reflect either the students’ inability to know their precise academic performance or their 
reluctance to reveal it. Students who fail to report the number of resumes that they submitted for 
job hunting is over 25%. 
 For the “Have-job-offer” sample, additional job related variables are associated with 
moderate missing rates. For example, 9.58% of the sample participants fail to provide the 
starting monthly salary figure. It seems that for this retrospective dataset, variables with the most 
missing values at student level are the job-related and family background related variables. 
 For the institution questionnaires, we have no missing values when the categorical college 





college quality measures for sampled institutions, especially for non-elite colleges. Even if data 
from multiple sources are used, the missing rate is still very high for some concrete input-based 
resource measures such as the proportion of faculty members with doctorates and the teaching 
expenditure per student. The high missing rate of around 68% occurs when collecting the 
teaching expenditure per student measure due to the extreme difficulty of finding institutional 
level operational and expenditure data, particularly for non-elite colleges in China. Although elite 
colleges have been required to increase transparency and accountability since 2010, many 
non-elite colleges are still not obliged to publish annual teaching quality reports and they are 
conservative in disclosing school finance facts that are considered to be sensitive. 
Table 3-4 Proportion of Missing Values of Variables in the "Intention-to-work" Sample 
Measures                                                    Percent of Missing Values 




Rural household registration  0.30 
Students’ national college entrance examination (NCEE) total score 11.32 
Academic track in senior high school 1.08 
Student leader in senior high school 0 
Has private room in senior high school 0 
Has private desk in senior high school 0 
Has private computer in senior high school 0 
Has a high volume of books in senior high school 1.85 
Home environment index in senior high school 1.85 
Key senior high school 1.16 
Only child  1.26 
Father’s employment status 10.09 
Father’s highest education level 8.86 
Father’s industry 17.81 
Father’s occupation 9.33 
Mother’s employment status 10.39 
Mother’s highest education level 9.21 
Mother’s industry 16.21 
Mother’s occupation 9.63 
Type of dwelling 1.36 
Area of the dwelling 4.96 
Annual household income 17.84 
Socioeconomic status (SES) index 21.99 
Enrollment rate of ministry-administered universities in home province 2.55 





Residential region before college 2.53 
College major 0.12 
Average academic score in college 22.57 
Whether student has leadership experience in college 0 
Whether student is a Chinese Communist Party member 0.98 
Whether student has technical certificates 0 
Whether student has passed College English Test level-4 and level-6 2.73 
Whether student has Part-time work experiences at college 1.34 
Whether student has merit aid in college 0 
Whether student has need-based aid in college 0 
Whether student has loan in college 2.01 
Whether student has a minor in college 2.09 
Whether student likes the major 1.97 
Number of resumes submitted 26.46 
Whether student has obtained at least one job offer 0 
Institution Level (4984 in total) 
Institution quality categories 0 
Institution specialization 0 
Institution region 0 
Faculty-student ratio in 2011 7.20 
Proportion of faculty members with doctoral degrees in 2011 24.68 
Average NCEE score for newly admitted 2011 college freshman 0 
Teaching expenditure per undergraduate student in 2011 67.54 
College quality index for four input indicators 72.35 
College quality index for three input indicators (expenditure per student excluded) 24.68 
 
Table 3-5 Proportion of Missing Values of Variables in the "Have-job-offer" Sample 
Measures                                                    Percent of Missing Values 




Rural household registration 0.28 
Students’ national college entrance examination (NCEE) total score 9.78 
Academic track in senior high school 0.82 
Student leader in senior high school 0 
Has private room in senior high school 0 
Has private desk in senior high school 0 
Has private computer in senior high school 0 
Has a high volume of books in senior high school 1.86 
Home environment index in senior high school 1.86 
Key senior high school 1.21 
Only child  1.26 
Father’s employment status 8.57 
Father’s highest education level 7.22 
Father’s industry 16.49 
Father’s occupation 7.72 
Mother’s employment status 8.88 
Mother’s highest education level 7.56 





Mother’s occupation 8.03 
Type of dwelling 1.24 
Area of the dwelling 4.23 
Annual household income 16.69 
Socioeconomic status (SES) index 19.79 
Enrollment rate of ministry-administered universities in home province 2.26 
Average GDP per capita in home province,1993-2007 2.26 
Residential region before college 2.23 
College major 0.11 
Average academic score in college 20.44 
Whether student has leadership experience in college 0 
Whether student is a Chinese Communist Party member 0.87 
Whether student has technical certificates 0 
Whether student has passed College English Test level-4 and level-6 2.09 
Whether student has Part-time work experiences at college 1.21 
Whether student has merit aid in college 0 
Whether student has need-based aid in college 0 
Whether student has loan in college 2.11 
Whether student has a minor 2.23 
Whether student likes the major 1.58 
Monthly starting salary from the highest initial job offer 10.54 
Industry of the initial job 3.89 
Whether student has inter-provincial migration behavior 10.4 
Province of workplace 10.37 
Ownership sector of the employer 5.22 
Institution Questionnaire (3547 in total) 
Institution quality categories 0 
Institution specialization 0 
Institution region 0 
Faculty-student ratio in 2011 7.08 
Proportion of faculty members with doctoral degree in 2011 25.85 
Average NCEE score for newly admitted 2011 college freshman 0 
Teaching expenditure per undergraduate student 68.71 
College quality index for four input indicators 74.23 
College quality index for three input indicators (expenditure per student excluded) 25.85 
 Overall, the missing data problem is not severe. However, given the moderate missing data 
percentages for some variables for the above two samples, it is better to treat the missing data 
problem carefully instead of simply ignoring it. In this dissertation, the dummy variable 
adjustment approach is employed to deal with the missing data in student questionnaire 
instruments. The results reported in the main body of this dissertation are based on the imputed 
data with the single imputation procedure and the dummy variable adjustment method.  





case of missing value in one or more variables by default. Thus, the valid sample size for the full 
model of the wage determination equation shrinks considerably. Complete case analysis is often 
criticized for loss of statistical power and efficiency. Although, in the case that missing data 
mechanism is missing completely at random (MCAR), the result is generally unbiased. But the 
conclusion will not hold if the data missing mechanism for the dataset is indeed missing at 
random (MAR) and not missing at random (NMAR). Moreover, the inconsistent sample sizes 
from model to model make the direct comparison of results infeasible.  
 When the dummy variable adjustment treatment is executed, we generate a set of missing 
dummy indicators D (1 for missing, and 0 for not missing) and include them in regressions. The 
missing values in original variables with incomplete cases X are imputed by Z (0 for dummies 
and group mean for continuous variables). Then, X is replaced by both Z and D in regressions. 
The coefficients on Z are our focuses, which captures the effects of the non-missing X while the 
coefficients on D are the average impact of missing data. For the dataset in use, the results are 
quite robust when the dummy variable adjustment treatment is employed. 
 The outliers are identified before any missing data treatment measures are executed. There is 
no outlier for dichotomous variables or categorical variables. For continuous variables, an outlier 
influences both the mean and standard deviation of a variable’s distribution and twists the true 
relationship between this variable and another. A few monthly wage numbers that are near the 
top or bottom distribution of wage values are deemed outliers and recoded to missing. No 
outliers are identified for the NCEE score since all of them lie in a reasonable range. In fact, no 
test score can be seen as the outlier as long as it does not exceed the full score. Thus, only a few 
very low average academic scores in college are treated as outliers. Furthermore, our research 





the Chinese education system. But there is no upper bound for students’ age. Thus, several 
observations in the bottom of the age distribution are regarded as outliers. The cleaned age 
variable ranges from 20 to 31.  
3.7.5 Index Construction 
 In multiple regressions, retaining all available covariates may lead to a severe 
multicollinearity problem and cause over fitting of the model. It may also reduce the estimation 
accuracy by inducing a larger standard error when we have a large number of measurements 
from different dimensions to gauge certain variables. In order to avoid possible measurement 
error and collinearity, some variables derived from the student and institutional instruments are 
combined into fewer indexes with the method of principal component analysis (PCA). Invented 
by Pearson (1901) and Hotelling (1933), PCA is a statistical procedure to transform a set of 
interrelated variables into a new set of uncorrelated variables, the principal components, while 
maintaining the variation as much as possible in order to reduce the dimensionality of a data set 
(Jolliffe, 2002). Because the first principal component keeps the largest possible variance, the 
indexes using the first principal component will replace the original set of pre-transformation 
variables. The tables below report the loading matrixes for constructed indexes in this 
dissertation. 
 With extensive measures for family background and household wealth, it is an increasingly 
common routine to create a Socioeconomic status (SES) index to avoid the potential 
multicollinearity problem when a collection of family or household variables are jointly used 
(Houweling, 2003; Krishnan, 2010; Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006). The SES index in this 
dissertation is constructed from many family background variables including annual household 





education levels and parents’ occupations. Most of these raw family background variables are 
categorical variables except annual household income and household wealth variables. For 
instance, parents’ education attainment is categorized into 12 categories. Likewise, we have 20 
categories for parents’ occupation and 18 categories for parents’ industry. These categorical 
variables are recoded as binary variables because the quantitative scale does not have any 
meaning and is not suitable for PCA analysis, as suggested by Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006). 
Even with these recoded binary variables, including all of them would lead to a 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) value below the acceptance threshold of 0.5.  
 Therefore, the categorical variables are recoded in the following way: For parents’ education 
levels, they are recoded into continuous years of education measures based on the rule specified 
in a previously Chinese study (Du & Yue, 2010). Specifically, people with “no schooling” are 
recoded as having 0 years of education, “primary school graduates” as having 9 years of 
schooling, “high school or secondary vocational school graduates” as having 12 years of 
schooling, “post-secondary vocational college” as having 14.5 years of schooling and “college 
graduates” as having 16 years of school. Unlike Du & Yue (2010), we further differentiate people 
with master’s degrees and doctoral degrees. “Master’s degree holders” are coded as having 19 
years of schooling and “doctoral degree holders” are coded as having 22 years of education. This 
coding rule is in accordance with the typical length of schooling completion at each educational 
level in China. For parents’ occupational information, three sets of binary variables are created. 
These new variables are created at the household level, so a value of 1 indicates that at least one 
parent in the household belongs to that category. The first set of variables describes the position 
or nature of one’s occupation. The categories include whether a parent in the household was a 





clerks, sales), self-employed (e.g., small business owners, peddlers), a manual worker or farmer, 
or unemployed/not in the labor force. The second set of variables describes the parents’ working 
industry. The categories represent whether a parent in the household worked in the 
manufacturing industry, retail or service industry, high-income industry including IT and finance 
industries, or public service industries including education and medical service. The third set 
describes the nature of the employer. The categories are whether a parent in the household 
worked for the government, for public services, for enterprises, or for a self-owned business. The 
type of dwelling is recoded into six categories: a dwelling in a rural area, a dwelling in an 
affordable housing community, a dwelling in town, a dwelling in the residency community of 
one’s employer, an ordinary commercial dwelling and a commercial dwelling in high-income 
community. 
 The continuous variables, annual household income and area of dwelling are transformed 
with the natural logarithm form to avoid distribution skewness and kurtosis. Outliers are 
identified and deleted during the PCA because of its sensitivity to outliers. Any missing 
observations are also dropped in the PCA process. A final sample of 5231 observations is left in 
the analysis. 
 Additional criteria are met before the PCA proceeds. The correlation matrix examination 
ensures that no variables with too weak correlation (none of the correlation parameters is greater 
than 0.2) or too strong correlation (any correlation parameter is greater than 0.9) with other 
variables are dropped. In addition, variables with individual KMO value less than 0.5 is also not 
allowed. We pay special attention to keep at least two variables from each of the three sets of 
variables that describe parents’ occupational information.  





income in its natural logarithm form, father’s years of education, mother’s years of education, 
area of dwelling in its natural logarithm form, two variables describing type of dwelling 
(rural/urban, ordinary commercial dwelling or not), four variables describing parents’ occupation 
position (whether a manager, a professional, an ordinary staff, or a manual worker or farmer), 
two variables describing the nature of employers (government, public institutions) and two 
variables describing the parents’ working industry (public service, service and retail industry). 
 Other than fulfilling the standards above, the appropriateness of the PCA process is tested 
and proved. The null hypothesis of Bartlett’s test of sphericity is rejected with a p-value of 0.000, 
which satisfies the requirement. The KMO value of all variables is 0.805, larger than the 
minimum requirement of 0.5. The determinant of the correlation matrix is 0.019, larger than the 
necessary value. Five components with eigenvalues greater than 1 are derived from the PCA 
extraction. The first component explains 30.35% of the total variance. We use the first 
component to present the SES as the common routine in applications of PCA in SES index 
construction (Houweling, 2003). The component loadings for SES variables are shown in Table 
3-6. Additional results from the PCA analysis for SES index construction are included in 
Appendix 2. 
Table 3-6 Component Loadings for Socioeconomic Status Variable 
 Component 
1 
Annual household income 0.625 
Area of dwelling -0.120 
Mother’s years of schooling 0.723 
Father’s years of schooling 0.729 
Rural residency -0.739 
Ordinary commercial residency 0.514 
At least one parent is a manager in the household 0.568 
At least one parent is a professional in the household 0.541 
At least one parent is an ordinary staff in the household 0.307 
At least one parent is a farm worker -0.602 





At least one parent works in public institutions 0.606 
At least one parent works in the public service sector 0.582 
At least one parent works in the service and retail industry 0.168 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Component 1: Socioeconomic Status (SES) 
 Table 3-7 lists pre-college home environment variables. The home environment variable 
describes the study environment at home and parental attention to kids’ study. This first 
component explains 42% of the total variance. It is constructed from four indicator variables for 
whether the student has a private room, a private desk, a private computer, and a high volume of 
books during senior high school period. The loadings for all variables are positive. The overall 
KMO value is 0.65, which satisfies the validity requirement. 
Table 3-7 Component Loadings for Pre-college Home Environment Variable 
Variable Component 1 
Have private room in senior high school 0.4496 
Have private desk in senior high school 0.4832 
Have private computer in senior high school 0.5779 
Have a high volume of book in senior high school 0.4800 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Component 1: Pre-college Home Environment 
 Table 3-8 reports input-based resource college quality variables. Two college quality indexes 
are computed. One index is for four input-based college quality indicators, and the other index is 
for three input-based college quality indicators excluding the expenditure per student because of 
the extraordinarily high missing rate on this variable. These two indexes explain about 60% of 
the total variance in the data. They both have high positive loadings on the proportion of faculty 
members with doctoral degrees and the average freshman NCEE score, but negative loading on 
the faculty-student ratio.  
Table 3-8 Component Loadings for College Quality Variable 




Faculty-student ratio  -0.3343             -0.0933 
Proportion of faculty members with doctoral 
degrees 





Average freshman NCEE 0.5837          0.7048 
Teaching expenditure per student 0.4890          Not included 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 


















































Chapter 4 Descriptive Statistics 
 Chapter 4 begins with the descriptive statistics tables for both the “Intention-to-work” 
sample and the “Have-job-offer” sample and it is followed by the descriptive analysis on early 
labor market outcomes and college quality. Section 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics for all 
the variables used in the models. Then the partial correlation coefficients are listed for covariates 
used in the empirical models. Section 4.2 presents the distribution of early labor market 
outcomes by college quality type. Section 4.3 shows the aspects of college quality and student 
characteristics by college quality type. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation  
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 The descriptive statistics analysis aims to give us an understanding of how the data are 
distributed for each variable in our dataset. We could inspect distributions of all quantitative 
variables by providing the mean, standard deviation, the minimum values and the maximum 
values in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2. It is worth noting that means for dichotomous variables (the 
categorical variables are broken down into dummies) should be interpreted as proportions. 
 Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 below show the descriptive statistics of variables that are going to 
be used in the employment status determination model and the wage determination model 
separately. The former is based on the “Intention-to-work” sample, while the latter is based on 
the sample with students within the “Intention-to-work” sample who successfully obtained at 
least one job offer. Thus, the latter one is called the “Have-job-offer” sample. Both tables report 
the original data without missing data replacements, and the figures are weighted by the 





and overall college quality indexes. 
 According to Table 4-1, the percentage of students that have at least one offer is 66.2%. 
Female students account for around 46% of all the students who have the intention to work after 
graduation. About 5.4% of all students are minority students, and 46.6% are rural 
registered-residence students. The sampling weighted average NCEE score is 69.8. Within this 
sample, 34.8% of students are only children in the family, and their average academic score in 
college is about 79. More than half are in the science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) 
majors compared with 13.1% in liberal arts majors, 8% in social sciences, 17.8% in economics 
and management, and 6.1% in others. The percentage of party members, student union leaders, 
and technical certificate holders is 27.1%, 20.5%, and 45.1%, respectively. 24.1% of students do 
not pass the College English Test (CET) level 4 even when they are about to graduate, in contrast 
to 46.3% of CET 4 passers and 29.6% of CET 6 passers. It is common for students to take 
part-time jobs in college. The percentage of students that have part-time working experiences is 
about 82.2%, and 30.8% of students have earned merit aid scholarships. 21% of students have 
need-based aid and almost 30% of students take out loans. 6.4% of students have a minor. 
Students make great efforts to find jobs. The average number of resumes submitted for job 
hunting is about 22 copies. 
 In terms of institutional characteristics, 16% of students are in elite colleges versus 84% in 
non-elite colleges. More specifically, 5.1% are in Project 985 colleges, 10.8% are in Project 211 
colleges, 72.8% are in non-key colleges, and 11.2% are in independent colleges. Engineering is 
the most popular specialized subject category in our sample, which is followed by 29.7% of 
students attending normal universities
14
 and 21.2% of students attending comprehensive 
colleges. The sample covers institutions from five regions with the largest proportion of students 
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from institutions in the East. On average, one faculty member needs to accommodate about 17 
students. There is a large discrepancy among HEIs in terms of the composition of faculty 
education attainments and the teaching expenditures on the undergraduate student body. It is 
astonishing that the best-equipped university has spent nearly 20 times the expense on 
stimulating student learning and teaching than the worst-equipped university in our sample.  
Table 4-1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the "Intention-to-work" Sample-Weighted 
Variable N Mean/ 
Proportion 
S.D. Minimum Maximum 
Student variables 
Have job offer (Yes = 1) (%) 4984 0.662 0.473 0 1 
Age 4890 23.016 0.995 20 31 
Female (Yes = 1) (%) 4967 0.459 0.498 0 1 
Minority (Yes = 1) (%) 4942 0.054 0.227 0 1 
Rural household registration (Yes = 1) (%) 4969 0.466 0.499 0 1 
NCEE (rescaled to 1~100) 4420 69.824 7.721 24 100 
Academic track in high school (%)      
  Humanities 4930 0.245 0.430 0 1 
  Science and comprehensive 4930 0.693 0.461 0 1 
  Arts and athletics 4930 0.062 0.242 0 1 
Non-cognitive leadership skills (%) 4984 0.398 0.490 0 1 
Home environment in high school 4892 -0.155 1.167 -1.479 2.95 
Only child (Yes = 1) (%) 4921 0.348 0.476 0 1 
SES index 3888 -0.237 0.942 -2.191 2.799 
Enrollment rate of ministry-administered 
colleges in home province 
4857 4.806 2.733 1.890 13.770 
Average GDP per capita in home province 4857 10835 6528 3360 32344 
Residential region before college (%)      
  Municipality 4858 0.093 0.291 0 1 
  East 4858 0.308 0.462 0 1 
  Northeast 4858 0.134 0.340 0 1 
  Central 4858 0.248 0.432 0 1 
  West 4858 0.216 0.412 0 1 
College majors (%)      
Liberal arts 4978 0.131 0.338 0 1 
Social sciences 4978 0.080 0.271 0 1 
 STEM 4978 0.551 0.497 0 1 
Economics and management 4978 0.178 0.382 0 1 
Others 4978 0.061 0.239 0 1 
Average academic score in college 3859 78.617 6.553 25 100 
Communist party member (Yes = 1)(%) 4935 0.271 0.444 0 1 
Student leader (Yes = 1) (%) 4984 0.205 0.404 0 1 
Have technical certificate (Yes = 1) (%) 4984 0.451 0.498 0 1 
College English Test proficiency (%)      
does not pass CET4 & CET6 4848 0.241 0.428 0 1 





 pass CET6 4848 0.296 0.456 0 1 
Have Part-time work experience (Yes = 1) 
(%) 
4917 0.822 0.382 0 1 
Have merit aid (Yes = 1) (%) 4396 0.308 0.462 0 1 
Have need-based aid 4984 0.210 0.408 0 1 
Have loan 4884 0.293 0.445 0 1 
Have minor (Yes = 1) (%) 4880 0.064 0.246 0 1 
Like major 4886 2.633 0.802 1 4 
Number of resumes submitted 3990 22.432 24.727 0 100 
Institution variables 
Elite college (Yes = 1) (%) 4984 0.160 0.366 0 1 
Institution quality categories (%)      
  Project 985 colleges 4984 0.051 0.221 0 1 
  Project 211 colleges 4984 0.108 0.311 0 1 
  Non-key colleges 4984 0.728 0.445 0 1 
  Independent colleges 4984 0.112 0.316 0 1 
Institution specialization (%)      
  Comprehensive 4984 0.212 0.408 0 1 
  Engineering 4984 0.441 0.497 0 1 
  Normal 4984 0.297 0.457 0 1 
  Agriculture 4984 0.040 0.196 0 1 
  Finance 4984 0.001 0.035 0 1 
  Political science 4984 0.007 0.081 0 1 
  Ethnic 4984 0.003 0.053 0 1 
Institution region (%)      
  Municipality 4984 0.133 0.339 0 1 
  East 4984 0.272 0.445 0 1 
  Northeast 4984 0.150 0.357 0 1 
  Central 4984 0.242 0.428 0 1 
  West 4984 0.203 0.403 0 1 
Faculty-student ratio 4625 0.057 0.007 0.042 0.077 
Proportion of Ph.D. faculty members 3754 0.335 0.163 0.070 0.870 
Average freshman NCEE score 4984 67.2 5.3 56.0 86.5 
Teaching expenditure per student 1618 5056 4293 1177 20000 
College quality index 1378 -0.249 1.437 -3.031 4.864 
College quality index(expenditure 
excluded) 
3754 -0.988 1.422 -3.727 3.991 
 A number of variables included in the equation of employment status also appear in the wag 
equation. Minor changes of descriptive statistics occur for these shared variables, as shown in 
Table 4-2. The mean starting monthly wage for the students who have at least one job offer is 
2377 RMB. Students show a large distribution of wages, with a standard deviation of about 1208 
RMB. This may be due to highly uneven job placements and job pay even when entering the 





outliers are identified and removed. Some graduates’ starting salaries barely surpass the local 
minimum-wage level and these graduates need to work the entire year to earn the equivalent 
amount. Wage determination models control for student job market behaviors that are not in the 
employment status determination model. College students are highly flexible and mobile in 
terms of work place destination choice. For example, 43.2% of students have inter-provincial 
migration behaviors that are conditional on successfully finding a job. Students lean to jobs in 
the knowledge-intensive industries and high value-added industries. The mining, manufacturing, 
and construction industry sector absorbs the biggest proportion of college graduates, about 26%. 
It is followed by telecom/computer service and the software industry and then finance and 
utilities/energy. The developed areas such as the coastal provinces and large municipal cities are 
the most attractive workplace destinations for fresh college graduates. 46.8% of students find 
jobs in the private sector and 40.9% are in the public sector. The foreign or co-owned enterprises 
absorb 12.2% of students. 
Table 4-2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the "Have-job-offer" Sample-Weighted 
Variable N Mean/ 
Proportion 
S.D. Minimum Maximum 
Student variables 
Starting monthly wage (in RMB) 3173 2376.94 1207.63 500 20000 
Age 3491 23.031 0.997 20 30 
Female (Yes = 1) (%) 3537 0.427 0.495 0 1 
Minority (Yes = 1) (%) 3518 0.0500 0.219 0 1 
Rural household registration (Yes = 1) (%) 3537 0.503 0.500 0 1 
NCEE (rescaled to 1-100) 3200 70.55 7.335 24 100 
Track in high school (%)      
  Humanities 3518 0.213 0.410 0 1 
  Science and comprehensive 3518 0.736   0.441 0 1 
  Arts and athletics 3518 0.051 0.219 0 1 
Student leader in high school 3547 0.419 0.494 0 1 
Home environment in high school 3481 -0.245 1.148 -1.479 2.950 
Residential region before college (%)      
  Municipality 3468 0.088 0.283 0 1 
  East 3468 0.287 0.453 0 1 
  Northeast 3468 0.121 0.327 0 1 
  Central 3468 0.273 0.445 0 1 





Only child (Yes = 1) (%) 3510 0.305 0.461 0 1 
SES index 2845 -0.310 0.931 -2.191 2.799 
Enrollment rate of ministry-administered 
universities in home province 
3467 4.730 2.708 1.890 13.770 
Average GDP per capita in home province 3467 10551 6437 3360 32344 
College major (%)      
Liberal arts 3543 0.116 0.320 0 1 
Social sciences 3543 0.059 0.235 0 1 
 STEM 3543 0.605 0.489 0 1 
 Economics and management 3543 0.170 0.376 0 1 
Others 3543 0.051 0.219 0 1 
Average academic score in college 2822 78.209 6.173 25 100 
Communist party member (Yes = 1) (%) 3516 0.285 0.451 0 1 
Student union leader (Yes = 1) (%) 3547 0.204 0.403 0 1 
Have technical certificate (Yes = 1) (%) 3547 0.461 0.499 0 1 
College English Test proficiency (%)      
does not pass CET4 & CET6 3473 0.226 0.418 0 1 
pass CET4 3473 0.472 0.499 0 1 
 pass CET6 3473 0.301 0.459 0 1 
Have Part-time work experience (Yes = 1) 
(%) 
3504 0.855 0.352 0 1 
Have merit aid (Yes = 1) (%) 3128 0.372 0.483 0 1 
Have need-based aid 3547 0.235 0.424 0 1 
Have loan 3472 0.328 0.470 0 1 
Have minor  3468 0.065 0.247 0 1 
Like major 3491 2.651 0.785 1 4 
Inter provincial work migration (Yes = 1) 
(%) 
3178 0.432 0.495 0 1 
Job industry (%)      
  Agriculture/Fishing/Forestry 3409 0.023 0.150 0 1 
  Mining/Manufactory/Construction 3409 0.260 0.439 0 1 
  Utilities/Energy 3409 0.056 0.231 0 1 
  Transportation/Storage/Postal 3409 0.042 0.201 0 1 
  Telecom/Computer and software 3409 0.154 0.361 0 1 
  Wholesale/Retail 3409 0.039 0.193 0 1 
  Hospitality/Food service 3409 0.023 0.151 0 1 
  Finance 3409 0.072 0.258 0 1 
  Real estate 3409 0.041 0.197 0 1 
  Lease & Business service 3409 0.021 0.143 0 1 
  Education 3409 0.085 0.279 0 1 
  Medical care 3409 0.029 0.167 0 1 
  Culture/Sport/Social utility 3409 0.046 0.209 0 1 
  Science & Research/Technology service 3409 0.055 0.227 0 1 
  Water/Environment protection 3409 0.012 0.108 0 1 
  Community and other services 3409 0.015 0.121 0 1 
  Government/NGO/International  
  organization 
3409 0.012 0.111 0 1 
  Other 3409 0.016 0.124 0 1 
Province of work place (%)      
Beijing 3179 0.109 0.311 0 1 





Hebei 3179 0.014 0.116 0 1 
Shanxi 3179 0.005 0.072 0 1 
Inner Mongolia 3179 0.005 0.074 0 1 
Liaoning 3179 0.036 0.187 0 1 
Jilin 3179 0.030 0.170 0 1 
Heilongjiang 3179 0.015 0.120 0 1 
Shanghai 3179 0.045 0.207 0 1 
Jiangsu 3179 0.038 0.192 0 1 
Zhejiang 3179 0.041 0.198 0 1 
Anhui 3179 0.008 0.088 0 1 
Fujian 3179 0.144 0.352 0 1 
Jiangxi 3179 0.038 0.191 0 1 
Shandong 3179 0.057 0.231 0 1 
Henan 3179 0.045 0.207 0 1 
Hubei 3179 0.019 0.136 0 1 
Hunan 3179 0.036 0.187 0 1 
Guangdong 3179 0.128 0.334 0 1 
Guangxi 3179 0.012 0.107 0 1 
Hainan 3179 0.005 0.070 0 1 
Chongqing 3179 0.023 0.151 0 1 
Sichuan 3179 0.022 0.148 0 1 
Guizhou 3179 0.006 0.078 0 1 
Yunnan 3179 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Tibet 3179 0.001 0.034 0 1 
Shannxi 3179 0.078 0.267 0 1 
Gansu 3179 0.004 0.062 0 1 
Qinghai 3179 0.001 0.036 0 1 
Ningxia 3179 0.002 0.040 0 1 
Xinjiang 3179 0.010 0.101 0 1 
Ownership type of Employer (%)      
Public 3362 0.409 0.492 0 1 
Foreign or co-owned 3362 0.122 0.328 0 1 
Private 3362 0.468 0.499 0 1 
Institution variables 
Elite college (%) 3547 0.175 0.380 0 1 
College quality categories (%)      
  Project 985 colleges 3547 0.059 0.236 0 1 
  Project 211 colleges 3547 0.116 0.320 0 1 
  Non-key colleges 3547 0.736 0.441 0 1 
  Independent colleges 3547 0.089 0.285 0 1 
Institution specialization (%)      
  Comprehensive 3547 0.206 0.405 0 1 
  Engineering 3547 0.503 0.500 0 1 
  Normal 3547 0.247 0.431 0 1 
  Agriculture 3547 0.035 0.183 0 1 
  Finance 3547 0.001 0.020 0 1 
  Political science 3547 0.006 0.076 0 1 
  Ethnic 3547 0.003 0.053 0 1 
Institution region (%)      
  Municipality 3547 0.126 0.332 0 1 





  Northeast 3547 0.134 0.341 0 1 
  Central 3547 0.260 0.439 0 1 
  West 3547 0.220 0.414 0 1 
Faculty-student ratio 3296 0.057 0.007 0.042 0.077 
Proportion of Ph.D. faculty members 2630 0.346 0.157 0.070 0.870 
Average freshman NCEE score 3547 67.7 5.1 56.0 85.5 
Teaching expenditure per student 1110 5498 4691 1177 20000 
College quality index 914 -0.151 1.517 -3.031 4.864 
College quality index (expenditure 
excluded) 
2630 -0.848 1.333 -3.727 3.991 
4.1.2 Correlation 
 It is necessary to check the correlation coefficients of the covariates in multivariate 
regressions to detect potential multicollinearity problems and refine the models. In this section, I 
examine the pairwise correlation coefficients between the covariates by Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient matrixes for the “Intention-to-work” sample and the “Have-job-offer” sample.  
 According to results from the Pearson’s correlation coefficient matrixes in Table 4-3 and 
Table 4-4, all covariate pairs yield correlation coefficients lower than |0.7|, which is regarded as 
an appropriate indicator for finding possible collinearity that might severely distort model 
estimations.  
 Further diagnosis is conducted with the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) method after each 
regression is run to guarantee that no explanatory variable in the correlation tables has VIF 
higher than the threshold value of 10. Therefore, we should not be concerned about the 
multicollinearity problems. More specifically, the VIF test results demonstrate that high VIF 
values appear when several pairs of covariates are included simultaneously in the regression 
models. For instance, students’ region of residence before college and the region of the college 
location are highly correlated, and it tends to generate a high VIF value when both variables are 
included in analysis models, so the students’ region of residence variable has been deleted from 





industries and the initial job position variable itself lacks variation because most of the fresh 
graduates end up in junior positions when their career begins. Therefore, graduates’ job position 
indicators are not included in subsequent model specifications. 
 The SES index is constructed to reduce the multidimensional family background information, 
and it includes information from highly correlated family background such as the annual 
household income, parental years of education, parental job industry and parental occupation. We 
use the SES index to replace the set of family background variables. As expected, the overall 
college quality indexes are correlated with input-based college quality indicators. 
Table 4-3 Pearson's Correlation Coefficients for the "Intention-to-work" Sample-Weighted 











index for 4 
inputs 
Quality 
index for 3 
inputs 
Elite 1       
Faculty-student 
ratio 
-0.0185 1      
Proportion of 
Ph.D. faculty 
0.5802** 0.1316** 1     
Student 
selectivity 
0.6245** -0.0430** 0.6964** 1    
Expenditure per 
student 
0.4388** -0.2371** 0.6495** 0.5134** 1   
Quality index 4 0.6372** -0.2115** 0.9428** 0.9230** 0.8473** 1  
Quality index 3 0.6337** -0.0191 0.9008** 0.9366** 0.6584** 0.9669** 1 
Age -0.0694** -0.0416** -0.1712** -0.0718** -0.0225 -0.0927** -0.1266** 
Female -0.0502** 0.0383** -0.1129** -0.0125 -0.0625* -0.0310 -0.0470** 
Minority 0.0575** -0.0888** -0.0558** -0.0268 0.0341 0.00480 -0.0515** 
Rural -0.0216 -0.00850 -0.0115 0.00310 0.1229** 0.0639* 0.00790 
NCEE 0.3851** -0.1543** 0.4171** 0.5017** 0.1496** 0.2986** 0.5135** 
Humanities track -0.0496** 0.1693** -0.0916** -0.0544** -0.1402** -0.1053** -0.0735** 
Arts and 
Athletics track 
-0.0310* 0.0816** -0.1257** -0.0263 -0.0215 -0.0440 -0.0894** 
Non-cognitive 
leadership skills 
0.0330* -0.0285 -0.0171 0.0430** 0.0589* 0.0664* 0.0177 
Only child 0.0360* -0.0573** 0.0146 -0.0234 0.0297 0.1047** -0.0180 




0.0594** 0.0192 0.1425** 0.0486** -0.0465 0.0324 0.0953** 
Major in liberal 
arts 
-0.0571** 0.0787** -0.1952** -0.1192** -0.0469 -0.0383 -0.1777** 
Major in social 
sciences 
-0.0450** 0.0258 0.0132 0.0398** -0.0717** 0.0137 0.0595** 







Major in other 
disciplines 
0.0181 0.0528** -0.0637** 0.00190 0.0218 0.0576* -0.0356* 
Average 
Academic score 
-0.0175 0.0912** -0.0978** -0.0449** -0.0658* -0.0118 -0.0793** 
Party member 0.0713** 0.0738** 0.0358* 0.1164** 0.0149 0.00140 0.0927** 
Student leader 0.0176 0.0342* 0.0286 0.0600** -0.0641** -0.0784** 0.0565** 
Pass CET4 -0.0475** -0.0491** -0.0496** -0.0867** -0.0179 -0.0666* -0.0845** 
Pass CET6 0.1685** -0.0168 0.2329** 0.2753** 0.0225 0.1238** 0.3100** 
Have certificate -0.0284* -0.0290* -0.0605** -0.0405** 0.00900 -0.00340 -0.0583** 
Part-time work -0.0240 0.0559** -0.0369* 0.0275 0.0390 0.0157 0.00410 
Have merit aid 0.00110 0.0215 -0.0433** 0.00720 -0.0176 0.0478 -0.0117 
Have minor 0.0197 -0.0765** 0.0364* 0.0597** -0.0473 -0.0570* 0.0627** 
Like major 0.0130 -0.00150 -0.0747** -0.0399** -0.00110 0.0171 -0.0720** 
Engineering 
college 
-0.0568** -0.3324** 0.0402* -0.0417** -0.0874** -0.0766** -0.0184 
Normal college -0.2451** 0.2273** -0.5007** -0.2981** -0.00570 0.1107** -0.4438** 
Agriculture 
college 
0.0681** 0.1860** 0.2140** 0.0569** -0.0328 -0.0200 0.1326** 
Finance college -0.0153 -0.00880 -0.00880 -0.00760   -0.00840 
Political science 
college 
-0.0357* -0.0376* 0.0628** 0.1369** -0.1212** -0.0160 0.1181** 
Ethnic college 0.1223** -0.0384**  0.0730**    
College in the 
Northeast 
-0.1307** -0.5236** -0.3390** -0.2795** -0.00540 0.0275 -0.3166** 
College in the 
Central 
-0.0404** 0.2891** 0.2102** -0.1817** -0.3507** -0.4630** -0.0363* 
College in the 
West 
0.0895** 0.0688** -0.3020** 0.1512** 0.5949** 0.3568** -0.0804** 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 
Table 4-3 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients for the “Intention-to-work” Sample-Weighted 
(Continued) 





Age 1       
Female -0.0413** 1      
Minority 0.0169 -0.000100 1     
Rural 0.1579** -0.0754** -0.0557** 1    
NCEE -0.0650** -0.0331* -0.0968** 0.1180** 1   
Humanities track -0.00750 0.3744** -0.0225 -0.0394** 0.0778** 1  
Arts and athletics track 0.0578** 0.0387** 0.00630 -0.0748** -0.5436** -0.1470** 1 
Non-cognitive leadership 
skills 
0.0201 0.0207 0.0246 -0.0507** 0.0142 0.0264 0.00930 
Only child -0.1375** -0.0110 0.0761** -0.4582** -0.1155** -0.0399** 0.0828** 
SES -0.1979** 0.0880** 0.0741** -0.6564** -0.1124** 0.0304 0.0671** 
Annual household income -0.1473** 0.0817** 0.0205 -0.3377** -0.0385* 0.0823** 0.0139 
Major in liberal arts 0.00650 0.3005** 0.00330 -0.0342* 0.0194 0.5073** -0.0700** 
Major in social sciences 0.00710 0.1330** -0.0410** 0.0214 -0.0189 0.2152** 0.0876** 
Major in economics and 
management 





Major in other disciplines 0.0339* 0.0583** 0.0571** -0.0482** -0.3669** -0.1063** 0.5957** 
Average academic score 0.0354* 0.2915** -0.0298 0.0108 -0.00660 0.1760** 0.0940** 
Party member 0.0374** 0.1355** -0.0481** 0.0371** 0.0608** 0.0664** 0.0401** 
Student leader 0.00140 0.0619** 0.000700 -0.0729** 0.0247 0.0717** -0.0109 
Pass CET4 0.0278 -0.0820** -0.00120 0.0111 -0.00120 -0.0790** -0.0403** 
Pass CET6 -0.0984** 0.2402** -0.0745** -0.0452** 0.3243** 0.1878** -0.1486** 
Have certificate 0.00210 0.0368** -0.00280 0.00860 -0.0100 0.0116 -0.00140 
Part-time work 0.0702** 0.1329** -0.0392** 0.1148** -0.0281 0.0776** -0.00380 
Have merit aid 0.00630 0.1959** -0.0203 0.0536** 0.0273 0.0226 -0.0140 
Have minor 0.0143 0.0434** -0.00180 -0.0751** 0.0381* 0.0325* 0.0293* 
Like major 0.0469** 0.0391** 0.0243 0.0163 -0.0947** 0.0202 0.1155** 
Engineering college -0.0201 -0.2917** 0.0322* 0.0513** 0.0803** -0.2863** -0.0749** 
Normal college 0.0890** 0.2745** -0.0746** 0.0857** -0.2003** 0.3152** 0.0882** 
Agriculture college -0.0260 0.0779** 0.0129 -0.0635** -0.0693** -0.0299* -0.0164 
Finance college -0.00160 -0.00660 0.00120 0.00450 -0.00200 0.0330* -0.00910 
Political science college -0.0426** 0.00920 -0.00560 -0.0622** 0.0948** 0.0460** -0.0212 
Ethnic college -0.00300 0.0202 0.1164** -0.0100 0.0300* 0.0216 0.00820 
College in the Northeast 0.1100** 0.0118 0.1471** -0.0907** -0.1278** -0.0633** 0.0125 
College in the Central -0.0665** -0.2375** -0.0636** 0.0881** 0.0466** -0.1065** -0.0792** 
College in the West 0.1085** 0.00570 -0.0346* 0.0743** -0.0755** -0.0001 0.1508** 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 























1       
Only child 0.0840** 1      
SES 0.0240 0.5091** 1     
Annual household income 0.0162 0.2531** 0.5391** 1    
Major in liberal arts 0.0343* -0.0333* -0.0107 -0.0242 1   
Major in social sciences 0.00460 -0.0469** -0.0296 0.0300 -0.1142** 1  
Major in economics and 
management 
0.0296* 0.0601** 0.0862** 0.1272** -0.1806** -0.1367** 1 
Major in other disciplines 0.00200 0.0775** 0.0517** 0.00960 -0.0988** -0.0748** -0.1182** 
Average academic score 0.1322** -0.0308 -0.0428* -0.0186 0.1604** 0.0263 0.0448** 
Party member 0.1383** -0.0500** -0.0195 -0.00660 0.0429** 0.0503** 0.0234 
Student leader 0.1512** 0.0640** 0.0627** 0.0431** 0.0575** 0.0246 0.0339* 
Pass CET4 0.0246 0.0162 0.000600 -0.0138 -0.1002** 0.0205 -0.0310* 
Pass CET6 -0.00260 -0.00660 0.0392* 0.0594** 0.1536** 0.0196 0.0852** 
Have certificate 0.00170 0.00240 -0.0371* -0.0423** 0.0226 -0.0171 0.0323* 
Part-time work 0.0643** -0.1632** -0.1136** -0.0369* 0.0663** 0.0422** 0.0242 
Have merit aid 0.1016** -0.0870** -0.0491** -0.0105 0.00730 -0.0287* 0.0183 
Have minor 0.0484** 0.0693** 0.1001** 0.0508** -0.00360 0.0747** 0.00640 
Like major 0.0767** 0.0634** 0.0545** 0.0258 0.0555** 0.00400 0.0213 
Engineering college -0.00100 -0.0170 0.00630 -0.0594** -0.1974** -0.2196** -0.0247 
Normal college -0.00990 -0.1177** -0.1453** -0.0903** 0.2696** 0.2594** -0.0805** 
Agriculture college -0.0315* 0.1178** 0.0710** 0.0540** -0.0733** 0.00460 0.0451** 
Finance college -0.00120 -0.000300 -0.00590 -0.00120 -0.0106 0.00880 0.0350* 





Ethnic college 0.00360 0.000600 0.0180 -0.00190 0.0258 -0.00410 0.00800 
College in the Northeast 0.0464** 0.1662** 0.0884** -0.0590** 0.0493** -0.0411** -0.0561** 
College in the Central -0.0308* -0.0940** -0.0622** -0.0514** -0.1231** -0.1209** 0.0505** 
College in the West 0.00330 -0.0911** -0.0617** -0.1183** 0.0207 0.00600 -0.0413** 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 
Table 4-3 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients for the “Intention-to-work” Sample-Weighted 
(Continued) 














Major in other 
disciplines 
1       
Average academic score 0.0821** 1      
Party member 0.00320 0.2354** 1     
Student leader -0.0301* 0.1472** 0.2258** 1    
Pass CET4 -0.0554** -0.0306 -0.0270 0.00350 1   
Pass CET6 -0.1061** 0.1827** 0.1010** 0.0546** -0.6020** 1  
Have certificate -0.00720 0.0451** 0.0253 0.0406** 0.0274 0.0491** 1 
Part-time work 0.00900 0.0323* 0.0458** 0.0522** -0.0517** 0.0329* 0.0204 
Have merit aid -0.0200 0.3647** 0.3165** 0.1616** -0.00970 0.1244** 0.0415** 
Have minor -0.00770 0.0799** 0.0721** 0.0789** 0.000500 0.0565** 0.0258 
Like major 0.0577** 0.2495** 0.0926** 0.0615** -0.0418** 0.00160 0.0217 
Engineering college -0.0799** -0.1467** -0.0307* -0.0511** 0.0832** -0.0962* 0.0207 
Normal college 0.0433** 0.1010** 0.0404** 0.00960 -0.0362* -0.00160 0.0711** 
Agriculture college 0.1267** 0.0349* -0.00450 -0.0106 -0.00260 -0.0505** -0.0823** 
Finance college -0.00890 -0.0135 0.00890 0.00260 0.00680 -0.0139 0.00760 
Political science college -0.0208 0.0327* 0.0693** 0.0234 -0.0498** 0.0985** 0.0136 
Ethnic college 0.00830 0.0162 -0.00430 -0.0115 -0.00680 0.0123 0.00630 
College in the Northeast 0.0185 0.0778** -0.1386** -0.0168 0.0826** -0.1170** 0.0696** 
College in the Central -0.0797** -0.0809** 0.00320 -0.0113 0.0504** -0.0761** -0.00870 
College in the West 0.1077** 0.0321* 0.1827** -0.0255 -0.0503** -0.00160 0.0219 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 















Part-time work  1       
Have merit aid 0.1233** 1      
Have minor 0.00290 0.0164 1     
Like major -0.00650 0.0938** 0.0196 1    
Engineering college -0.1470** -0.0261 0.0153 -0.0260 1   
Normal college 0.1348** 0.0468** -0.0405** -0.0267 -0.5769** 1  
Agriculture college -0.00920 -0.0151 -0.0293* 0.0234 -0.1813** -0.1326** 1 
Finance college 0.00560 0.00340 -0.000500 -0.00980 -0.0312* -0.0228 -0.00720 
Political science college -0.0184 0.00220 0.0764** 0.0289* -0.0727** -0.0532** -0.0167 
Ethnic college 0.0113 -0.00610 -0.00970 0.00750 -0.0474** -0.0346* -0.0109 
College in the Northeast -0.1088** 0.0265 0.0422** 0.0841** 0.1759** 0.00810 0.0128 
College in the Central -0.0975** -0.0552** 0.0109 -0.00700 0.5138** -0.3672** -0.1154** 





** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 

















Finance college 1       
Political science college -0.00290 1      
Ethnic college -0.00190 -0.00440 1     
College in the Northeast -0.0148 -0.0344* -0.0224 1    
College in the Central -0.0198 -0.0463** -0.0301* -0.2379** 1   
College in the West 0.0694** -0.0414** -0.0270 -0.2127** -0.2857** 1  
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 
Table 4-4 Pearson's Correlation Coefficients for the "Have-job-offer" Sample-Weighted 















 3 inputs 
Elite 1       
Faculty-student ratio 0.00740 1      
Proportion of Ph.D. 
faculty 
0.6055** 0.2104** 1     
Student selectivity 0.6508** 0.00240 0.6515** 1    
Expenditure per student 0.4074** -0.2608** 0.6346** 0.5066** 1   
Quality index 4 inputs 0.6521** -0.2109** 0.9447** 0.9343** 0.8421** 1  
Quality index 3 inputs 0.6666** 0.0495* 0.8868** 0.9256** 0.6471** 0.9686** 1 
Age -0.0748** -0.0603** -0.1458** -0.0581** -0.0367 -0.0911** -0.1033** 
Female -0.0333* 0.0555** -0.0927** 0.00480 -0.0549 -0.0161 -0.0249 
Minority 0.0549** -0.1092** -0.0123 0.0194 0.0373 0.0143 0.00260 
Rural -0.0158 -0.0140 -0.0265 -0.0208 0.0976** 0.0331 -0.0175 
NCEE 0.3982** -0.1158** 0.4125** 0.5181** 0.0901** 0.2490** 0.5300** 
Humanities track -0.0345* 0.1751** -0.0431* -0.0406* -0.1222** -0.0801* -0.0326 
Arts and athletics track -0.0229 0.0646** -0.1101** 0.00680 0.0223 0.0259 -0.0666** 
Non-cognitive 
leadership skills 
0.0226 -0.0242 -0.0225 0.0426* 0.0371 0.0632 0.0189 
Only child 0.0441** -0.0714** 0.0351 0.0430* 0.0252 0.1030** 0.0337 
SES 0.0524** -0.0465* 0.000400 0.00130 -0.0294 0.0584 -0.0216 
Annual household 
income 
0.0590** 0.0357 0.1232** 0.0271 -0.0329 0.0645 0.0662** 
Major in liberal arts -0.0480** 0.0620** -0.1278** -0.0947** -0.0233 0.00760 -0.1199** 
Major in social sciences -0.0450** 0.0457** -0.0233 0.0246 -0.0552 0.0322 0.0264 
Major in economics and 
management 
0.0697** 0.0741** 0.0167 0.0188 -0.0347 -0.0672* 0.0095 
Major in other 
disciplines 
0.0199 0.0287 -0.0263 0.0343* 0.0231 0.0471 0.0021 
Average academic score 0.0160 0.0830** 0.0202 0.0517** -0.0667* -0.00840 0.0465* 
Party member 0.0579** 0.0968** 0.0216 0.0797** -0.0109 -0.0450 0.0600** 
Student leader 0.0311 0.0555** 0.0365 0.0800** -0.0449 -0.0348 0.0762** 
Pass CET4 -0.0499** -0.0910** -0.0433* -0.0755** -0.0104 -0.0735* -0.0681** 
Pass CET6 0.1814** 0.0419* 0.2304** 0.2777** 0.0115 0.1362** 0.3093** 
Have certificate -0.0263 -0.0461** -0.0540** -0.0174 -0.0088 -0.0007 -0.0345 





Have merit aid -0.0156 0.0410* -0.0200 0.0001 -0.0428 0.0267 0.0006 
Have minor 0.0284 -0.0705** 0.0258 0.0820** -0.0738* -0.0954** 0.0723** 
Like major 0.00600 -0.0141 -0.0500* -0.0325 0.0259 0.0341 -0.0570** 
Engineering college -0.1020** -0.3396** -0.0714** -0.1096** -0.1658** -0.1824** -0.1241** 
Normal college -0.2259** 0.2531** -0.3953** -0.2348** -0.0234 0.0918** -0.3318** 
Agriculture college 0.0678** 0.1750** 0.1890** 0.0427* -0.0558 -0.0412 0.1117** 
Finance college -0.00900 -0.00320 -0.00680 -0.00630   -0.0074 
Political science college -0.0350* -0.0279 0.0537** 0.1258** -0.1209** -0.0273 0.1076** 
Ethnic college 0.1162** -0.0332  0.0715**    
Work migration 0.0959** -0.1218** 0.0301 0.0364* 0.2001** 0.1298** 0.0267 
Foreign sector -0.00760 -0.0268 0.0292 0.00150 0.0229 -0.00190 0.0156 
Private sector -0.0806** 0.0580** -0.0352 -0.0809** -0.0794** -0.0818* -0.0548** 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 
Table 4-4 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients for the “Have-job-offer” Sample-Weighted 
(Continued) 





Age 1       
female -0.0557** 1      
Minority 0.00490 -0.0206 1     
Rural 0.1847** -0.1164** -0.0385* 1    
NCEE -0.0556** -0.0127 -0.0697** 0.1038** 1   
Humanities track 0.0102 0.4165** -0.0445** -0.0826** 0.0906** 1  
Arts and athletics 
track 
0.0529** 0.0366* -0.0125 -0.0740** -0.5341** -0.1204** 1 
Non-cognitive 
leadership skills 
0.00300 0.0178 0.0163 -0.0684** 0.0182 0.0251 0.0164 
Only child -0.1509** 0.0159 0.0420* -0.4426** -0.1002** -0.0169 0.0733** 
SES -0.2089** 0.1024** 0.0560** -0.6680** -0.0965** 0.0548** 0.0923** 
Annual household 
income 
-0.1561** 0.1036** -0.00830 -0.4103** -0.0557** 0.0881** 0.0566** 
Major in liberal arts 0.0390* 0.3267** -0.0320 -0.0113 0.0352* 0.5370** -0.0542** 
Major in social 
sciences 
-0.00600 0.1200** -0.0320 -0.0266 -0.0642** 0.1985** 0.1412** 
Major in economics 
and management 
-0.0355* 0.1629** -0.0122 -0.0748** 0.0730** 0.3040** -0.0943** 
Major in other 
disciplines 
0.0229 0.0549** 0.0817** -0.0425* -0.3483** -0.0971** 0.5689** 
Average academic 
score 
0.00180 0.2676** -0.0667** 0.0380* 0.0558** 0.1319** 0.0521** 
Party member 0.0536** 0.1465** -0.0434* 0.0297 0.0333 0.0860** 0.0364* 
Student leader 0.0264 0.0499** 0.00360 -0.0620** 0.0511** 0.0619** -0.0170 
Pass CET4 0.0298 -0.1022** 0.0217 0.0220 0.00770 -0.0580** -0.0764** 
Pass CET6 -0.1117** 0.2574** -0.0779** -0.0629** 0.3094** 0.1999** -0.1253** 
Have certificate 0.0221 0.0169 0.0178 0.0252 0.00980 0.0257 -0.0285 
Part-time work 0.0581** 0.1511** -0.0525** 0.1166** -0.0462** 0.0953** 0.0378* 
Have merit aid -0.0130 0.1940** -0.0311 0.0549** 0.0161 0.0374* 0.00190 
Have minor 0.0105 0.0379* -0.00750 -0.0821** 0.0362* 0.0464** 0.0486** 
Like major 0.0316 0.00360 0.0126 0.0182 -0.0633** -0.00990 0.1111** 
Engineering college 0.00100 -0.3043** 0.0583** 0.0453** 0.0228 -0.2806** -0.0639** 





Engineering college -0.0211 0.1003** 0.0262 -0.0708** -0.0782** -0.0409* 0.00410 
Finance college 0.00860 0.0001 0.00960 0.00830 -0.00600 0.0240 -0.00450 
Political science 
college 
-0.0403* 0.0333* 0.000100 -0.0715* 0.0836** 0.0456** -0.0177 
Ethnic college -0.000100 0.0238 0.1015** -0.00980 0.0191 0.0144 0.0236 
Work migration 0.0446* -0.2255** 0.0179 0.0733** 0.0709** -0.1720** -0.0477** 
Foreign sector 0.0493** 0.0244 0.00960 0.0192 0.0342 -0.0118 -0.0423* 
Private sector 0.0164 0.1020** -0.0180 0.0796** -0.0585** 0.0874** 0.0177 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 




















1       
Only child 0.1059** 1      
SES 0.0555** 0.5167** 1     
Annual household 
income 
0.0229 0.2895** 0.5603** 1    
Major in liberal arts 0.0112 -0.0309 -0.0157 -0.00390 1   
Major in social 
sciences 
0.00610 -0.0282 0.00710 0.0660** -0.0902** 1  
Major in economics 
and management 
0.0408* 0.0398* 0.0946** 0.1285** -0.1639** -0.1130** 1 
Major in other 
disciplines 
0.00340 0.0576** 0.0690** 0.0465* -0.0835** -0.0576** -0.1046** 
Average academic 
score 
0.1165** -0.0977** -0.0749** -0.0192 0.0593** 0.0627** 0.0762** 
Party member 0.1427** -0.0498** -0.0454* -0.0277 0.0767** 0.0591** 0.0477** 
Student leader 0.1417** 0.0827** 0.0525** 0.0419* 0.0298 0.0179 0.0584** 
Pass CET4 -0.00390 0.0102 -0.00840 0.00530 -0.0933** -0.0190 -0.00450 
Pass CET6 0.0133 0.00850 0.0543** 0.0500** 0.1512** 0.0526** 0.0942** 
Have certificate -0.00980 0.00220 -0.0720** -0.0615** 0.0611** -0.0368* 0.0139 
Part-time work 0.0716** -0.1436** -0.1508** -0.0484** 0.0648** 0.0633** 0.0342* 
Have merit aid 0.0643** -0.0968** -0.0841** -0.0104 -0.0398* -0.00600 0.0504** 
Have minor 0.0410* 0.0850** 0.1047** 0.0913** 0.00210 0.0844** 0.0154 
Like major 0.0695** 0.0371* 0.0405* -0.00600 0.0191 0.0217 0.0390* 
Engineering college -0.0229 0.00240 0.0268 -0.0716** -0.1781** -0.2009** -0.0788** 
Normal college 0.0151 -0.1288** -0.1311** -0.0414* 0.2661** 0.2702** -0.0348* 
Agriculture college -0.0368* 0.1076** 0.0725** 0.0411* -0.0642** -0.0253 0.0389* 
Finance college 0.000400 -0.000800 -0.00140 -0.00480 -0.00710 0.00700 0.0134 
Political science 
college 
0.0294 0.0806** 0.0869** 0.1193** -0.0275 0.2998** -0.0345* 
Ethnic college 0.0119 0.00210 0.0229 0.00390 0.0102 0.000100 0.00920 
Work migration 0.0391* -0.0498** -0.0429* -0.0746** -0.0652** -0.1316** -0.0931** 
Foreign sector 0.000800 0.00250 -0.0177 0.0224 0.00270 -0.0684** 0.00830 
Private sector -0.0536** -0.0890** -0.1109** -0.0511** 0.0911** 0.00740 0.0451** 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 
















Pass CET4 Pass CET6 Have 
certificate 
Major in other 
disciplines 
1       
Average academic 
score 
0.0700** 1      
Party member -0.00660 0.2309** 1     
Student leader -0.0198 0.1291** 0.2142** 1    
Pass CET4 -0.0880** -0.0634** -0.0542** -0.0259 1   
Pass CET6 -0.1011** 0.2340** 0.1213** 0.0565** -0.6217** 1  
Have certificate -0.0579** 0.0278 0.0579** 0.0167 0.00220 0.0467** 1 
Part-time work 0.0588** 0.0782** 0.0404* 0.0343* -0.0299 0.0283 0.0100 
Have merit aid 0.000600 0.3876** 0.2851** 0.1377** -0.0509** 0.1575** 0.0486** 
Have minor 0.0191 0.0813** 0.0644** 0.0774** 0.00220 0.0576** 0.00400 
Like major 0.0390* 0.1942** 0.0858** 0.0708** -0.0411* 0.00450 0.0129 
Engineering college -0.0719** -0.1019** -0.0423* -0.0503** 0.0963** -0.1198** 0.0203 
Normal college 0.0125 0.00200 0.0621** 0.0106 -0.0504** 0.0103 0.0644** 
Agriculture college 0.1810** 0.0569** 0.0194 0.000700 -0.0207 -0.0449** -0.0834** 
Finance college -0.00450 -0.00990 0.0001 -0.00290 -0.00170 -0.0130 -0.00690 
Political science 
college 
-0.0176 0.0321 0.0535** 0.0192 -0.0521** 0.0947** 0.0124 
Ethnic college 0.0235 0.0206 -0.00940 -0.00750 -0.000200 0.00260 0.00420 
Work migration -0.0680** 0.00360 0.0400* 0.00280 0.0549** -0.00450 0.0546** 
Foreign sector 0.0243 0.0122 -0.0180 -0.0164 -0.0108 0.0113 0.00540 
Private sector 0.0256 -0.0307 -0.0302 -0.0812** -0.0679** 0.0258 -0.0031 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 














Part-time work 1       
Have merit aid 0.1117** 1      
Have minor 0.0129 0.0213 1     
Like major -0.0396* 0.0902** 0.0320 1    
Engineering 
college 
-0.1650** -0.0342* -0.0134 0.00720 1   
Normal college 0.1679** 0.0474** -0.0246 -0.0597** -0.5760** 1  
Agriculture 
college 
-0.00340 0.00670 -0.0295 0.0254 -0.1911** -0.1088** 1 
Finance college 0.000200 0.00420 -0.00520 0.00160 -0.0197 -0.0112 -0.00370 
Political science 
college 
-0.0161 -0.00650 0.0799** 0.0177 -0.0765** -0.0436** -0.0145 
Ethnic college 0.00440 -0.00720 -0.00760 0.00380 -0.0538** -0.0306 -0.0102 
Work migration -0.1069** 0.0214 -0.0285 0.00180 0.3951** -0.2595** -0.0870** 
Foreign sector 0.0219 -0.00460 -0.00640 -0.00100 0.0227 -0.0197 0.0318 
Private sector 0.0774** -0.0220 -0.0965** -0.0579** -0.0985** 0.1452** -0.0200 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 




















Finance college 1       
Political science 
college 
-0.00150 1      
Ethnic college -0.00100 -0.00410 1     
Work migration -0.0104 -0.0339 -0.0265 1    
Foreign sector -0.00700 0.00530 0.000700 0.0113 1   
Private sector 0.00540 -0.0147 -0.00250 -0.1214** -0.3139** 1  
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
4.2 Employment Status and Starting Salary 
 Focusing on fresh college graduates who want to find jobs after graduation, the employment 
rates vary by college quality categories. More specifically, the employment rate for students 
enrolled in elite colleges is about 72%, and it is around 65% for non-elite college students. These 
numbers are relatively lower for surveyed students who took the survey right before college 
graduation compared with the official reported employment rates of over 90%, which were 
typically reported 6 months later after students’ graduation. When split into four detailed college 
quality categories, the data reveal an unsurprising employment rate that has decreased as college 
quality becomes lower. It is worth noting that nearly half of graduates of independent colleges 
have not successfully obtained any job offer. The Project 211 college students only have minor 
advantages in terms of finding jobs than students from non-key colleges. 
Table 4-5 Employment Rates of Students by College Quality Categories in the 
"Intention-to-work" Sample 
 
Have job offer 
College Quality Categories 









Yes   0.76 0.71 0.67 0.53 
No    0.24 0.29 0.33 0.47 
Total   1 1 1 1 
 Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 below present the histogram and distribution density plots of the 





and the lines as the kernel density estimates. To distinguish the earning ability by elite college 
groups, the red color is used for earnings of non-elite college students, whereas the wages for 
elite college students appear in blue. In both graphs, we can see a clear trend that the earning 
density with high frequency for non-elite college students is to the left of the highly concentrated 
earning area of elite college students. In other words, we have an impression that in general, elite 
college students outperform non-elite college students in terms of starting wages. From the 
kernel density plot, we find two earning peaks for students in both college quality categories. 
This pattern suggests that many fresh college graduates are offered with threshold starting wage 
levels corresponding to 2000, 2500 and 3000 RMB per month before the natural log 
transformation. Elite college students are more likely to be offered the higher threshold level of 
3000 RMB as their starting wage level than are non-elite college students. Even after outliers are 
removed, the wage variable is highly skewed. Thus, the wage variable has been transformed by 
taking the natural logarithm form to make its distribution normalized and the interpretation easier 
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4.3 College Quality 
 Table 4-6 presents average levels of four input-based resource indicators for each college 
quality category. With the exception of the faculty-student ratio, there is a clear declining trend 
for input indicators from top quality to bottom quality categories. Higher quality colleges are 
equipped with teaching faculties with higher qualifications, more capable students and can afford 
more teaching expenses for students. Unexpectedly, faculty availability does not follow this trend. 
The faculty members seem to be more abundant in independent colleges. It may be due to the 
small scale of many newly established independent colleges and their nature as teaching 
colleges. 
Table 4-6 College Inputs for Each Quality Category 
Input-based college 
quality indicators 
College quality categories 













0.615 0.510 0.334 0.230 
Average freshman 
NCEE score 




9773.74 4623.10 2374.52 N/A 
 Table 4-7 displays group means and differences in means from t-test results conditional on 
elite college attendance for the “Have-job-offer” sample. After weighted by the sampling weight, 
the group means and group differences are compared for the representative sample of the 
population. The simple t-test reveals that the average wages offered to students in elite colleges 
is 32% higher than students in non-elite colleges (2960.16 versus 2250.42). The difference is 
significant at the 1% significance level.  





Simple T-test results from Table 4-7 demonstrate that students’ individual characteristics and 
family backgrounds in elite colleges differ from those of students in non-elite colleges. For 
example, female students encounter difficulties in gaining access to elite colleges, whereas 
minority students may have minor advantages in terms of elite college entrance. Being the only 
child in the family might allow for easier access to into elite colleges. Student selectivity as 
measured by the overall national college entrance examination score is significantly higher for 
elite college students, reflecting the higher admission score line set by elite colleges in China.  
 In terms of college experiences, elite college students are less likely to choose liberal arts 
majors and less likely to gain part-time working experience. However, they have accumulated 
more leadership experience in student organizations and are more likely to have become 
members in the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) while in college. They also perform better on 
College English Test (CET) in terms of the CET-4 passing rate and in achieving higher a higher 
English proficiency level as demonstrated in CET-6. After graduation, elite college students 
appear to be more likely to migrate across provinces.  
 Elite colleges have more favorable school environments and conditions as shown in T-test 
comparisons on concrete college input indicators. Elite college students have more interactions 
and greater attention from faculty members. They are surrounded by higher quality peers, faculty 
members with higher educational attainments, and supported by substantially higher investments 

















Wage 2250.42 2960.16 709.74*** 
Age 23.066 22.869 -0.197*** 
Female 0.438 0.391 -0.047*** 
Minority 0.046 0.076 0.031*** 
Rural 0.507 0.486 -0.021 
NCEE 69.208 76.906 7.698*** 
Science track 0.727 0.777 0.050*** 
Humanities track 0.220 0.183 -0.037** 
Arts and athletics track 0.053 0.040 -0.013 
Only child 0.297 0.350 0.053*** 
SES -0.333 -0.208 0.126*** 
Major in liberal arts 0.123 0.082 -0.041*** 
Major in social sciences 0.063 0.036 -0.027*** 
Major in STEM 0.606 0.595 -0.012 
Major in economics & management 0.158 0.227 0.069*** 
Major in other disciplines 0.049 0.060 0.011 
Average academic score in college 78.161 78.413 0.251 
CPC party member 0.273 0.342 0.069*** 
Student organization leader 0.198 0.231 0.033* 
Have certificate 0.467 0.433 -0.034 
Does not pass CET4&6 0.253 0.100 -0.153*** 
Pass CET4 0.484 0.419 -0.065*** 
Pass CET6 0.263 0.481 0.218*** 
Part-time work 0.871 0.844 -0.027* 
Have merit aid 0.332 0.313 -0.019 
Have need-based aid 0.224 0.283 0.059*** 
Have loan 0.338 0.280 -0.059*** 
Have minor 0.062 0.081 0.018* 
Like major 2.648 2.660 0.012 
Inter-provincial work migration 0.412 0.534 0.123*** 
Public sector 0.385 0.520 0.135*** 
Foreign sector 0.124 0.114 -0.010 
Private sector 0.491 0.366 -0.125*** 
Faculty-student ratio 0.0565 0.0566 0.0001*** 
Proportion of Ph.D. faculty members 0.300 0.541 0.241*** 
Average freshman NCEE score 66.147 74.843 8.696*** 
Teaching expenditure per student 2337.719 6652.876 4315.158*** 














Chapter 5 Empirical Results 
 In this chapter, empirical findings for the effect of college quality will be discussed in the 
order that the research questions are proposed. In each section, the empirical results are 
organized and presented by the methodology and identification strategies to achieve these results. 
In Section 5.1, the first research question concerning the effect of attending high-quality colleges 
on initial employment status will be examined with the baseline probit model and the IV 
estimation. In section 5.2, the principal research question on the average effect of college quality 
on starting salary will be answered by three identification strategies, namely, the OLS regression, 
the IV estimation, and the PSM approach. The heterogeneous effect of college quality across 
different individuals is explored in section 5.3, and the effect variability by earning distribution is 
examined in section 5.4. Section 5.5 seeks to overcome the shortcomings of previous Chinese 
studies by using input-based college quality measures. Statistical significance is assessed at the 
5% level and 1% level unless stated otherwise, and robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. For categorical variables, comparisons are always made by contrasting with the 
reference group. At the student level, students who take NCEE exams in the science track are in 
the reference group. For major field of study in college, the science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics (STEM) major group is set as the reference group. For English proficiency levels, 
students who do not pass College English Test level-4 (CET 4) form the reference group. For 
college characteristics, comprehensive universities are compared with colleges of other 
concentrated disciplines. Colleges in municipal cities constitute the reference group for regional 
location of colleges. In the labor market, the employer in the public sector is the reference group 
for employers in both the foreign and private sectors. For brevity, the coefficients of categorical 





industry (18 categories) and workplace province (31 categories). 
5.1 The Effect of College Quality on Initial Employment Status 
 In this section, we examine the effect of college quality with weighted probit models, as the 
outcome of interest here is the binary employment status. Focus will be concentrated on the 
coefficients of quality categorical dummies. Other determinants of the probability of successfully 
obtaining at least one job offer before graduation are also reported and discussed. Section 5.1.1 
and 5.1.2 will present the estimation results from the sample weighted probit model and the 
IV-probit model, respectively. 
5.1.1 The Baseline Probit Model 
 In Table 5-1, the results from estimating the baseline probit model are reported. The 
dichotomous categorical measure of college quality (elite/non-elite) is used in the estimation 
equation. Student demographic characteristics, family background, student ability, college 
experiences, institutional characteristics and labor market behaviors are the covariates. The 
sampling weight is used to address the oversampling of elite colleges in the stratified randomized 
sampling process. 
 In column 1 of the result table 5-1, we report a regression that does not control for student 
ability and college experiences. Model 2 in column 2 adds student cognitive ability and 
non-cognitive leadership skill controls. Model 3 additionally controls for a set of college 
experience variables, and model 3 is our full model or preferred model, which also contains rich 
sets of covariates including student demographics, student ability, family background, college 
experiences, institutional characteristics and student labor market behaviors. Model specification 
in model 4 is the same as model 3, but we extend the sample restriction from those who have the 





observations = 6977) for robustness check purposes.  
 The coefficient for elite college participation dummy is positive but not statistically 
significant for the preferred model in column 3 in the “Intention-to-work” sample. As such, no 
definite conclusion can be drawn when splitting colleges into two broad quality categories. This 
dichotomous grouping might be too general and obscures the effect differentials across different 
types of colleges. For a more informative analysis, the regression models are rerun after the 
measures of college quality are changed to four categories (Project 985 colleges, Project 211 
colleges, non-key colleges and independent colleges).  
 Results from our preferred model in column 3 are reported as the marginal effect calculated 
at the mean values of all regressors. Table 5-1 shows that family background matters when job 
seeking. Being an only child in a family would lower the probability to be employed by 5.9% 
compared with students who have siblings. Students with higher ability, both cognitive and 
non-cognitive, are more likely to be employed. Some college experiences affect job placements. 
Students who major in social sciences are at a disadvantage compared with STEM students. 
Student academic performance is not positively associated with a higher probability of 
employment, but having part-time work experience during college enhances the probability of 
finding a job after graduation by 10.9%, which is a huge contrast compared with these students’ 
inexperienced counterparts. Students who report liking their major fields of study are more likely 
to be employed. One additional copy of a resume submitted is associated with 0.1% probability 
increase of employment. This means that students who spend higher amounts of job search cost 
and make more endeavors in job seeking are paid off in the early labor market. Institutional 
subject specialization and regions are also significant determinants of initial employment status.  





Omitting covariates that influence job-seeking success would induce large biases and worsen the 
goodness of fit of the model as suggested in the results in Table 5-1. To separate the effect of 
student ability and that of college quality, model 2 incorporates the student ability controls and 
the significant coefficient on the elite college dummy becomes insignificant and of lesser 
magnitude. The Pseudo R
2
 improves remarkably from model 2 to model 3. A comparison of 
model 3 and model 4 suggests that we should impose the sample restriction to students who 
intend to work. Otherwise, the effect of elite college attendance on obtaining job offers becomes 
negative, which might merely reflect that a larger proportion of students in elite colleges would 
go on to attend graduate school after obtaining bachelor’s degrees.  
Table 5-1 The Effect of College Quality on Initial Employment Status Elite vs. Non-elite 
Colleges 
 
(1) Model 1 (2) Model 2 (3) Model 3 (4) Model 4 
Elite 0.048** 0.006 0.016 -0.017 
 
(0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) 
Age 0.006 0.006 -0.001 -0.007 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Female -0.026 -0.019 -0.048* -0.018 
 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) 
Minority -0.045 -0.034 -0.033 -0.031 
 
(0.042) (0.041) (0.045) (0.045) 
Rural 0.027 0.023 0.010 0.030 
 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) 
Only child -0.087*** -0.089*** -0.059** -0.023 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) 
SES -0.025 -0.019 -0.017 -0.042*** 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
NCEE 
 
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Humanities track 
 
-0.059* 0.001 0.013 
  
(0.032) (0.041) (0.041) 
Arts and athletics track 
 
-0.034 0.047 0.087 
  
(0.049) (0.054) (0.061) 
Non-cognitive leadership skills 
 
0.069*** 0.058** 0.045* 
  
(0.022) (0.023) (0.024) 
Major in liberal arts 
  
-0.035 0.013 






Major in social sciences 
  
-0.179*** -0.160*** 
   
(0.067) (0.062) 
Major in economics and management 
  
-0.073* -0.011 
   
(0.039) (0.037) 
Major in other disciplines 
  
-0.097* -0.105** 
   
(0.053) (0.049) 
Average academic score 
  
-0.005** -0.010*** 






























   
(0.032) (0.028) 
Have merit aid 
  
0.019 -0.010 
   
(0.028) (0.028) 
Have need-based aid 
  
0.050 0.027 















   
(0.015) (0.015) 
Number of resumes submitted 
  
0.001*** 0.002*** 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
Engineering college 0.179*** 0.158*** 0.161*** 0.184*** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.033) 
Normal college -0.108*** -0.088** -0.045 -0.087** 
 
(0.037) (0.036) (0.038) (0.041) 
Agriculture college -0.022 -0.015 0.080* 0.118** 
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.046) 
Finance college -0.485*** -0.477*** -0.393*** -0.358*** 
 
(0.071) (0.074) (0.095) (0.068) 
Political science college 0.004 -0.063 0.044 0.187** 
 
(0.058) (0.066) (0.079) (0.075) 
Ethnic college 0.009 0.016 -0.042 0.004 
 
(0.076) (0.075) (0.088) (0.070) 






(0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) 
College in the Northeast -0.111*** -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.063* 
 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.042) (0.038) 
College in the Central -0.121*** -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.105*** 
 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040) 
College in the West 0.034 0.035 -0.016 0.038 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.036) 
N 4984 4984 4984 6977 
Pseudo R
2
 0.059 0.072 0.196 0.261 
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
 Table 5-2 presents the results for four categories of college quality, with non-key colleges as 
the reference group. It shows that on average, students graduating from project 985 colleges have 
a significant marginal probability of 9.2% higher than non-key college students of finding 
employment. However, no distinguishable differences are found for students in other college 
quality categories. Although the magnitudes of coefficients on covariates change when we alter 
the measurement of college quality from two categories to four categories, the effect sign and 
general inferences remain unchanged for covariates. If we use the independent college as the 
reference group, we find similar results that students in Project 985 colleges have significant 
higher employment probability than students in independent colleges but no assertions can be 
made for differences among students in Project 211 colleges, non-key colleges and independent 
colleges. 
 Contrary to previous Chinese literature that identified the determinants of initial employment 
status mostly with logit regressions, this study employs the probit model with notably higher 
pseudo R
2
 of about 0.2 in the preferred specification. This study contains a rich set of covariates 
including student ability and labor market behavior controls that had been mostly overlooked in 
previous works. Without these covariates, previous studies tended to find a statistically 
significant effect of elite college attendance (Du & Yue, 2010; Yue & Yang, 2012), whereas it is 





previous studies did not use the four-fold college quality measure. When the four-fold college 
quality measure is used in this study, the source of differential employment probability due to 
college quality is pinned down to the difference between students in Project 985 colleges and 
students in non-key colleges. This study has not been able to achieve full consensus with 
previous findings on key determinants of initial employment status. For example, this study is 
unable to confirm some significant determinants of initial employment status such as family 
socio-economic factors and the possession of technical certificate or being a student union leader, 
but this study finds some previously non-significant or neglected factors to be significant 
determinants such as being an only child and student’s attitude about his or her major. This study 
has used a much richer set of covariates than previous studies, which may partly explain the 
difference in some findings. 
Table 5-2 The Effect of College Quality on Initial Employment Status for Four College 
Quality Categories 
 
(1) Model 1 (2) Model 2 (3) Model 3 (4) Model 4 
Project 985 college 0.099*** 0.057 0.092** -0.008 
 
(0.033) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) 
Project 211 college 0.014 -0.006 -0.006 -0.019 
 
(0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) 
Independent college -0.154*** -0.120** -0.081 -0.014 
 
(0.048) (0.049) (0.052) (0.055) 
Age 0.006 0.006 -0.001 -0.007 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Female -0.034 -0.025 -0.052* -0.018 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.028) 
Minority -0.042 -0.039 -0.036 -0.031 
 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) 
Rural 0.020 0.019 0.006 0.030 
 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) 
Only child -0.083*** -0.087*** -0.059** -0.023 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) 
SES -0.025 -0.019 -0.017 -0.042*** 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
NCEE 
 
0.003 0.004* 0.003 
  







-0.055* 0.003 0.013 
  
(0.032) (0.041) (0.041) 
Arts and athletics track 
 
-0.056 0.036 0.085 
  
(0.050) (0.055) (0.061) 
Non-cognitive leadership skills 
 
0.067*** 0.056** 0.045* 
  
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Major in liberal arts 
  
-0.031 0.014 
   
(0.054) (0.051) 
Major in social sciences 
  
-0.184*** -0.160*** 
   
(0.067) (0.062) 
Major in economics and management 
  
-0.072* -0.011 
   
(0.038) (0.037) 
Major in other disciplines 
  
-0.099* -0.106** 
   
(0.054) (0.049) 
Average academic score 
  
-0.005** -0.010*** 






























   
(0.032) (0.028) 
Have merit aid 
  
0.020 -0.010 
   
(0.028) (0.028) 
Have need-based aid 
  
0.049 0.027 















   
(0.015) (0.015) 
Number of resumes submitted 
  
0.001*** 0.002*** 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
Engineering college 0.185*** 0.166*** 0.172*** 0.186*** 
 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.033) 
Normal college -0.079** -0.069* -0.025 -0.085* 
 
(0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.043) 






(0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.046) 
Finance college -0.469*** -0.465*** -0.371*** -0.356*** 
 
(0.075) (0.077) (0.099) (0.069) 
Political science college 0.003 -0.041 0.064 0.191** 
 
(0.058) (0.065) (0.076) (0.074) 
Ethnic college -0.048 -0.020 -0.119 -0.003 
 
(0.086) (0.084) (0.098) (0.074) 
College in the East 0.010 0.002 -0.003 0.087** 
 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) 
College in the Northeast -0.090** -0.100*** -0.111*** -0.062 
 
(0.037) (0.038) (0.042) (0.038) 
College in the Central -0.065* -0.064* -0.079** -0.101** 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.041) 
College in the West 0.018 0.025 -0.033 0.036 
 
(0.035) (0.034) (0.039) (0.037) 
N 4984 4984 4984 6977 
Psuedo R
2
 0.065 0.075 0.198 0.261 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
5.1.2 Instrumental Variable Estimation 
 The outcome of interest in this section is an indicator of employment status that equals 1 if 
the student has obtained at least one job offer when he or she took the survey and equals to 0 if 
the student is unemployed, but still looking for a job. Because the endogeneity of elite college 
attendance is suspected, the employment status equation is estimated again by the IV-probit 
model. The instrument in the IV-probit regression is an opportunity index of entering 
high-quality colleges in a student’s home province before college. This is measured by dividing 
the admission quota in ministry-administered or affiliated colleges by the number of NCEE 
takers in one’s home province before college. It is the same instrument used in the IV estimation 
models of the wage equations in the subsequent section. The validity of the instrument will be 
discussed in details later in section 5.2.2. The stata module “ivprobit”, which combines a 
first-stage linear probability model with a probit model in the second stage, is used to estimate 





regression generates consistent second-stage estimates even with a dummy endogenous variable 
(Angrist & Krueger, 2001). 
 Table 5-3 reports the marginal probabilities in the second-stage that is associated with the 
probit coefficients. The coefficient of college quality in this IV-probit model is positive and 
statistically significant. The magnitude of this coefficient implies that one unit increase in the 
probability of being in an elite college is associated with 62.3% higher probability of 
employment. In both the probit and IV-probit models, the sign for the elite college dummy is 
positive, although it is not statistically significant in the baseline probit model. The magnitude is 
substantially higher in the IV-probit model than in the probit estimation. With regard to other 
covariates, the magnitude and significance level change for some covariates, but the general 
inferences for most covariates are consistent. It is reasonable because the effect is revealed for 
the subpopulation that is affected by the observed changes in the instruments. The p-value from 
the Wald test of exogeneity is close to zero, which suggests that the appropriate estimation 
strategy is the IV-probit model. No previous study used the IV-probit model to examine the effect 
of college quality in China. The magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than the previous 
findings that were close to 1 and obtained from the logit regressions in Yue et al. (2004) and Du 
and Yue (2010). 





















Humanities track 0.023 
 
(0.030) 
Arts and athletics track -0.144** 
 
(0.064) 












Major in liberal arts -0.108** 
 
(0.048) 
Major in social sciences 0.029 
 
(0.038) 
Major in economics and management -0.026 
 
(0.035) 
Major in other disciplines -0.075 
 
(0.052) 
Average academic score -0.002 
 
(0.002) 
Party member 0.003 
 
(0.022) 
Have certificate 0.024 
 
(0.017) 
Student leader 0.001 
 
(0.022) 
Pass CET4 0.024 
 
(0.023) 
Pass CET6 0.001 
 
(0.031) 
Part-time work 0.078*** 
 
(0.023) 
Have merit aid 0.024 
 
(0.021) 
Have need-based aid 0.000 
 
(0.027) 
Have loan 0.047** 
 
(0.021) 
Have minor 0.039 
 
(0.033) 
Like major 0.024** 
 
(0.012) 







Engineering college 0.265*** 
 
(0.032) 
Normal college 0.127*** 
 
(0.049) 
Agriculture college 0.064 
 
(0.039) 
Finance college 0.045 
 
(0.134) 
Political science college 0.383*** 
 
(0.090) 
Ethnic college -0.204*** 
 
(0.052) 
College in the East 0.113** 
 
(0.044) 
College in the Northeast 0.017 
 
(0.048) 
College in the Central 0.038 
 
(0.053) 
College in the West 0.055 
 
(0.040) 




Wald test of exogeneity p-value 0.002 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
5.2 The Effect of College Quality on Starting Wage 
 In this section, the average effect of college quality on graduates’ starting salaries will be 
examined empirically. In section 5.2.1, baseline OLS regression models will be established to 
investigate the average effect of elite college attendance. To address the potential endogeneity 
problem of the treatment variable, the IV estimation and the propensity score matching approach 
will be applied, respectively, in section 5.2.2 and section 5.2.3. 
5.2.1 The Baseline OLS Model 





variable is the natural logarithm form of starting monthly wage for the first accepted job offer. 
The robust standard errors are reported, and the sampling weight is used to adjust the 
oversampling of elite colleges. In parallel to the baseline probit regression result table, we show 
a regression that does not control for student ability and student college experience covariates in 
column 1 of Table 5-4. Model 2 in column 2 adds student cognitive and non-cognitive ability 
controls. Model 3 additionally controls for a set of college experience variables, and it is our 
preferred model because it contains a full set of covariates including student demographics, 
student ability, family background, college experiences, institutional characteristics, and labor 
market behaviors. Model specification in model 4 is the same as that in model 3, but we extend 
the sample restriction from those who intend to work and obtain at least one job offer to those 
who do not report their intentions as job seekers but do have jobs (Number of observations = 
3384 students) for robustness checks. 
 Table 5-4 presents the OLS estimates for elite college attendance status and covariates. 
When all covariates are held constant, graduates from elite colleges enjoy a 12.4% wage 
premium over those from non-elite colleges in China as shown in the preferred model. There is 
solid empirical evidence that there exists an earning advantage for elite college graduates 
because this earning advantage is always present across various model specifications and 
samples. The sensitivity tests suggest that omitting key covariates such as student ability and 
college experience controls in the OLS regression tends to generate overestimated results (The 
coefficients on the elite dummy are larger in models 1 than in model 2 and model 3.) Even after 
controlling for various types of college experiences, the magnitude of the elite dummy slightly 
drops from 0.129 to 0.124. It implies that these college experiences can only explain a small 





decrease in coefficient magnitude is detected when we change the sample to include observations 
that pursue further studies in graduate schools and report wage values. Generally, the estimates 
are quite robust across specifications and across samples. 
 The following detailed result interpretations are based on the preferred estimates in model 3. 
We can see that a number of other factors are significant determinants of the starting salary 
besides college quality. The only significant factor in student demographic variables is gender. 
Female graduates on average earn 7.3% less than male graduates. This gender gap in pay has 
been consistently documented in previous Chinese studies.  
 This study does not find that students with favorable family backgrounds perform better in 
the labor market in terms of earnings as was reported in previous literature. For example, some 
U.S. literature asserted that the effect of family background functions indirectly through family 
propensity to invest in education(L. Zhang, 2005c). A recent Chinese study also found that the 
wage premium is associated with having a cadre parent
15
 (Hongbin Li et al., 2012b), and this 
premium is not attributed to indirect human capital gain. Further work needs to be done to 
confirm the existence of strong family background effects. 
 It is worth noting that student cognitive ability measured by the total NCEE score seems to 
positively affect graduates’ earnings, though the effect size is small. One additional point in the 
NCEE score is associated with a 0.7% increase in starting salaries. Although we do not observe 
and measure all non-cognitive skills, leadership skills is found to be a significant determinant of 
starting salary, suggesting that leadership skills are highly rewarded by employers when one’s 
career begins. 
 A rich set of college experience variables is included as control variables. The substantial 
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earning differentials among graduates from different study majors are found. For example, 
students who major in economics and management earn 9.8% less than STEM students. English 
skill requirements are stressed and valued by many employers and we use passage of the College 
English Test (CET) to measure the English proficiency of college graduates. It turns out that 
students who have passed CET level-6 earn 13.6% more than students who neither pass CET 
level-4 nor CET level-6. It is suggested that CET level-4 passage is also beneficial, but not as 
much as is CET level-6 passage. As expected, winning merit aid and liking one’s major are 
positively associated with starting wage, whereas having need-based aid is detrimental, although 
these effects are significant at the 10% level. 
 Realizing that starting salary may also be in part dependent on the characteristics of 
institutions that students chose to participate in, we include two sets of covariates: dummies for 
institution subject specializations and the institution’s region. Even after controlling for 
individual majors, students in normal universities and agriculture colleges show difficulty 
competing with their counterparts in comprehensive colleges in terms of earning ability.  
 To explain earning differentials, it is necessary to control for students’ labor market behavior 
and job characteristics. On the job market, the students who have inter-provincial migration 
behaviors tend to enjoy higher earnings. Thus, a series of industry dummies are included. As 
expected, students in technology and skill-intensive industries show earning advantages over 
those in the labor-intensive agriculture industry. A series of province dummies of their 
workplaces are also included to mitigate the concerns that economic development levels, 
consumption expenses and labor market conditions vary across provinces and they should be 
adjusted accordingly. For example, the surveyed wage values are nominal wages. It is the real 





 The economic return of attending elite colleges with 2011 college graduates data in this 
study is as high as 12.4%, which is similar to 10.7% for the 2010 graduation class as found by 
Hongbin Li et al. (2012a) and echoes the premium of 13% for the same cohort in the study by 
Yue and Yang (2012). However, once the authors control for human capital and college 
experiences, the effect of college quality diminishes to a small and insignificant figure, which 
leads the authors to assert that college quality functions through these college experiences 
(Hongbin Li et al., 2012a). But, this study shows the persistent presence of the effect of college 
quality even after controlling for all types of college experiences. It implies that college quality 
might raise individual human capital accumulation in college through other ways or it is also 
possible that students in elite colleges earn more simply because their university prestige or 
rankings provide employers with a signal of higher productivity. 
Table 5-4 The Baseline OLS Estimates for the Starting Wage Equation 
 
(1) Model 1 (2) Model 2 (3) Model 3 (4) Model 4 
Elite 0.186*** 0.129*** 0.124*** 0.116*** 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) 
Age -0.001 0.004 0.008 0.009 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Female -0.050** -0.046** -0.073*** -0.070*** 
 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
Minority -0.029 -0.012 -0.003 0.001 
 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.042) 
Rural -0.038 -0.037 -0.036 -0.041* 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) 
Only child 0.018 0.023 0.013 0.023 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) 
SES 0.013 0.020 0.014 0.010 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
NCEE 
 
0.009*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Humanities track 
 
-0.062** -0.047 -0.063* 
  
(0.028) (0.036) (0.035) 
Arts and athletics track 
 
0.007 -0.028 -0.029 
  
(0.054) (0.060) (0.059) 
Non-cognitive leadership skills 
 






(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Major in liberal arts 
  
0.079 0.056 
   
(0.057) (0.054) 
Major in social sciences 
  
0.013 -0.015 
   
(0.045) (0.043) 
Major in economics and management 
  
-0.098** -0.109*** 
   
(0.043) (0.042) 
Major in other disciplines 
  
0.046 -0.016 
   
(0.055) (0.055) 
Average academic score 
  
-0.000 0.000 






























   
(0.027) (0.026) 
Have merit aid 
  
0.040* 0.031 
   
(0.021) (0.020) 
Have need-based aid 
  
-0.038* -0.034* 















   
(0.011) (0.011) 
Engineering college -0.008 -0.021 -0.029 -0.028 
 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
Normal college -0.132*** -0.107** -0.114** -0.109** 
 
(0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.045) 
Agriculture college -0.127** -0.115** -0.119** -0.115** 
 
(0.055) (0.054) (0.053) (0.051) 
Finance college -0.100 -0.093 -0.108 -0.089 
 
(0.154) (0.159) (0.159) (0.157) 
Political science college 0.283*** 0.204** 0.048 0.042 
 
(0.087) (0.091) (0.099) (0.095) 
Ethnic college 0.125* 0.116* 0.103 0.085 
 





College in the East 0.053 0.035 0.016 0.026 
 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.049) 
College in the Northeast -0.118** -0.104* -0.095* -0.081 
 
(0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) 
College in the Central -0.074* -0.053 -0.054 -0.049 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) 
College in the West 0.016 0.030 0.017 0.030 
 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Work migration 0.130*** 0.119*** 0.114*** 0.121*** 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) 
Foreign-sector employer 0.038 0.043 0.054* 0.045 
 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) 
Private-sector employer -0.065*** -0.054** -0.038* -0.048** 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) 
Work industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Workplace province Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 7.696*** 6.978*** 6.965*** 6.987*** 
 
(0.229) (0.271) (0.295) (0.283) 
N 3173 3173 3173 3384 
R2 0.280 0.300 0.335 0.323 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 When the four-fold college quality measure is used as shown in Table 5-5, we find that 
students in project 985 and project 211 colleges earn significantly higher than non-key college 
students. There is no statistically significant difference between non-key college students and 
students in independent colleges. There are minor changes in coefficients on covariates. 
Table 5-5 The Effect of College Quality on Starting Wage for Four College Quality 
Categories 
 OLS 
Project 985 college 0.121*** 
 
(0.043) 
Project 211 college 0.127*** 
 
(0.023) 






















Humanities track -0.045 
 
(0.036) 
Arts and athletics track -0.043 
 
(0.062) 
Non-cognitive leadership skills 0.040** 
 
(0.018) 






Major in liberal arts 0.079 
 
(0.057) 
Major in social sciences 0.014 
 
(0.045) 
Major in economics and management -0.098** 
 
(0.044) 
Major in other disciplines 0.045 
 
(0.055) 
Average academic score -0.0001 
 
(0.002) 
Party member 0.031 
 
(0.022) 
Student leader 0.024 
 
(0.022) 
Have certificate -0.014 
 
(0.018) 
Pass CET4 0.055** 
 
(0.025) 
Pass CET6 0.134*** 
 
(0.031) 
Part-time work -0.031 
 
(0.026) 
Have merit aid 0.040* 
 
(0.021) 
Have need-based aid -0.035* 
 
(0.021) 
Have loan -0.021 
 
(0.021) 
Have minor 0.002 
 
(0.032) 







Engineering college -0.026 
 
(0.036) 
Normal college -0.115** 
 
(0.050) 
Agriculture college -0.116** 
 
(0.053) 
Finance college -0.111 
 
(0.160) 
Political science college 0.058 
 
(0.100) 
Ethnic college 0.111 
 
(0.071) 
College in the East 0.021 
 
(0.050) 
College in the Northeast -0.097* 
 
(0.053) 
College in the Central -0.038 
 
(0.039) 
College in the West 0.018 
 
(0.041) 
Work migration 0.117*** 
 
(0.032) 
Foreign-sector employer 0.055* 
 
(0.029) 
Private-sector employer -0.037* 
 
(0.020) 
Job industry Yes 








Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
5.2.2 Instrumental Variable Estimation 
 In this section, the IV method is used to estimate the starting wage equation to address the 
potential endogeneity of college quality. 
 Table 5-6 presents the second stage estimates from the 2SLS regression for the wage 





quality and the overall explanatory power of the IV model is less than the baseline OLS 
regression. According to Table 5-6, the predicted probability of elite college attendance has a 
significantly positive effect on fresh college graduates’ starting salaries at the 5% level. A one 
unit increase in the probability of attending an elite college is associated with an 81% increase in 
starting salary. The IV estimator recovers the local average treatment effects (LATE) rather than 
the average treatment effect (ATE). The effect is revealed for the subpopulation that enrolled in 
elite colleges induced by the provincial enrollment opportunity into higher quality HEIs in their 
home provinces but that would not have participated otherwise. 
 In student demographic variables, the gender gap is notable, with female students earning 
5.4% less than male students earn if other things are equal. Again, family background does not 
seem to matter. In college experience covariates, students major in economics and management 
earn 10.3% less than STEM students. Students who pass the CET-6 possess a competitive edge 
when they enter the early labor market. Having merit aid scholarships is also helpful to seize 
well-paid jobs, whereas having need-based aid is harmful to earning. Students from political 
science colleges and those employed in the foreign sector are rewarded with higher starting 
wages. 

























Humanities track -0.026 
 
(0.041) 
Arts and athletics track -0.270** 
 
(0.124) 
Non-cognitive leadership skills 0.037* 
 
(0.020) 






Major in liberal arts 0.051 
 
(0.062) 
Major in social sciences 0.035 
 
(0.047) 
Major in economics and management -0.103** 
 
(0.045) 
Major in other disciplines 0.022 
 
(0.062) 
Average academic score 0.001 
 
(0.002) 
Party member 0.001 
 
(0.028) 
Have certificate -0.011 
 
(0.020) 
Student leader 0.022 
 
(0.024) 
Pass CET4 0.049* 
 
(0.027) 
Pass CET6 0.109*** 
 
(0.035) 
Part-time work -0.029 
 
(0.029) 
Have merit aid 0.063** 
 
(0.026) 
Have need-based aid -0.072** 
 
(0.029) 
Have loan -0.006 
 
(0.025) 
Have minor 0.006 
 
(0.036) 
Like major 0.022* 
 
(0.012) 
Engineering college 0.216* 
 
(0.127) 







Agriculture college -0.090 
 
(0.060) 
Finance college 0.224 
 
(0.267) 
Political science college 0.711** 
 
(0.345) 
Ethnic college -0.117 
 
(0.127) 
College in the East 0.191* 
 
(0.107) 
College in the Northeast 0.089 
 
(0.110) 
College in the Central 0.130 
 
(0.104) 
College in the West 0.129* 
 
(0.075) 
Work migration 0.065 
 
(0.043) 
Foreign-sector employer 0.074** 
 
(0.033) 
Private-sector employer -0.020 
 
(0.023) 
Ln(average GDP per capita) in home province 0.118* 
 
(0.069) 
Job industry Yes 









Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity 0.018 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 A large body of literature has cautioned about the risks of having weak instruments. In 
essence, the results of the IV estimation would be biased if the instruments are weak. A 
discussion on the validity of instrumental variables is crucial and necessary to assess the 
reliability of results derived from the IV estimation models for the starting wage equations. 





framework: relevance, ignorability, and exclusion restriction. 
 Several instrument candidates are tested to verify instrument validity. The list of instrument 
candidates include parental years of education, distance from student’s hometown to the nearest 
capital city in student’s home province, and the number of elite colleges in student’s home 
province. They all turned out to be too weak as none of them pass the relevance tests (F-statistic 
test and significant correlation coefficient in the first stage with the right sign and size). 
Geographical distance is a commonly used instrument to predict access to selective colleges in 
the United States. (Griffith & Rothstein, 2009; Long, 2008). As demonstrated in (Do, 2004), 
living near a high-quality public university increases the quality of college the student actually 
attended because of its positive role-model effect and encouragement effect. This evidence 
indicates that changing the incentives and costs associated with elite college attendance would 
affect college selection. However, distance fails to apply to China because the number of 
students at the margin who are constrained by the distance in attend elite colleges may not be 
large. Furthermore, the benefits may outweigh the costs of attending prestigious colleges in 
China, especially for those from rural and remote areas. In addition, the absolute number of elite 
colleges fails to account for college accommodation capacity. 
 Instead, the instrumental variable used in this study is the provincial level enrollment rate of 
high-quality HEIs in students’ home provinces before college. A good measure would be the ratio 
of the quota of elite college slots divided by the total undergraduate enrollment in the student’s 
home province in 2007. However, this measure is not available publicly, and this study resorts to 
a proxy variable. This proxy variable is calculated as the enrollment slots in 
ministry-administered or affiliated colleges in 2006 divided by the number of NCEE takers in 





the expansion policy started in 1999, only about 10000 more students were admitted in 
ministry-administered colleges in 2007. The increased enrollment slots from 1996 to 1997 only 
accounted for less than 2% of the total enrollment slots for ministry-administered colleges 
according to the MOE regulations. In addition, the correlation between the provincial enrollment 
slots in the last year and the current year is as high as 98.4% (Pan, Xu, Chen, Kang, & Lan, 
2010). Therefore, the enrollment slots in 2006 could be used to replace the 2007 figure when the 
2007 data are not available. The proportion distribution among provinces remained unchanged 
until 2008 when regional equality was stressed in setting the enrollment quota across provinces.
16
 
In sum, this proxy is reasonable to capture the provincial inequality in elite college enrollment 
opportunities. But this proxy may induce a component of measurement error in the estimation, 
and the coefficients in the first stage of the 2SLS will probably be biased toward zero. Because 
most of the ministry-affiliated universities are traditional national key colleges and most of them 
are current 985 and 211 project colleges, it is not a large problem. The 2006 enrollment slots in 
ministry-administered universities is readily available from Qiao (2007), and the number of 
NCEE takers in 2007 is from the Sunshine NCEE information platform supported by the MOE. 
This paper calculates the enrollment rate for ministry-administered national key universities in 
each province throughout China. Theoretically, this instrumental variable accounts for the school 
capacity and takes advantages of the provincial variation of enrollment opportunities into 
high-quality HEIs across provinces in China. There is a large variation in this opportunity index 
across provinces. A detailed analysis of the validity of the instrument in use will be discussed in 
the following paragraphs to check whether it meets three requirements. 
 First, valid instrumental variables should be highly correlated with endogenous regressors 
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even after controlling for the exogenous covariates (Relevance). This requirement can be 
empirically tested in the first stage of the IV regressions. In this study, the correlation coefficient 
between provincial elite college enrollment rate and elite college attendance status is 0.019 and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in the first-stage. It implies that one percentage point 
increase in the elite college enrollment rate would increase the probability of entering an elite 
college by 1.9 %, holding other things constant. The sign of the coefficient is in the right 
direction as we expected, because the underlying rationale is that the students take the NCEE and 
enroll in the province with more elite college slot quota to have better chances to access elite 
colleges. Because college admission is highly segmented provincially in China, colleges often 
allocate a high proportion of freshman slots for enrollees living in the same province. It is 
reasonable to expect a greater opportunity to enroll in an elite college if the student is from elite 
college concentration areas such as in large municipal cities. Students who live in a province or 
municipality with higher chances to enter elite colleges tend to be more encouraged and have 
less fierce competition, so they have a higher probability of ultimately attending one. Moreover, 
the instrument used in this paper meets the standard of Staiger and Stock (1997) because the F 
statistic is 16.05, which passes the threshold of 10 (an accepted value of F-statistic to reject the 
hypothesis that the coefficients on the instruments in the first-stage regression of 2SLS are 
jointly equal to zero). Overall, the weak instrument is not a problem in this study. 
 Second, the instrumental variable should be randomized or conditionally randomized 
(Ignorability of the instrument). Although the exogeneity of the instrument cannot be tested in 
theory, there are reasons it is regarded as exogenous. The elite colleges in China are usually built 
for a long time and their establishment is more correlated with historical and cumulative factors 





starting salary levels. Moreover, one feature of Chinese college admission procedure is that the 
number of slots in elite colleges in China is determined by the government quota before or after 
the NCEE. It functions as a government decision or policy regulation at the provincial level, and 
it is independent of market demand. Government policies and college openings were commonly 
used instruments in previous literature related to education access and attainment (Angrist & 
Krueger, 1991; Currie & Moretti, 2003; Oreopoulos, 2006). In summary, though the instrument 
variable might be endogenous at the provincial level, it is highly exogenous for individual level 
outcomes. 
 Third, the instrument only affects the outcome through the treatment and there is no third 
path (Exclusion restriction). This assumption is not directly testable. In this study, the provincial 
level elite college enrollment rate is unlikely to be directly related to individual level personal 
wages, but there might be indirect links that we need to control for. The additional covariate is 
hoped to account for possible channel through which provincial features might affect wages. 
There is a possibility that provinces with higher elite college enrollment quotas are relatively 
richer provinces with a higher number of elite colleges. Students earn more not because they gain 
higher human capital accumulation from high-quality colleges, but because they benefit from 
where they come from if they are from richer provinces and stay there to attend colleges and find 
jobs. To rule out this possibility, the natural logarithm form of the average GDP per capita from 
1993 to 2007 for students’ home provinces is also included in the regression with the hope that it 
helps account for this possible unobservable channel through which student wages are affected. 
Moreover, provinces with higher enrollment quota of ministry-administered colleges are not 
always the richer area in China. According to Qiao (2007), students in some western provinces 





 In theory, we need at least one instrument for each endogenous variable. When the number 
of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous regressors, the IV estimator is over-identified. 
We do not have the over-identification problem in this study because we have one instrument 
(provincial enrollment opportunity to elite colleges) for one potentially endogenous variable 
(elite college attendance status), and other instrument candidates fail to work out. Thus, the IV 
estimator is regarded as just-identified, and no further tests are needed. 
 One might be concerned about inter-provincial mobility that students might move to 
provinces with more elite college openings or slots in order to attend an elite college. The hukou 
(household registration) system is a feature of China that greatly restricts such endogenous 
mobility when students were taking NCEE exams in 2007. Students are only allowed to take 
NCEE and admitted from the provinces where they have local hukou. Therefore, it should not be 
a big concern. 
 Finally, we test whether the potential endogenous variable (elite college attendance status) is 
indeed endogenous by using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. The p-value for the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is 0.018, so we tend to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. This 
suggests that elite college attendance is endogenous and that we should rely more on the IV 
estimations to draw inferences. 
5.2.3 Heckman Sample Selection Correction  
 The prevalence of sample selection bias research in labor economics has been widely 
recognized over the past decades. We are concerned about the potential sample selection bias that 
could arise in this study because we only observe the starting salaries for fresh college graduates 
who obtained at least one job offer immediately after graduation. If we limit the regression to the 





may lead to biased results. In other words, the coefficients we obtained may not apply to all 
college graduates (those who have job offers and those who do not). 
 To assess whether this selection distorts our estimations, the common approach called 
“Heckman sample selection correction” method is adopted. The “Heckman correction” fits into 
the context of this study by involving both the estimation of a selection equation with a probit 
model, determining the selection process and a second-step outcome equation with an OLS 
model with the correction factor—the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) plugged in (Heckman, 1979). 
This strategy requires strong model identification that includes the exclusion restrictions. 
Exclusion restrictions are variables that only affect the outcomes through the selection process 
but do not have an independent effect on the outcomes. Implementation without exclusion 
restrictions might exacerbate the standard error inflation due to collinearity between the IMR and 
the included regressors (Bushway, 2007). In this case, the number of resumes submitted is used 
as an additional identifying variable because job search costs and endeavors are tested to predict 
the probability of finding a job, but not to influence wages for job offers once a person is 
working. 
 The results from the selection equation suggest that one additional submitted resume 
increases the probability of working by 0.14 percentage points. The identifying variable is 
significant at the 1% level, which is a good signal to be qualified for the exclusion restriction. 
The bottom of the Table 5-7 lists the coefficient and the standard error associated with the IMR, 
which represents a test for the presence of selection bias. The coefficient on the IMR is not 
statistically significant at any significance level, indicating that selection bias might not be 
present in this study. For the sake of comparison, results both corrected and uncorrected for the 





the magnitudes of coefficients, and the inferences do not change before and after the IMR term is 
included in the OLS regression equation. For the above reasons, we conclude that the sample 
selection does not bias our estimates and that the students who find jobs are likely representative 
of the “Intention-to-work” sample and we should not be concerned about the sample selection 
bias. For the sake of brevity, the remaining part of the dissertation will show the results from the 
regression without the IMR. 
Table 5-7 The Effect of College Quality on Starting Wage with and without the Heckman 
Selection Correction 
 
(1) With IMR (2) Without IMR 
Elite 0.124*** 0.124*** 
 
(0.025) (0.025) 
Age 0.008 0.008 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
Female -0.076*** -0.073*** 
 
(0.022) (0.021) 
Minority -0.005 -0.003 
 
(0.045) (0.045) 
Rural -0.035 -0.035 
 
(0.025) (0.025) 
NCEE 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Humanities track -0.047 -0.046 
 
(0.036) (0.036) 
Arts and athletics track -0.025 -0.028 
 
(0.061) (0.060) 
Non-cognitive leadership skills 0.045** 0.041** 
 
(0.019) (0.018) 
Only child 0.010 0.013 
 
(0.024) (0.024) 
SES 0.013 0.014 
 
(0.015) (0.014) 
Party member 0.032 0.031 
 
(0.022) (0.022) 
Student leader 0.025 0.026 
 
(0.022) (0.022) 
Have certificate -0.013 -0.014 
 
(0.018) (0.018) 







Pass CET6 0.139*** 0.136*** 
 
(0.031) (0.031) 
Part-time work -0.025 -0.031 
 
(0.026) (0.026) 
Have merit aid 0.041** 0.039* 
 
(0.021) (0.021) 
Have need-based aid -0.036* -0.038* 
 
(0.021) (0.021) 
Have loan -0.016 -0.019 
 
(0.021) (0.021) 
Have minor 0.007 0.005 
 
(0.032) (0.032) 
Like major 0.024** 0.022** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) 
Work migration 0.114*** 0.113*** 
 
(0.031) (0.031) 
Foreign-sector employer 0.055* 0.054* 
 
(0.029) (0.029) 
Private-sector employer -0.038* -0.038* 
 
(0.020) (0.020) 




 Major dummies Yes Yes 
Institution specialization dummies Yes Yes 
Institution region dummies Yes Yes 
Job industry dummies Yes Yes 
Workplace province dummies Yes Yes 
Constant 6.928*** 6.961*** 
 
(0.296) (0.293) 
N 3173 3173 
R
2
 0.335 0.335 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 The potential sample selection concern was never addressed in previous Chinese studies by 
the Heckman sample selection method. Hongbin Li et al. (2012a) tried to identify the possible 
direction of the sample selection bias by separately estimating the probability of having 
non-missing wage values for elite and non-elite samples with OLS regressions, but their attempts 
failed because the selection may go in either direction, and they were unable to determine which 





5.2.4 Propensity Score Matching 
 Propensity score methods have seen a tremendous increase in use during the last decade to 
estimate the labor market effects of college quality in American studies (Black & Smith, 2004; 
Brand & Halaby, 2006; Long, 2008). As discussed in section 2.4, PSM has advantages over the 
standard regression approach primarily because it is sufficient to match the propensity core 
instead of specifying the multi-dimensional relationship between the dependent variable and 
independent variables. Moreover, PSM relaxes the linearity assumption as a semi-parametric or 
non-parametric alternative and fulfills the restriction of regression in the common support area. A 
common PSM practice usually involves several steps. This dissertation will illustrate the 
implementation steps in detail as follows: 
(1) Estimation of Propensity Score 
 The first step is to estimate the propensity score. In this study, the treatment is defined as 
whether the student has attended an elite college in China. It is coded to 1 for elite college 
attendants and 0 for non-elite college attendants in our sample. Because the treatment is binary, a 
probit model is used as the choice of model in our treatment equation. Appropriate confounders 
should be the pre-treatment variables that predict both the treatment and the outcome. Therefore, 
I prioritize the confounding covariates into three categories in Table 5-8 in the order based on 
their importance with respect to the treatment and outcome variables according to the economic 
theory and previous empirical evidence. Student cognitive ability as measured by the NCEE 
score is the primary determinant for college admission. Previous Chinese studies have 
documented unequal access to high quality education due to family background, household 
registration system, and the region of residence (Xie & Wang, 2006; Yue, 2009). The ignorability 





high school characteristics and home environment due to the concern that the selection bias 
could be largely induced by omitting these observable pre-college confounders (Brand & Halaby, 
2006). Some student demographic characteristics belong to the variables that are the least 
important to balance category. 
Table 5-8 A List of Confounders in Categories in Order of Importance to Balance 
Rank of confounders  Variables 
Most important to balance NCEE score, Residential region before college, Academic track in 
senior high school, Minority 
Somewhat important to 
balance 
Whether from a key senior high school, Rural household 
registration, SES index, Home environment 
Least important to balance Age, Female, Only child, Non-cognitive leadership skills 
   
 Table 5-9 gives the results of a probit regression of elite college attendance on the 
pre-college covariates. We can see that the most important determinants of elite college 
attendance in this sample are student cognitive ability, student ethnicity, student age, student’s 
high school quality, academic track in senior high school and region of residence. Although the 
coefficients for variables SES, home environment, only child and non-cognitive leadership skills 
are not significant, the signs are in the expected direction. All the variables in this probit model 
are included in the propensity score estimation model. 
Table 5-9 Probit Regression of Elite College Attendance on Pre-college Covariates 
Pre-college covariates Coefficient Standard Error 
Age -0.019*** 0.005 
Female -0.007 0.011 
Minority 0.139*** 0.039 
Rural 0.006 0.013 
Residential region in the East  0.003 0.022 
Residential region in the Northeast 0.006 0.025 
Residential region in the Central -0.018 0.021 
Residential region in the West 0.149*** 0.031 
NCEE 0.024*** 0.001 
Humanities track -0.027** 0.012 
Arts and athletics track 0.600*** 0.085 





Only child 0.018 0.013 
SES 0.008 0.008 
Key senior high school 0.030*** 0.011 
Home environment 0.009* 0.005 
N 3537  
Pseudo R
2
 0.29  
Note: Municipality is the reference group for residence region and science track is the reference group for 
academic tracks. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
(2) Choice Among Alternative Matching Algorithms 
 There are a variety of matching algorithms to choose during the implementation of PSM. 
Researchers need to make choices in terms of how to assign the comparison observations to each 
treated observation. Some of the previous researches considered more than one matching 
algorithm and compared the results from various matching algorithms because the estimates 
would differ in finite samples. For example, Black and Smith (2004) considered three alternative 
matching estimators: the nearest neighbor estimator, the Gaussian kernel estimator, and the 
Epanechnikov kernel estimator. The leave-one-out validation mechanism results suggested that 
the latter two perform better, and the nearest neighbor estimator and the Epanechnikov kernel 
estimator performed modestly better than the Gaussian kernel matching. In addition, all 
estimators were insensitive to the bandwidth selection unless it was very small. In another 
example of PSM application in China, Z. Liu and Qiu (2011) compared the treatment effect from 
four matching algorithms: the nearest neighbor estimator, the Gaussian kernel estimator, the 
Epanechnikov kernel estimator and the Caliper estimator. They confirmed the superiority of the 
Epanechnikov estimator and the insensitivity of choice of bandwidth. Given this evidence, I 
present treatment effect estimates from these four commonly used matching algorithms to test 
the robustness of the results. Given the limited space, I have merely presented the checks of 





most reliable matching algorithm for this research topic. The bandwidth choices cross-validated 
in Z. Liu and Qiu (2011) (bandwidth = 0.03 for Gaussian kernel matching, bandwidth = 0.12 for 
Epanechnikov matching, and bandwidth = 0.08 for Caliper matching) are used so that the results 
are more comparable across studies. Matching with replacement option is taken for the 
one-to-one nearest neighbor matching. 
(3) Checking the Overlap or Common Support Assumptions 
 Visual analysis of the propensity score distribution is a straightforward way to examine the 
overlap between treatment and control groups. The overlap assumption is met when there are 
individuals in the control group that have propensity scores similar to those in the treatment 
group. The overlapping range is commonly referred to as the region of common support.  
 Figure 5-1 plots histograms of the estimated scores for elite college attendants in the top 
histogram and non-elite college attendants in the bottom histogram. The horizontal axis defines 
the propensity score and the length of each bar on the vertical axis indicates the fraction of 
sample fall into a corresponding interval of propensity score. We can see that observations in the 
control group span the full range of propensity scores, which means for nearly all elite college 
students, more than one student in the non-elite college has a similar propensity score and vice 
versa. There are a few exceptions in the very high and low spectrums, which form the narrow 
off-support regions. Moreover, the distribution is highly uneven. Most of the cases in the control 
group are concentrated below the propensity score of 0.7, whereas the majority of cases in the 
treatment group have propensity scores of higher than 0.5. The frequencies at the top end for 
observations in the control groups are very low. Therefore, the thick support area is between 
approximately 0.2 and 0.7.  





distributions before and after the Epanechnikov matching. Before and after matching graphs are 
the same for the Epanechnikov matching because this matching algorithm uses weighted 
averages of all the cases in the control group to estimate counterfactual outcomes. We can see 
that the overlap of the propensity scores is substantial and that the common support region is 
quite wide. As such, the two figures demonstrate that the primary assumption of overlap is met in 
this study. 
Figure 5-1 The Distribution of Propensity Scores 
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(4) Assessing the Matching Quality and the Balance 
 The goal of the matching procedure is to balance the distribution of relevant cofounders so 
that the group differences between the treatment group and control group on the measured 
confounders can be minimized after adjusting for the propensity scores. Balance evaluation 
based on statistical tests such as the T-test and the Chi-square test are not reliable because even 
small differences may be statistically significant if the sample size is large. Therefore, the 
standardized mean differences (STD) are used to diagnose the balance as recommended by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985).  
 Standardized mean differences are calculated as the difference in means/proportions across 
the treatment groups divided by the standard deviation within the treatment group (Stuart, 2010). 
It is difficult to tell how close is close enough and what balance is good enough. Here, the 





(Cohen, 1988; Lanza, Moore, & Nicole, 2013). Thus, if standardized mean differences are less 
than an absolute value of 0.2 after matching, the treatment groups are regarded as balanced on 
measured confounders. When the differences are less than 0.2 for all the confounders, the 
balance has been fully achieved. If some of the differences are larger than 0.2, the model 
specification can be adjusted by adding square terms and interaction terms or by dropping 
variables. The above four steps of PSM implementation can be repeated iteratively until balance 
is achieved. In this study, adding square terms for age or NCEE score seems unreasonable 
because there is no evidence of a nonlinear relationship between these variables and elite college 
attendance. Finally, the balance is fully achieved no matter what matching algorithm is chosen. 
For brevity, Table 5-10 below represents the balance diagnostics for the Epanechikov kernel 
matching. The standardized mean differences between students in elite and non-elite colleges on 
each of the confounders pre- and post- match are calculated and compared. Any difference 
greater than 0.2 is denoted with an asterisk. After matching, the standardized mean differences 
are much lower than in the unmatched data for most confounders and all below 0.2. The standard 
deviation ratios for most covariates are close to 1. Therefore, the balancing of covariates is 
properly achieved.  
Table 5-10 Balance Diagnostics of Standardized Mean Differences for Epanechikov Kernel 
Matching 
Variable Sample 
Mean SD STD 
Diff 
Ratio  
of SDs Treated  Control Treated Control 
NCEE score Unmatched 75.98 70.55 6.540 6.870 0.830* 0.950 
 Matched 75.97 75.30 6.530 6.790 0.117 0.960 
Humanities track Unmatched 0.162 0.173 0.370 0.380 -0.030 0.970 
 Matched 0.162 0.183 0.370 0.390 -0.058 0.950 
Arts and athletics track Unmatched 0.034 0.051 0.180 0.220 -0.096 0.820 
 Matched 0.034 0.058 0.180 0.230 -0.136 0.770 
Science track Unmatched 0.800 0.770 0.400 0.420 0.075 0.950 
 Matched 0.800 0.746 0.400 0.440 0.133 0.920 
Residential region in Unmatched 0.036 0.176 0.190 0.380 -0.757* 0.490 





Residence region in the East Unmatched 0.267 0.167 0.440 0.370 0.227* 1.190 
 Matched 0.267 0.440 0.440 0.014 0.014 1.010 
Residential region in the Unmatched 0.071 0.103 0.260 0.300 -0.127 0.840 
Northeast Matched 0.071 0.069 0.260 0.250 0.008 1.010 
Residential region in the Unmatched 0.188 0.317 0.390 0.470 -0.331* 0.840 
Central Matched 0.188 0.176 0.390 0.380 0.031 2.030 
Residential region in the  Unmatched 0.438 0.236 0.500 0.430 0.407* 1.170 
West Matched 0.438 0.449 0.500 0.500 -0.022 1 
Minority Unmatched 0.090 0.046 0.290 0.210 0.154 1.360 
 Matched 0.090 0.097 0.290 0.300 -0.024 0.970 
Key senior high school Unmatched 0.845 0.757 0.360 0.430 0.243* 0.840 
 Matched 0.845 0.820 0.360 0.380 0.067 0.940 
SES index Unmatched -0.284 -0.244 0.940 0.900 -0.043 1.040 
 Matched -0.285 -0.182 0.940 0.920 -0.110 1.020 
Rural Unmatched 0.527 0.470 0.500 0.500 0.114 1 
 Matched 0.528 0.474 0.500 0.500 0.108 1 
Home Environment Unmatched 0.308 0.351 0.460 0.480 -0.094 0.970 
 Matched 0.308 0.321 0.460 0.470 -0.027 0.990 
Age Unmatched 22.97 23.02 1.020 0.970 -0.052 1.050 
 Matched 22.97 22.93 1.020 0.970 0.044 1.050 
Female Unmatched 0.361 0.421 0.480 0.490 -0.125 0.970 
 Matched 0.362 0.409 0.480 0.490 -0.100 0.980 
Only child Unmatched 0.308 0.351 0.460 0.480 -0.094 0.970 
 Matched 0.308 0.329 0.460 0.470 -0.045 0.980 
Non-cognitive Unmatched 0.436 0.426 0.500 0.490 0.022 1 
leadership skills Matched 0.436 0.434 0.500 0.500 0.003 1 
* Standardized effect sizes greater than 0.2 
(5) Treatment Effect Estimates 
 Once the key overlap and balance assumptions have been satisfied, the treatment effect can 
be estimated with difference in mean outcomes or a regression-adjusted matched estimate. This 
study proceeds with the regression-adjusted matched estimate with the hope that the additional 
covariate adjustment in the outcome equation will help with both bias and precision. The same 
set of covariates used in the baseline OLS model including student demographics, family 
background, college experiences, institution characteristics, and labor market conditions will be 
used as controls. 
 Three related estimands should be distinguished, namely, the average treatment effect (ATE), 





(ATC). The focus of this study is to examine the effect of attending elite colleges for those who 
actually attended one in our sample, not the economic gain for non-elite college students if they 
had attended an elite college otherwise or the average economic gain for all. Therefore, ATT is 
the estimand of interest in this dissertation.  
 Table 5-11 presents the estimated treatment effect for elite college attendance for four 
matching algorithms of choice. For each method, the first column corresponds to the ATT. The 
second and third columns correspond to the standard error and p-value. The PSM results 
demonstrate that students who receive elite college education outperform students who attend 
non-elite colleges in terms of monthly starting salary. The PSM estimates are all statistically 
significant and positive, regardless of the propensity score technique used. The matching 
estimates range from 0.133 to 0.165, suggesting smaller impacts with Epanechikov kernel 
matching and Caliper matching techniques. In sum, the effect of college quality on starting salary 
is about 0.133 produced by the PSM Epanechikov kernel estimator, which means that students in 
elite colleges earn 13.3% higher than non-elite fresh college graduates. The PSM estimation is 
similar, but slightly larger than the estimation coefficient from the OLS regression (0.124).  
Table 5-11 Treatment Effect of Elite College Attendance versus Non-elite College Education 
Method ATT 
Estimate Std. Error p-value 
Epanechikov kernel matching (Bandwidth = 0.12) 0.133*** 0.026 0.000 
Gaussian kernel matching (Bandwidth = 0.03) 0.165*** 0.036 0.000 
Caliper matching (Bandwidth = 0.08) 0.135*** 0.026 0.000 
One-to-one Nearest neighbor matching 0.165*** 0.036 0.000 
Note: The PSM is based on the unweighted sample because the module “psmatch2” does not have a procedure 
to properly account for sample weights. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
(6) Sensitivity Analysis   
 PSM is built on the same assumption of ignorability or selection on observables as the OLS 





covariates, the Rosenbaum bounds for ATT proposed by Rosenbaum (2002) are calculated in 
Table 5-12. The sensitivity analysis shows that the study becomes sensitive to hidden bias at 1.9. 
Since 1.9 is a value that is neither too low or too high and it is between the highly sensitive and 
highly robust gamma values suggested by S. Guo and Fraser (2010), the conclusion is that 
college quality appears to have a positive treatment effect on fresh college graduates’ starting 
salary, and the PSM results are not very sensitive to hidden bias. The treatment effect would be 
altered only if the hidden bias is large in this study. But, we still need to be cautious and 
sufficiently control for potential confounders.  
Table 5-12 The Rosenbaum Bound Sensitivity Test for the PSM 
Gamma Sig+ Sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI- 
1 0 0 0.112226 0.112226 0.096362 0.132453 
1.1               0 0 0.101985 0.128194 0.078168 0.144712 
1.2 0 0 0.084272 0.139677 0.063388 0.163019 
1.3 3.4e-14 0 0.07114 0.152809 0.054284 0.173016 
1.4 1.0e-10 0 0.059311 0.167505 0.042055 0.188000 
1.5 5.6e-08 0 0.051506 0.176295 0.030074 0.198079 
1.6 7.6e-06 0 0.04075 0.189748 0.021794 0.202579 
1.7 0.000321 0 0.030287 0.19799 0.014031 0.211084 
1.8 0.005328 0 0.022749 0.201892 0.005054 0.221813 
1.9 0.040652 0 0.016418 0.208182 -0.001156 0.229821 
2 0.164701 0 0.008616 0.217318 -0.004368 0.239630 
Note: Gamma is the odds ratio that individuals will receive treatment due to unobserved factors. 
     Sig+ is the upper bound of the p value using the Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test. 
     Sig- is the lower bound of the p value using the Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test. 
     t-hat+ is the maximum value of the Hodges-Lehmann point estimate. 
     t-hat- is the minimum value of the Hodges-Lehmann point estimate. 
     CI+ is the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval of the Hodges-Lehmann interval estimate. 
     CI- is the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval of the Hodges-Lehmann interval estimate. 
     The sensitivity tests are based on 1372 matched pairs. 
5.2.4 Summary of Findings 
 The analysis in section 5.2 answers the key question by estimating the effect of college 
quality on starting salaries. According to estimation results from various methodologies, a 
positive and statistically significant effect has been confirmed for elite college attendance in 
China. This effect is very robust to changes in model specifications and sample restrictions and 





attendance is around 0.124 as suggested by the OLS regression, and it is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The estimation results are robust, no matter what methodology is employed. The 
PSM estimator (0.133) is close and slightly larger than the OLS estimator. The magnitude of the 
point estimate from the IV estimation (0.81) is substantially larger than from either the OLS or 
PSM. The results also suggest that the potential endogenous elite college attendance stemmed 
from either omitted variables or omitted selection on unobservable student characteristics is a 
concern and should be dealt with in Chinese studies as suggested by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
exogeneity test. 
 In terms of covariates, previous studies usually miss the cognitive ability control due to lack 
of proper measurements and fail to sufficiently control for covariates that should be taken into 
account such as college experience activities, institution characteristics and individual labor 
market behaviors. This dissertation also includes an exhaustive set of student individual and 
family background covariates to address the potential selection bias. For example, in the PSM 
applications, some individual pre-college experiences that were never used in previous Chinese 
studies are also used to match the observations in treatment and control groups with the hope that 
any unobserved variables that correlated with both elite college entrance and labor market 
performance are included in the model. The majority of coefficients of the covariates are in the 
expected direction and the inferences for covariates do not change across estimations from three 
different identification strategies. At student level, determinants of starting wage include 
student’s gender, innate ability, major, English proficiency, merit aid awards, job industry, 
workplace province, and inter-provincial work migration pattern. At college level, the 
institutional subject specialization affects students’ early labor market outcomes. 





statistically significant effect of college quality at the 1% level for undergraduate cohort 
graduating in 2011. The magnitude of the effect generated by the OLS in this dissertation is 
identical to findings that used the same method in Yue and Yang (2012) for the same cohort, 
whereas it is about 0.02 larger than in Hongbin Li et al. (2012a), which focused on the 2010 
cohort and less significant. It may imply the gaining of a competitive edge for students in 
high-quality colleges in the harsh hunting season in recent years. 
5.3 The Heterogeneous Effect of College Quality Varying by Student Characteristics 
 This section complements the above section by exploring the potential heterogeneous effect 
of college quality for different groups of college graduates. It might be the case that attending 
elite colleges is more beneficial for some students with some traits than for others. The empirical 
analysis in section 5.3 aims to detect the potential differential effect of college quality among 
individuals varying by student characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, rural household 
registration status, SES and innate ability.  
 Accordingly, several research questions are posed. For example, do female students enjoy a 
higher wage premium than male students through elite college attendance? Do ethnic minority 
students have an earning advantage over the majority (Han) students that are provided by elite 
college educations? Do elite colleges benefit rural students more than urban students? Do elite 
colleges affect the starting salary of poor students who fall below the average of SES level more 
than wealthy students that who fall above the mean SES index? Does elite college attendance 
offer higher earning potential for less-capable students who have below-average NCEE scores 
than for those who are more capable? These potential disparities are tested by generating a series 
of interaction terms in the OLS models. 





interaction terms. In this section, the college quality is coded as a dummy variable. Many student 
demographics of interest are also coded in dummies such as gender, ethnicity and rural residence. 
However, interpretations are not very straightforward for some continuous variables such as SES 
index and student cognitive ability score rescaled to a range of 0 to 100. Therefore, I divide the 
students into two comparable groups in two halves: the group of students with the SES index 
lower than the average SES index and the group of students with the SES index higher than the 
average level. Similarly, the student ability variable is recoded to separate students into two 
comparable groups: the group of students with high intellectual ability and the less-capable 
student group.  
 Table 5-13 lists the estimation results for each of above characteristics one by one. Column 1 
to 5 considers adding one interaction term at a time and column 6 adds all the interaction terms 
in the wage equation. Several observations emerge from Table 5-13. First, none of the newly 
added interactions is statistically significant at the 5% or 1% significance level except the 
interaction between student ability and elite college participation. Second, the only 
heterogeneous effect appears when less-capable students are sorted into elite colleges. The 
coefficient on the interaction of elite college and less capable student dummy suggests that the 
effect of college quality is not uniform for all students. Graduating from an elite college boosts 
the less-capable students in obtaining higher entry-level earnings by 6.4%. This finding helps 
explain the phenomenon that many parents and students are eager to attend elite colleges even 
when their children are less-capable. Third, this effect does not diminish even if we control for 
other sources of heterogeneity by including all the interaction terms. Fourth, general inferences 
for covariates still hold compared with results from the baseline OLS wage equation. The results 





found for disadvantaged groups. The students with lower capabilities may earn additional human 
capital when they interact with higher-quality peers and in better school environments. 
 Hongbin Li et al. (2012a) suggested that the wage premium is not uniform and that the 
economic returns lean toward female students and students with favorable family background; 
however, these previous findings are not supported by this study. The new finding that the 
returns are higher for students with lower cognitive abilities and the existence of potential 
heterogeneity should be verified through future research.  
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Elite*Female 0.024 

































Elite* Low SES 
    
-0.026 -0.035 
     
(0.035) (0.041) 
Age 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Female -0.079*** -0.073*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.079*** 
 
(0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) 
Minority -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 
 
(0.045) (0.058) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.059) 
Rural -0.035 -0.035 -0.034 -0.035 -0.035 -0.038 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) 
NCEE 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Humanities track -0.045 -0.046 -0.046 -0.048 -0.046 -0.047 
 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Arts and athletics track -0.027 -0.028 -0.028 -0.024 -0.029 -0.025 
 
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Non-cognitive leadership skills 0.041** 0.041** 0.041** 0.041** 0.041** 0.041** 
 





Only child 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
SES 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.011 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Major in liberal arts 0.079 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.079 
 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Major in social sciences 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.012 
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Major in economics and 
management -0.098** -0.097** -0.097** -0.099** -0.098** -0.100** 
 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Major in other disciplines 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.044 0.047 0.044 
 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
Average academic score -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party member 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Student leader 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Have certificate -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Pass CET4 0.056** 0.056** 0.056** 0.055** 0.056** 0.056** 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Pass CET6 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.135*** 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Part-time work -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.032 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
Have merit aid 0.039* 0.039* 0.039* 0.039* 0.039* 0.039* 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Have need-based aid -0.038* -0.038* -0.038* -0.037* -0.037* -0.037* 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Have loan -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Have minor 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Like major 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 0.022* 0.022** 0.022* 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Engineering college -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.030 -0.031 -0.031 
 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
Normal college -0.113** -0.114** -0.114** -0.113** -0.116** -0.114** 
 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) 
Agriculture college -0.118** -0.118** -0.118** -0.124** -0.120** -0.125** 
 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) 
Finance college -0.108 -0.108 -0.109 -0.106 -0.109 -0.106 
 





Political science college 0.049 0.048 0.048 0.043 0.050 0.045 
 
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) (0.099) (0.100) 
Ethnic college 0.091 0.099 0.099 0.093 0.098 0.089 
 
(0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.064) 
College in the East 0.013 0.016 0.016 0.013 0.014 0.009 
 
(0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) 
College in the Northeast -0.096* -0.094* -0.094* -0.096* -0.095* -0.100* 
 
(0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) 
College in the Central -0.056 -0.053 -0.054 -0.054 -0.055 -0.058 
 
(0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) 
College in the West 0.015 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.013 
 
(0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) 
Work migration 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Foreign-sector employer 0.053* 0.054* 0.054* 0.054* 0.053* 0.053* 
 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Private-sector employer -0.038* -0.038* -0.038* -0.038* -0.038* -0.038* 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Job industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Workplace province Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 6.960*** 6.962*** 6.962*** 6.930*** 6.968*** 6.936*** 
 
(0.292) (0.293) (0.293) (0.294) (0.294) (0.295) 
N 3173 3173 3173 3173 3173 3173 
R
2
 0.335 0.335 0.335 0.335 0.335 0.336 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
5.4 The Varying Effect of College Quality by Earning Distribution 
 The analyses in previous sections in this chapter are based on the design of econometric 
models that evaluate the effects at the mean of the earning distribution. Given the large 
divergence in staring salary level, people may wonder how the effect of college quality might 
change over the earning distribution. This section extends the examination of the economic 
returns to college quality to another dimension with data from China. For example, the 
hypothesis that the predictive power of college quality may be higher at the top of the earnings 
distribution than for the graduates at the bottom was confirmed in the U.S.(L. Zhang, 2005c). 
People may be curious to know whether this pattern holds for China as well. 





distribution, results are reported for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile points in wage 
distribution. These points in earning distribution are commonly used as representative points that 
spread evenly across the distribution. The specifications in this section are exactly the same as in 
the preferred baseline OLS model (Model 3) in section 5.2.1, and the quantile regressions are 
estimated. The OLS estimates in column 1 provide a benchmark for comparison with quantile 
regression results estimates in column 2 through column 6. Because the dependent variable is in 
its natural log form, the estimates are in log points and the following inferences will be discussed 
in unit of log points. 
 A couple of observations can be drawn from Table 5-14: First, overall, elite college 
attendance leads to an increase in starting wages, no matter what position is examined in the 
wage distribution. This effect is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Second, 
college quality has the most pronounced impact on wages at the two tails of the earning 
distribution, and it has smaller effects in the middle area of the distribution in terms of point 
estimates. The general pattern is mixed, and the effects fluctuate across earning distribution 
positions. For example, having attended elite college is associated with a 13.4 percentage point 
increase at the 10th percentile. In contrast, the starting wage is increased by 12 percentage points 
at the median of the wage distribution and 12.8 percentage points at the 90th percentile for elite 
college graduates. However, the magnitudes of these effects across earning distribution are quite 
close, roughly within the range of 0.11 to 0.14. Third, the OLS results are similar to that of 
median regression (i.e., regression at the 50th percentile). It makes sense intuitively because 
median quantile regression by construction is largely based on observations at average levels and 
resembles the OLS regression that examines the average effect methodologically. Fourth, the 





the directions generally do not change. 
 To my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to explore the potential heterogeneous effect 
of college quality by earning distribution for fresh college graduates in China. Compared with 
previous U.S. studies that examine the effect of college quality for college graduates with many 
years of work experience, the results in this section reveal that the pattern of differential college 
quality effects for earning distribution does not hold in China. In the United States, a diploma 
from a high-quality college will not help much if the student ends up in a low-paid job placement 
while the brand of college matters much more for college graduates with well-paid jobs. In other 
words, it implies that college quality is a stronger determinant of starting wage at the top of the 
earning distribution than at the bottom of it (L. Zhang, 2005c). There may be several possible 
reasons why a similar finding does not occur in China. First, quality differentiation and 
divergence would be bigger in sampled American colleges that cover all types of universities 
nationwide. Second, the elite social class in the U.S. labor market tends to value individuals with 
elite education backgrounds more than in China’s case. Third, the effect of college quality tends 
to be more evident at the mid- or later-career stages than at the starting point. The elite college 
premium may rise as graduates gain longer periods of work experience. 
Table 5-14 The Effect of Attending Elite Colleges Varying by Earning Distribution 
 























Elite 0.124*** 0.134*** 0.103*** 0.120*** 0.109*** 0.128*** 
 
(0.025) (0.031) (0.026) (0.012) (0.020) (0.029) 
Age 0.008 0.028** 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.006 
 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) 
Female -0.073*** -0.064** -0.059** -0.069*** -0.091*** -0.113*** 
 
(0.021) (0.029) (0.023) (0.011) (0.017) (0.024) 
Minority -0.003 -0.014 0.034 0.023 0.008 0.005 
 
(0.045) (0.048) (0.040) (0.018) (0.028) (0.038) 
Rural -0.035 -0.001 -0.002 -0.008 -0.015 -0.045* 
 





NCEE 0.007*** 0.003 0.004* 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Humanities track -0.046 -0.017 0.021 -0.055*** -0.079*** -0.040 
 
(0.036) (0.041) (0.035) (0.016) (0.026) (0.035) 
Arts and athletics track -0.028 -0.092 -0.023 0.018 0.071 0.033 
 
(0.060) (0.076) (0.067) (0.031) (0.050) (0.070) 
Non-cognitive leadership 
skills 0.041** 0.015 0.016 0.020** 0.027* 0.003 
 
(0.018) (0.023) (0.019) (0.009) (0.014) (0.020) 
Only child 0.013 0.027 0.012 0.005 -0.010 0.023 
 
(0.024) (0.031) (0.025) (0.011) (0.018) (0.024) 
SES 0.014 0.007 0.025 0.035*** 0.041*** 0.032** 
 
(0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) 
Major in liberal arts -0.014 -0.078 -0.122*** -0.050** -0.004 -0.007 
 
(0.045) (0.056) (0.046) (0.022) (0.033) (0.044) 
Major in social sciences 0.067 0.037 -0.026 0.040 0.016 0.012 
 
(0.054) (0.076) (0.061) (0.028) (0.041) (0.051) 
Major in economics and 
management -0.111*** -0.128*** -0.099*** -0.049*** -0.009 -0.011 
 
(0.031) (0.038) (0.031) (0.014) (0.022) (0.029) 
Major in other disciplines 0.033 -0.026 0.004 0.012 0.029 0.034 
 
(0.044) (0.065) (0.056) (0.025) (0.039) (0.054) 
Average academic score -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Party member 0.031 0.069** 0.041* 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.042* 
 
(0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.010) (0.016) (0.023) 
Student leader 0.026 0.009 0.023 0.029*** 0.057*** 0.074*** 
 
(0.022) (0.030) (0.024) (0.011) (0.018) (0.025) 
Have certificate -0.014 0.012 0.020 0.003 -0.003 -0.019 
 
(0.018) (0.023) (0.019) (0.009) (0.014) (0.019) 
Pass CET4 0.056** 0.057* 0.067** 0.049*** 0.066*** 0.070** 
 
(0.026) (0.033) (0.027) (0.013) (0.020) (0.028) 
Pass CET6 0.136*** 0.148*** 0.123*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.133*** 
 
(0.031) (0.039) (0.032) (0.015) (0.023) (0.034) 
Part-time work -0.031 -0.081** -0.058** -0.044*** -0.040** 0.031 
 
(0.026) (0.034) (0.028) (0.013) (0.020) (0.029) 
Have merit aid 0.039* 0.048* 0.029 0.024** 0.026 -0.001 
 
(0.021) (0.027) (0.023) (0.010) (0.017) (0.024) 
Have need-based aid -0.038* -0.006 0.010 -0.000 -0.017 -0.045* 
 
(0.021) (0.029) (0.024) (0.011) (0.017) (0.024) 
Have loan -0.019 -0.043 -0.033 -0.023** -0.028* 0.001 
 
(0.021) (0.028) (0.022) (0.010) (0.016) (0.022) 
Have minor 0.005 -0.012 0.029 -0.002 0.012 0.008 
 
(0.032) (0.046) (0.038) (0.017) (0.027) (0.036) 






(0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) 
Work migration 0.113*** 0.115*** 0.085*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.100*** 
 
(0.031) (0.033) (0.027) (0.013) (0.021) (0.030) 
Foreign-sector employer 0.054* 0.098** 0.078** 0.085*** 0.120*** 0.118*** 
 
(0.029) (0.039) (0.032) (0.015) (0.024) (0.034) 
Private-sector employer -0.038* -0.011 -0.007 -0.002 0.009 0.011 
 
(0.020) (0.027) (0.022) (0.010) (0.017) (0.023) 
Institution specialization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Institution region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Workplace province Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 6.975*** 5.851*** 6.871*** 7.226*** 6.785*** 6.783*** 
 
(0.287) (0.420) (0.396) (0.195) (0.294) (0.365) 





 0.335 0.192 0.153 0.191 0.160 0.221 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 Figure 5-3 plots the heterogeneous effect of college quality by measure of elite college 
attendance status across the whole earning distribution. Basically, a positive effect between 0.1 to 
0.17 is consistently present across different quantile positions. The effect seems to fluctuate 
across the distribution and there is no clear trend. The positive effect in the middle of the 
distribution is slightly lower than in the two ends, and the lowest effect appears to be around the 
20th and 90th percentile. The standard errors at the two extremes are larger than at other 
positions. This suggests that we should be more cautious about drawing inferences at two tails of 
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5.5 Input-based Measures of College Quality 
 This section extends the previous sections by examining the effect of college quality with 
measures of input-based college quality indicators: faculty-student ratio, proportion of faculty 
members with doctoral degrees, average freshman NCEE score, teaching expenditure per student, 
and an index composed of these measures. These measures provide additional information on the 
operation and productivity of the HEIs in the sample and are constructed as continuous variables. 
The OLS regression and IV estimation models are employed to replicate the analysis procedure 
with these new college quality measures to answer the key research question. The outcome under 
investigation in this section is the starting salary level. 
 People often wonder whether non-elite colleges really differ from elite colleges in quality 
and how big the quality gap is. In this section, we first explore whether the high-quality college 





the simple OLS regression with institution level data and controls. Then, we present the 
estimation results with the new college quality index measures. Finally, our target is to determine 
which aspect of college quality or which input indicator is more important in determining 
starting salary. 
 Table 5-15 presents simple comparisons for elite and non-elite colleges with institution level 
clustered data from the OLS regressions. Other institution characteristics are controlled for such 
as the institution subject specializations and institution location regions. Columns 1 through 4 
show the differences in concrete input-based resource indicators between elite and non-elite 
colleges. Columns 5 and 6 examine the differences among college quality categories with regard 
to overall quality indexes. According to Table 5-15, the proportion of faculty members holding 
doctoral degrees in elite colleges is 0.211 higher than in non-elite colleges, and the average 
freshman NCEE score is 7.075 points higher in elite colleges than in non-elite colleges. Both of 
these differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. On average, the teaching-related 
expenditure per undergraduate student is 2215.8 RMB higher in elite colleges, but the faculty 
members are less available in elite colleges. However, these effects are not statistically 
significant at the college level when other college characteristics are held constant. Therefore, the 
results suggest that elite colleges and non-elite colleges differ primarily in personnel inputs. Elite 
colleges in China are HEIs with higher quality faculty members and students. It is worth noting 
that although we are able to collect school average NCEE score for all institutions, the number of 
complete cases is 20, 37, 45, respectively for teaching expenditure, faculty quality and faculty 
availability measures at the institution level. Thus, we calculate two overall college quality 
indexes. Quality index in column 5 is compiled from all four input indicators for 17 HEIs in the 





expenditure, which has a high missing data rate of over 60%. We find consistent and statistically 
significant differences in overall institutional quality between elite and non-elite colleges when 
the two quality indices are in use, suggesting the existence of difference in overall quality 
between elite and non-elite colleges. 
Table 5-15 Differences in Input-based Quality Indicators: Elite Colleges versus Non-Elite 
Colleges 


















for 3 inputs 
Elite 2215.810 0.211*** -0.001 7.075*** 2.048* 1.965*** 
 (2208.186) (0.043) (0.002) (1.403) (1.002) (0.379) 
Engineering college 672.761 0.087 -0.003 1.534 0.282 0.816 
 (2468.763) (0.061) (0.002) (1.736) (0.835) (0.500) 
Normal college -967.640 -0.037 0.0003 -1.621 -0.097 -0.435 
 (2081.270) (0.073) (0.003) (2.046) (1.226) (0.655) 
Agriculture college -5476.558 0.089 0.002 -0.210 -1.455 0.477 
 (4098.451) (0.076) (0.003) (1.791) (0.869) (0.577) 
Finance college  0.083 -0.002 -1.087  0.385 
  (0.073) (0.002) (1.954)  (0.573) 
Political science college -958.378 0.090 -0.006*** 8.466*** -0.791 1.753** 
 (4487.013) (0.083) (0.003) (2.819) (2.872) (0.782) 
Ethnic college   -0.006*** -0.221   
   (0.007) (2.245)   
College in the East 264.561 0.055 -0.001 2.102 -1.867 0.793 
 (4002.542) (0.089) (0.003) (2.546) (2.958) (0.811) 
College in the Northeast 4786.039 -0.167** -0.007* -3.738 -1.093 -1.314* 
 (2807.521) (0.076) (0.004) (2.357) (2.368) (0.689) 
College in the Central -3120.669 -0.110 0.001 -2.479 -3.555 -0.931 
 (2689.031) (0.067) (0.003) (1.932) (2.485) (0.610) 
College in the West 3698.689 -0.133* -0.003 -0.480 -1.829 -0.657 
 (2807.521) (0.069) (0.003) (1.970) (2.368) (0.604) 
Constant 3418.748 0.350*** 0.060*** 67.595*** 0.433 -1.005** 
 (4487.013) (0.083) (0.002) (2.819) (2.872) (0.782) 
N 20 37 45 49 17 37 
R
2
 0.428 0.602 0.219 0.648 0.662 0.656 





 Table 5-16 contains the OLS and IV estimation results for college quality indexes extracted 
from four input indicators (including the expenditure measure) in column 1 and 2. Columns 3 
and 4 present the parallel results for the overall college quality index extracted from three input 
indicators (excluding the expenditure measure) for sensitivity checks given the severity of the 
missing rate in the teaching expenditure measure. In this dissertation, single imputation is only 
implemented at student level but not at the institution level because we lack proper ways to 
impute institution level missing values. Moreover, to make plausible inferences, the results 
should be based on the real treatment status, not imputed ones. Thus, the number of complete 
cases shrinks dramatically from around 2300 to fewer than 800 if the expenditure measure is 
taken into account. To make the regression results more comparable across regressions, 
specifications are the same as the baseline OLS model in section 5.2.1 and the IV estimation 
model in section 5.2.2. Nevertheless, the elite dummy is replaced by overall college quality 
indexes to answer the key research question—estimating the economic return to college quality.  
 Table 5-16 shows that the effect of overall quality on earning is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level if we use the quality index compiled either from all four input 
indicators or from three input indicators. The coefficients are smaller than those obtained from 
regressions with elite dummies. The interpretation is that one unit increase in the overall college 
quality index raises the starting salary by 7.9 percentage points, according to the OLS regression 
with the college quality index from four inputs. The IV estimations are substantially larger than 
the OLS results, which resembles the pattern when the elite dummy is plugged in. When we use 
the quality index extracted from three inputs, the sample size expands almost three-fold. 
However, the IV estimator is less precisely estimated with the weak instrument that does not pass 





from the OLS regressions in column 1 and column 3 are consistent; albeit, they are much smaller 
than point estimates in IV estimations. The IV estimations in column 2 and column 4 are not 
consistent, and the instrument turns out to be weak in the column 4 model. The 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test in column 2 infers that the IV model is more appropriate than the OLS 
regression when there is an endogenous treatment regressor. To sum up, the basic conclusion that 
higher college quality fosters a higher starting wage will not change if the college quality is 
measured by indexes but the effect wanes. 
Table 5-16 The Impact of College Quality Indexes on Starting Salary 
 (1) OLS (2) IV (3) OLS (4) IV 
Quality index for 4 inputs 0.079*** 0.543***   
 (0.022) (0.196)   
Quality index for 3 inputs   0.071*** 0.750* 
   (0.012) (0.417) 
Age 0.024 0.047** 0.003 0.036 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.010) (0.026) 
Female -0.126*** -0.111 -0.066*** -0.017 
 (0.039) (0.051) (0.023) (0.047) 
Minority -0.0004 -0.034 0.038 -0.059 
 (0.048) (0.069) (0.047) (0.127) 
Rural -0.075 -0.090 -0.042 -0.038 
 (0.048) (0.056) (0.029) (0.049) 
NCEE -0.001 -0.011* 0.003* -0.053 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.034) 
Humanities track -0.006 0.092 -0.064 -0.052 
 (0.046) (0.071) (0.038) (0.075) 
Arts and athletics track -0.078 -0.288* -0.035 -0.899* 
 (0.090) (0.158) (0.062) (0.542) 
Non-cognitive leadership skills 0.052 -0.013 0.025 0.022 
 (0.034) (0.048) (0.021) (0.036) 
Only child -0.065 -0.095* 0.008 -0.097 
 (0.041) (0.057) (0.026) (0.086) 
SES 0.014 0.037 0.008 0.042 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.017) (0.036) 
Major in liberal arts 0.037 -0.074 -0.022 0.074 





Major in social science 0.043 -0.045 -0.006 -0.147 
 (0.086) (0.111) (0.053) (0.127) 
Major in economics and management -0.033 -0.066 -0.077*** -0.014 
 (0.048) (0.061) (0.034) (0.068) 
Major in other disciplines 0.025 -0.047 0.001 -0.089 
 (0.055) (0.096) (0.046) (0.115) 
Average academic score 0.004 0.009* -0.001 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
Party member 0.059 0.100* 0.026 -0.071 
 (0.042) (0.048) (0.023) (0.070) 
Student leader 0.061* 0.088* 0.006 0.020 
 (0.033) (0.046) (0.025) (0.041) 
Have certificate 0.047 0.089** -0.004 -0.0001 
 (0.032) (0.044) (0.020) (0.034) 
Pass CET 4 0.056 0.035 0.062** 0.032 
 (0.052) (0.070) (0.029) (0.055) 
Pass CET 6 0.120** -0.011 0.165*** -0.013 
 (0.055) (0.090) (0.034) (0.130) 
Part-time work -0.056 -0.066 -0.019 -0.065 
 (0.042) (0.060) (0.031) (0.061) 
Have merit aid -0.067* -0.090* 0.032 0.081 
 (0.038) (0.047) (0.023) (0.051) 
Have need-based aid 0.002 0.010 -0.069*** -0.110** 
 (0.038) (0.048) (0.023) (0.046) 
Have loan -0.022 0.040 0.002 0.038 
 (0.032) (0.050) (0.023) (0.048) 
Have minor 0.041 0.095 -0.034 -0.069 
 (0.052) (0.066) (0.035) (0.061) 
Like major 0.048** 0.064** 0.016 0.022 
 (0.020) (0.026) (0.013) (0.024) 
Engineering college 0.026 0.648** -0.046 0.149 
 (0.056) (0.269) (0.032) (0.151) 
Normal college 0.226** -0.018 0.004 0.901 
 (0.102) (0.153) (0.051) (0.565) 
Agriculture college -0.057 1.008** -0.133** -0.752*** 
 (0.084) (0.456) (0.052) (0.367) 
Finance college   -0.074 0.606 
   (0.170) (0.568) 





 (0.133) (0.564) (0.095) (0.325) 
College in the East -0.182* 0.999* -0.045 -0.423* 
 (0.103) (0.557) (0.051) (0.220) 
College in the Northeast -0.065 0.317 -0.105* 0.294 
 (0.125) (0.293) (0.063) (0.306) 
College in the Central 0.034 1.975** -0.043 0.256 
 (0.106) (0.881) (0.045) (0.262) 
College in the West -0.072 0.572 -0.029 -0.042 
 (0.092) (0.361) (0.045) (0.117) 
Work migration 0.078 -0.284* 0.146*** 0.141** 
 (0.048) (0.169) (0.039) (0.067) 
Foreign-sector employer 0.017 0.045 0.082*** 0.173** 
 (0.052) (0.061) (0.031) (0.081) 
Private-sector employer -0.0003 0.032 -0.021 0.060 
 (0.038) (0.051) (0.141) (0.061) 
Ln(average GDP per capita) in home province  0.056  -0.088 
  (0.078)  (0.064) 
Job industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Workplace province Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 6.912*** 5.335*** 8.035*** 11.977*** 
 (0.623) (1.274) (0.369) (2.475) 
N 789 773 2331 2294 
R
2
 0.360  0.367  
First-stage relevance  0.053***  0.029* 
  (0.018)  (0.015) 
F-statistic  11.953  3.502 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of exogeneity  0.002  0.001 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 A further step is taken to determine what aspect of college quality is the most important 
determinant in overall college quality with the baseline OLS model when we plug in all four 
concrete input indicators. Again, results from another parallel baseline OLS model with three 
input indicators are also presented for robustness check purposes. The OLS regression is 
adequate on this issue because it was shown to be rather efficient and robust in previous sections, 
and it is more complicated to use the IV method when we have three or four treatment variables. 





deviation of one so that the coefficients on the input indicators are comparable with the 
assumption that one standard deviation in one variable is equivalent to the same metric in 
another variable. 
 When all four input indicators are plugged into the same wage equation, the single factor 
that has the biggest contribution to the variation in starting wage is the proportion of faculty 
members holding doctoral degrees. It is significant at the 10% level and based on a sample of 
about 830 observations in Table 5-17 column 1. The result is reversed when the teaching 
expenditure per student measure is omitted from the OLS regression in Table 5-17 column 2. It 
seems that the effect of faculty quality is overtaken by the positive effect of student selectivity 
and the negative effect of faculty availability. The results align with the previous studies that the 
conclusion could be sensitive and contingent on the explicit measures of college quality. Thus, 
this highlights the importance of examining college quality comprehensively and interpreting the 
results with caution. It seems that hiring additional faculty members with doctoral degrees and 
enhancing teacher quality would be the most effective way to raise college quality in China. In 
other words, the knowledge and ability gains in college that are passed on by teachers are the 
essence of college quality that is rewarded in the early labor market. However, we should be 
cautious to this conclusion because the coefficient is statically at the 10% level and this 
conclusion is based on the smaller sample of 830. Also, there are too few measures of college 
quality; and there is no consideration of costs and cost-effectiveness. Due to the data limitations, 
we need future studies with complete institution level data to confirm these findings. 
Table 5-17 The Effect of College Quality Input Indicators on Starting Salary 
 (1) Four input indicators (2) Three input indicators 
Faculty-student ratio -0.054 -0.167*** 
 (0.069) (0.036) 
Proportion of Ph.D. faculty members 0.339* 0.052 





Average freshman NCEE score 0.012 0.230*** 
 (0.245) (0.047) 
Teaching expenditure per student 0.187  
 (0.127)  
Age 0.053 0.007 
 (0.041) (0.025) 
Female -0.148*** -0.089*** 
 (0.046) (0.028) 
Minority 0.0004 0.026 
 (0.030) (0.030) 
Rural -0.088 -0.052 
 (0.056) (0.035) 
NCEE -0.025 0.004 
 (0.059) (0.040) 
Humanities track 0.008 -0.044 
 (0.045) (0.037) 
Arts and athletics track -0.046 -0.040 
 (0.052) (0.038) 
Non-cognitive leadership skills 0.061 0.027 
 (0.039) (0.025) 
Only child -0.073 0.004 
 (0.048) (0.032) 
SES 0.039 0.002 
 (0.048) (0.040) 
Major in liberal arts 0.021 -0.024 
 (0.065) (0.034) 
Major in social science -0.002 -0.017 
 (0.055) (0.034) 
Major in economics and management -0.038 -0.076*** 
 (0.042) (0.032) 
Major in other disciplines 0.017 -0.012 
 (0.035) (0.030) 
Average academic score 0.070 0.001 
 (0.035) (0.029) 
Party member 0.062 0.025 
 (0.045) (0.027) 
Student leader 0.072** 0.006 
 (0.032) (0.025) 





 (0.038) (0.024) 
Pass CET4 0.067 0.071** 
 (0.061) (0.035) 
Pass CET6 0.127* 0.192*** 
 (0.063) (0.041) 
Part-time work -0.064 -0.017 
 (0.041) (0.031) 
Have merit aid -0.080* 0.046* 
 (0.042) (0.027) 
Have need-based aid -0.002 -0.070*** 
 (0.037) (0.023) 
Have loan -0.030 -0.003 
 (0.034) (0.024) 
Have minor 0.025 -0.034 
 (0.033) (0.024) 
Like major 0.120*** 0.028 
 (0.043) (0.028) 
Engineering college 0.097 -0.081** 
 (0.068) (0.040) 
Normal college 0.143* 0.063* 
 (0.082) (0.037) 
Agriculture college -0.015 -0.028 
 (0.048) (0.033) 
Finance college  -0.012 
  (0.032) 
Political science college 0.070 0.025 
 (0.056) (0.035) 
College in the East -0.079 -0.014 
 (0.104) (0.045) 
College in the Northeast -0.049 -0.133*** 
 (0.097) (0.047) 
College in the Central 0.121 0.069 
 (0.094) (0.045) 
College in the West -0.025 -0.065 
 (0.110) (0.050) 
Work migration 0.076 0.175*** 
 (0.054) (0.044) 
Foreign-sector employer -0.004 -0.027 





Private-sector employer -0.004 -0.027 
 (0.042) (0.026) 
Job industry Yes Yes 
Workplace province Yes Yes 
Constant 0.156 0.004 
 (0.154) (0.117) 
N 830 2331 
R
2
 0.364 0.381 






































Chapter 6 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 College quality may play a crucial role in determining the early labor market outcomes for 
fresh college graduates in China. Understanding such a role is meaningful for students, colleges, 
and the government. However, the college quality measures were too broad and abstract in 
previous Chinese studies. They provided very little information on how to improve college 
performance and how college quality functions and influences student outcomes, not to mention 
they were insufficient to address the differential effects for various groups of students. This 
dissertation aims to determine the effect of college quality on early labor market outcomes of 
college students by answering the five research questions stated in Chapter 3. 
 The student survey and institutional survey conducted by Tsinghua University facilitate this 
study by providing valuable second-hand data. With my effort to collect explicit institutional 
quality measures from multiple data sources, this dissertation makes new advances in several 
aspects: First, the new round of data collected by the CSLM survey enables comprehensive 
analyses on determinants of early labor market outcomes in China, from aspects of student 
characteristics, family background, student college experiences, institutional characteristics, and 
labor market behaviors. Second, input-based concrete college quality measures primarily 
collected from the Tsinghua institutional survey and official reports relax the data constraints on 
college operations in China. These data constraints had hindered previous studies from 
addressing the issues of college quality assessment and enhancement in China. More thorough 
and informative insights are gained in this study with better defined college quality categories 
and concrete input-based college quality measures. This study is the first empirical study to use 
the new and specific input-based college quality measures to examine the impact of college 





to examine the controversial role of college quality systematically and rigorously. To establish 
the causality between college quality and labor market outcomes, the IV and PSM strategies are 
applied in additional to the conventional OLS model. The potential sample selection is also 
tested by the Heckman sample correction method. This study is more rigorous and thorough than 
previous Chinese studies in terms of identification strategies and causality analysis. Last but not 
least, this study extends research scopes by focusing on potential heterogeneity of the effect of 
college quality. The heterogeneous effects are examined for students of different individual 
characteristics and family backgrounds, and for students in different positions of the earning 
distribution.  
 This chapter first summarizes the key findings and conclusions in this study, and then 
discusses the policy implications and limitations and suggestions for future research. 
6.1 Summary of Findings and Conclusions 
 In this section, the main findings of this dissertation are inventoried in the sequence of 
proposed research questions. 
 First, the assertion about the effect of college quality on initial employment status is 
inconclusive when the dichotomous categorical measure of college quality is employed in the 
baseline probit model. However, when splitting the sampled HEIs into four quality categories, 
earning a degree from a Project 985 college appears to provide advantages in job seeking relative 
to graduating from a non-key college. The IV-probit model suggests that fresh college graduates 
in elite colleges have significantly higher employment opportunities than do their non-elite 
college counterparts. Thus, the effect size and significance level change depending on how 
colleges of various qualities are defined and categorized and what methodology is adopted. In 





 Second, the average effect of college quality on starting wages is positive and highly 
significant even after controlling for a rich set of covariates. The magnitudes of the economic 
return to college equality vary by alternative measures of college quality and by identification 
strategies employed. The point estimate from the OLS regression for elite college attendance 
dummy is 0.124. It is substantially smaller than the IV estimate of 0.810, which has a larger 
standard error. But it is quite similar to the PSM estimate of about 0.133. Therefore, the impact 
of college quality is consistently present across different model specifications and identification 
strategies. Generally speaking, we find unambiguous evidence that college quality has a positive 
and significant impact on fresh college graduates’ starting salary in China. The sample selection 
issue does not bias our results. 
 Third, we only find weak evidence that the effect of college quality operates in a 
heterogeneous manner. Less-capable students tend to benefit more from having more-capable 
schoolmates. Moreover, we do not find the effect of college quality vary by other individual 
student characteristics or family background such as gender, ethnicity, household registration 
status, and SES. Our findings are unable to confirm the previous Chinese studies that discovered 
greater benefits of attending elite colleges for female students and students with favorable family 
backgrounds.  
 Fourth, the quantile regression results suggest that the effect of college quality fluctuates 
across the earning distribution and that the variation is too subtle to distinguish. We do not 
observe the similar pattern as is found in the U.S. that if students end up in the low earning 
distribution, they will not enjoy as much of the premium of college quality as their counterparts 
in high-paying jobs. On the contrary, it suggests a relatively uniform effect of college quality at 





trajectories over college graduates’ careers differ for students in colleges of various quality 
categories, but the differences may not be evident at the initial stages of graduates’ careers. 
 Fifth, when alternative overall college quality index measures are utilized, we consistently 
find positive effects for starting salaries, and we do observe a substantial overall quality 
distinction between elite and non-elite colleges. When explicit input-based resource indicators 
are used to replace the abstract elite dummy, we find certain college quality measures have 
effects on the starting salary while others do not. Thus, we should rely on the measures that are 
strongly correlated with actual college teaching performance and view overall college quality as 
the assembly of various quality components. Among all four input measures, the proportion of 
doctoral faculty appears as the strongest determinant of starting salary. This suggests that 
students are more successful in obtaining well-paid jobs from HEIs with more faculty members 
with higher qualifications and advanced educational attainments. When the teaching expenditure 
measure is excluded, the results suggest otherwise. Thus, it is crucial to view college quality 
from the multidimensional perspective and to avoid misleading findings. 
6.2 Policy Implications 
 The following policy implications are proposed based on the key findings of this dissertation. 
Because some research questions in this dissertation are new and it is the first Chinese study to 
apply some identification strategies on this research topic, further research is needed to confirm 
these preliminary findings. Tentative suggestions are offered to students, college administrators, 
and education policy makers in the higher education sector. The primary goal is to stimulate 
college graduates’ early labor market success and to raise college quality in China. 
 Colleges of varying qualities tend to funnel students into different types of job placements in 





higher starting wages. This inequity might be passed on and widen over time. The findings 
provide justifications for daily observations that students and their parents make every effort to 
enter higher-quality universities. It is rational to expect continual fierce competition for elite 
college entrance because it is an important way to secure college investments that yield higher 
economic returns. Therefore, college quality may serve as a top priority in order to make rational 
college choice decisions. Given the highly unbalanced supply and demand of seats in elite 
colleges in China, preparation for the NCEE may continue to consume great social and financial 
costs unless the college admission system is reformed. 
 For HEIs, to overcome the financial restraints, non-elite colleges might take the initiative to 
welcome investments from society and enterprises that could build cooperative relationships 
with colleges. To better use the financial support, non-elite colleges might consider recruiting 
better-quality faculty members with doctoral degrees. It is possible that the performance gap 
between elite and non-elite colleges in the early labor market can be attributed to the differential 
speed of human capital accumulation, non-elite institutions may consider stress the cultivation of 
skills and abilities that are needed and rewarded in the labor market. Non-elite colleges might 
also implement various types of job recruitment encouragement programs that help students 
successfully search and locate jobs immediately after graduation. 
 For the government, the findings of higher returns for elite college attendance justify the 
huge governmental investments in national quality enhancement projects in China. Government 
agencies at all levels, central, provincial, and local, have paid great attention to the challenges of 
severe unemployment for fresh college graduates in China and are trying to end the 
discrimination and barriers that have occurred in the early labor market for fresh college 





elimination of discrimination of all forms when campus recruitment activities are held by 
employers and HEIs. New regulations forbid discriminations against female students, students 
with rural household registrations and students with lower levels of education attainment, and 
this is the first time that the discrimination against the students in certain college quality types is 
officially regulated: “The job recruitment advertisements that include the keywords such as 
“985” and “211” are strictly forbidden.” In other words, the government calls for the equal 
treatment of college students from institutions of various qualities. It reflects the government’s 
concern that non-elite college students are at a disadvantaged position when job hunting. 
Graduates from non-elite college are less likely to find jobs simply due to the less prestigous 
college names of HEIs students attended, not because of graduates’ lower working productivity. 
Based on the key findings of this study, evidence is found to support the disadvantageous initial 
job recruitment situation for non-elite college students. The findings also suggest that the 
influence of college quality discrimination may go beyond initial employment status. It is more 
evident for the equalities in starting salaries as supported by solid evidence in this study. The 
government may consider avoiding forming a hierarchy in any visible or invisible way in the 
early labor market in which elite-college students take the superior job placements while 
non-elite students take the inferior job placements. Policy makers may face tradeoffs when 
making policies that exploit the existence of the heterogeneous effect of college quality. The 
perfect sorting of students with high abilities into colleges with favorable backgrounds would 
exacerbate the future earning inequalities in the labor market, while inefficient sorting could 
result in lower student quality and poor college performance. The imperfect sorting may stem 
from the regional disparity in elite college enrollment opportunities and abuses of institutional 





6.3 Limitations and Future Research Suggestions 
 Despite the effort to undertake a sound study, this dissertation still suffers from a number of 
limitations. Further research should be conducted to adjust for these deficiencies and to gain 
in-depth understandings in this field of study.  
 The first and the most obvious caveat is the data quality. The data is self-reported. Although 
tremendous efforts have been devoted to collect concrete input-based college quality indicators, 
the missing rates for some key input indicators such as the teaching expenditure per student and 
the faculty-student ratio are still high, and no missing data treatment procedure has been 
approved to be the proper cure thus far. Therefore, the results are mitigated by the data 
deficiency at college level. Furthermore, because part of the raw data is not accessible, the input 
indicators are calculated and reported by self-calculations in different HEIs from different 
sources, which raises the suspicion of inconsistent metrics used in these sources to some extent. 
Not satisfied with the limited input-based quality measures used in this study, I believe that 
additional investigation should be continued to find better and comprehensive measures of 
college quality that well capture the essence of quality. It is a pity that the process-related college 
quality measures were denied access for this study. Otherwise, it is interesting to look at how 
students gain knowledge and human capital stock in colleges through various engagement 
activities and how these activities are related to the labor market outcomes. Qualitative research 
can also be designed to shed light on the college dynamics and mechanisms for college quality to 
have impacts.  
 Second, given the timeline to conduct the survey, there would be a higher proportion of fresh 
graduates who have not received any job offers compared with U.S. studies that typically collect 





study when we draw inferences for these time-variant labor market outcomes. This study focuses 
on the early labor market outcomes. The estimation results from the early labor market may not 
be generalized to other contexts in a person’s lifetime. Further research is needed to track the 
sampled students and to check the reliability of the results due to the fact that the returns to 
college quality might be fully exhibited in one’s mid- or late-career. The heterogeneity of the 
impact of college quality may also present with survey data that include college graduates with 
many years of work experience. 
 Third, the internal and external validity of the identification strategies is subject to potential 
threats. We need to satisfy the assumptions for the PSM and IV strategies to work. If we have 
more detailed information about how the government policies are implemented and how colleges 
operate, we can run falsification tests to verify the validity of the IV such as the exogeneity and 
exclusion restriction conditions or to better control for the selection bias. Moreover, this study 
fails to incorporate the sampling weight in the PSM procedure. The PSM results are unweighted. 
The estimations should be interpreted with caution. Future research should be done to address 
these issues and to produce more convincing results. With recent reforms and developments of 
HEIs, it seems promising that China’s higher education system will improve its transparency and 
accountability soon so that future studies on this research topic will produce results with greater 
precision and reliability. 
 Fourth, this study only addresses the potential sample selection problem within the 
“Intention-to-work” sample. There might exist other kinds of sample selections so that the 
sample under examination in this study is unable to represent all four-year college students in 
China. For example, by design, college dropouts are not present in the sample. Further research 





the findings. Future work might also want to explore the determinants of students’ 
post-graduation plans and intentions to better understand why students choose to work or pursue 
further studies. 
 Fifth, this study cannot explain why there is a college quality effect. It may due to the human 
capital accumulation, the signaling effect, social networking, or through other ways. Thus, the 
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Appendix 1: Data Collection and Calculation for Input-based College Quality Indicators 
Input-based College Quality 
Indicators 
Data Collection Sources Data Calculation 
Faculty-student ratio If the student-faculty ratio is reported in the 2011 Annual 
Undergraduate Teaching Quality Report, take the inverse of 
it. 
If it is not reported in the annual report, use the value 
reported from 2011 institutional survey by Tsinghua 
University. 
When there is a conflict, priority is given to the data 
reported by the official annual teaching quality report. 
The student-faculty ratio equals the total number of 
full-time equivalent teaching faculties divided by 
all the full-time equivalent students. 
(Note: the calculation may vary across HEIs 
although the Ministry of Education has the 
calculation guidance on this indicator. For example, 
1 undergraduate student = 1.5 master’s student = 2 
doctoral student.) 
 
Proportion of faculty members with 
doctoral degrees 
If the proportion is reported in the 2011 Annual 
Undergraduate Teaching Quality Report, use it. 
If it is not reported in the annual report, use the proportion 
calculated with data reported in 2011 institutional survey by 
Tsinghua University. 
When there is a conflict, priority is given to the data 
reported by the official annual teaching quality report. 
The proportion of faculty members with doctoral 
degrees equals the number of teaching faculties 
with doctoral degrees divided by the number of 
teaching faculties with at least a master’s degree. 
(Note: Most faculty members in Chinese HEIs have 
a master’s or higher educational degree. The 
majority of HEIs have only recruited new teachers 
with Ph.D. degrees in recent years.) 
Average freshman NCEE score The 2007 freshman NCEE score on the Sunshine NCEE 
Information Platform back-office supported by the Ministry 
of Education 
The raw student score is the 2007 freshman NCEE 
score rescaled to 0-100 by province and by 
academic track (science and liberal arts) in all 
provinces except Jiangsu province due to 
unavailability. 
Then, the average freshman NCEE score is 
calculated by taking the average of the raw data. 
Teaching expenditure per student 2011 Annual Undergraduate Teaching Quality Report The sum of teaching-related operational cost per 
undergraduate student and special funding per 
undergraduate student in 2011.  
(Note: Special funding includes the funding that is 









Appendix 2: Results From the SES Index Construction Process 
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics
a
 
 Mean Std. Deviation Analysis N 
lnfaminc 10.5186 .83543 5231 
lnresarea 4.6866 .39662 5231 
Mother's years of schooling 9.7541 3.89198 5231 
Father's years of schooling 10.9011 3.39531 5231 
resrural .46 .499 5231 
resordinary .25 .434 5231 
hous_manager .14 .351 5231 
hous_professional .17 .374 5231 
hous_ordstaff .16 .364 5231 
hous_farmworker .48 .500 5231 
hous_gov .10 .297 5231 
hous_inst .19 .389 5231 
hous_pub .15 .360 5231 
hous_servsale .25 .431 5231 
Note: a. Only cases for which etr_sescase = 0 are used in the analysis phase. 
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix
a,b
 






lnfaminc 1.000 .057 .396 .383 -.461 .365 
lnresarea .057 1.000 -.089 -.040 .227 -.127 
Mother's years of 
schooling 








Father's years of 
schooling 
.383 -.040 .620 1.000 -.454 .271 
resrural -.461 .227 -.487 -.454 1.000 -.535 
resordinary .365 -.127 .319 .271 -.535 1.000 
hous_manager .309 .008 .348 .407 -.348 .200 
hous_professional .248 -.040 .320 .335 -.266 .140 
hous_ordstaff .145 -.105 .166 .168 -.257 .140 
hous_farmworker -.325 .025 -.333 -.313 .415 -.259 
hous_gov .194 .019 .240 .281 -.227 .105 
hous_inst .248 -.025 .320 .354 -.292 .130 
hous_pub .237 -.026 .323 .365 -.257 .109 
hous_servsale .158 -.078 .067 .041 -.226 .163 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
lnfaminc  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
lnresarea .000  .000 .002 .000 .000 




.000 .000 .000 
Father's years of 
schooling 
.000 .002 .000 
 
.000 .000 
resrural .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 
resordinary .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
hous_manager .000 .279 .000 .000 .000 .000 
hous_professional .000 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 
hous_ordstaff .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
hous_farmworker .000 .036 .000 .000 .000 .000 
hous_gov .000 .080 .000 .000 .000 .000 








hous_pub .000 .030 .000 .000 .000 .000 










lnfaminc .309 .248 .145 -.325 .194 
lnresarea .008 -.040 -.105 .025 .019 
Mother's years of schooling .348 .320 .166 -.333 .240 
Father's years of schooling .407 .335 .168 -.313 .281 
resrural -.348 -.266 -.257 .415 -.227 
resordinary .200 .140 .140 -.259 .105 
hous_manager 1.000 .087 .013 -.330 .472 
hous_professional .087 1.000 -.030 -.272 .093 
hous_ordstaff .013 -.030 1.000 -.233 .164 
hous_farmworker -.330 -.272 -.233 1.000 -.219 
hous_gov .472 .093 .164 -.219 1.000 
hous_inst .295 .487 .167 -.272 .096 
hous_pub .213 .550 .085 -.251 .129 
hous_servsale -.018 -.034 .239 -.198 -.046 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
lnfaminc .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
lnresarea .279 .002 .000 .036 .080 
Mother's years of schooling .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Father's years of schooling .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
resrural .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
resordinary .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 








hous_professional .000  .014 .000 .000 
hous_ordstaff .175 .014  .000 .000 
hous_farmworker .000 .000 .000  .000 
hous_gov .000 .000 .000 .000  
hous_inst .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
hous_pub .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 




 hous_inst hous_pub hous_servsale 
Correlation 
lnfaminc .248 .237 .158 
lnresarea -.025 -.026 -.078 
Mother's years of schooling .320 .323 .067 
Father's years of schooling .354 .365 .041 
resrural -.292 -.257 -.226 
resordinary .130 .109 .163 
hous_manager .295 .213 -.018 
hous_professional .487 .550 -.034 
hous_ordstaff .167 .085 .239 
hous_farmworker -.272 -.251 -.198 
hous_gov .096 .129 -.046 
hous_inst 1.000 .600 .033 
hous_pub .600 1.000 -.099 
hous_servsale .033 -.099 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
lnfaminc .000 .000 .000 
lnresarea .033 .030 .000 








Father's years of schooling .000 .000 .002 
resrural .000 .000 .000 
resordinary .000 .000 .000 
hous_manager .000 .000 .102 
hous_professional .000 .000 .006 
hous_ordstaff .000 .000 .000 
hous_farmworker .000 .000 .000 
hous_gov .000 .000 .000 
hous_inst  .000 .009 
hous_pub .000  .000 
hous_servsale .009 .000  
Note: a. Only cases for which etr_sescase = 0 are used in the analysis phase. 
b. Determinant = .019 
 
Table 3. KMO and Bartlett's Test
a
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .805 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 20618.685 
df 91 
Sig. .000 
Note: a. Only cases for which etr_sescase = 0 are used in the analysis phase. 
 
Table 4. Total Variance Explained
a
 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 4.249 30.351 30.351 4.249 30.351 30.351 
2 1.647 11.763 42.114 1.647 11.763 42.114 








4 1.033 7.380 58.968 1.033 7.380 58.968 
5 1.004 7.169 66.137 1.004 7.169 66.137 
6 .780 5.574 71.711    
7 .716 5.116 76.827    
8 .643 4.593 81.420    
9 .603 4.307 85.727    
10 .558 3.984 89.711    
11 .382 2.725 92.436    
12 .375 2.679 95.115    
13 .371 2.652 97.767    
14 .313 2.233 100.000    
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a
 
a. Only cases for which etr_sescase = 0 are used in the analysis phase. 
 




1 2 3 4 5 
lnfaminc .625 -.159 .067 .067 .415 
lnresarea -.120 .244 .377 .597 .562 
Mother's years of schooling .723 -.019 .064 -.170 .049 
Father's years of schooling .729 .065 .139 -.099 .004 
resrural -.739 .333 .107 .202 -.053 
resordinary .514 -.397 -.109 -.319 .317 
hous_manager .568 -.001 .577 -.040 -.110 
hous_professional .541 .517 -.324 -.026 .088 
hous_ordstaff .307 -.396 -.210 .464 -.466 
hous_farmworker -.602 .153 .010 -.275 -.001 








hous_inst .606 .439 -.261 .200 -.131 
hous_pub .582 .571 -.234 .077 -.109 
hous_servsale .168 -.565 -.357 .378 .105 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a,b
 
a. 5 components extracted. 
. Only cases for which etr_sescase = 0 are used in the analysis phase. 
 
 
